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A VOYAGE OF THE IMAGINATION
by
David G. Hodgdon 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1996
In this dissertation I contend that there is a strong connection between 
critical thinking and the imagination, a connection which increases the dynamism 
and vitality of critical thinking. By acknowledging a role for the imagination, we 
are able to form a more coherent and complete critical thinking conception, which 
leads to the positing of a new theory of critical thinking. This new conception has 
pedagogical implications demanding that we alter or augment current approaches 
to critical thinking instruction.
Employing a conceptual analysis, I first focus on critical thinking 
conceptions found on a continuum from traditional conceptions, which focus on 
logic and argument analysis, to expanded conceptions, which are more eclectic 
and admit a role for the affective as well as the cognitive. In order to focus on the 
nature of the imagination, which I argue plays an important role especially in 
expanded conceptions of critical thinking, I examine first the philosophical and 
then the literary conceptions of the imagination, specifically considering the 
arguments by the philosophers Edward Casey and Mary Wamock and the writers 
William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Wallace Stevens. These 
philosophers and writers reveal an imagination characterized by a connection to
xi
creativity, the capacity to construct meaning, the generation of potentially 
unending possibilities, the capacity to enable the emotions to emerge and coexist 
with rationality. Other writers and literary theorists like Samuel Johnson, Toni 
Morrison, and Deanne Bogdan alert us to the epistemological and moral dangers 
of the imagination, dangers which need to be acknowledged and addressed in 
order to allow for the imagination to fully enrich and enhance critical thinking.
The new conception of critical thinking, which I call integrative critical 
thinking, fully employs the imagination to generate a variety of possible avenues 
for our thinking and our conclusions, evokes emotions held in creative tension 
with reason, envisages a conclusion (or conclusions) to one's thought process and 
the means to reach those conclusions, and allows for creativity during the critical 
thinking process. Integrative critical thinking incorporates criticism and judgment, 
but also recognizes that critical thinking occurs in and is affected by a social 
context. This conception integrates the three enduring approaches (knowledge, 
skills, and dispositions) to critical thinking and opens up the critical thinker not 
only to envision a liberated state of mind and being but also to act on that vision.
1CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Philip was a critical thinker. I  first met him when we were in 
undergraduate courses together. I  was in awe o f his thinking abilities. He seemed 
to operate cognitively at a level above the rest o f  us, even though I  believe that 
many o f us were viewed as effective thinkers.
We could discuss the role o f genius in examining individuals like Philip - 
people who excel to a degree unimaginable by their peers. Philip would dismiss 
the claim that his critical thinking had anything to do with genius. I f  individuals 
like him had a critical thinking genius (a natural or innate talent or inclination), 
he reasoned, then it would be much easier to dismiss critical thinking instruction 
in schools and there would be little incentive fo r  improving one's own thinking.
He firmly believed that his critical thinking abilities were not innate but learned 
through the observation o f effective models o f critical thinking and the instruction 
o f challenging teachers. He zealously strove to encourage those with whom he 
associated to discover their own critical thinking ability. The ability to think 
effectively, according to Philip, was an empowering experience fo r  him because 
this process gave him the tools to address issues and to contribute to the 
community in which he lived.
I  often thought that Philip saw his life as a series o f ongoing critical 
thinking exercises. Because he and I  became close friends, I  gained more insight 
into his thought processes than most individuals. Philip seldom acted 
precipitously. He studied and reflected on a problem, situation, or issue. I
2remember when Philip was selecting a university to pursue his graduate studies. 
He established certain minimal criteria that a college would need to meet and 
weighed the pros and cons o f selecting specific colleges according to the programs 
they offered, the professors teaching the courses, the location o f the college, the 
school's facilities, and much more. He envisioned scenarios he might encounter 
and the environment he would experience while he was engaged in his studies and 
dealing with the stress o f graduate work, trying to connect his own vision o f an 
ideal graduate school with the reality o f the colleges he was considering. He 
reflected on every piece o f information he received -from catalogues, 
conversations with friends and acquaintances, interviews, and visits to the 
campuses. His thinking was always aimed at the culmination o f the critical 
thinking process - a decision about which graduate school to attend - and his 
imagination was helping him to envision the problem in different ways in order to 
reach a decision. The imagination was providing him with a vehicle fo r  moving 
toward his goal without settling on only one means o f getting there.
He saw reflection as an analytical process, in which he appraised and 
reappraised situations and looked back at previous situations that might cast light 
on the current situations. In selecting a graduate school, he particularly reflected 
on his experiences when he was selecting his undergraduate college to ensure that 
he learned from his mistakes, remembering the valuable advice and suggestions he 
received during that process. When he saw a problem, he deliberated - analyzing 
the problem, considering it from different angles, looking at the myriad 
possibilities fo r  casting the problem and solving it, and deciding on a course o f  
action seemingly suitable at the particular moment.
What I  found fascinating was his ability to gain energy and insight from the 
wisdom and passion o f others. Critical thinking fo r  Philip was seldom an action 
in isolation but a shared experience which helped to build a community o f support
3around him. During the process o f deciding on a university, he drew each o f us 
into the critical thinking process. Our minds were engaged in the problem as he 
posed questions and discussed the results o f his reflection. He encouraged us to 
envision possibilities and to offer counterarguments to his own proposals. He 
continually relayed to us more than simply the facts he had uncovered; he painted 
a picture o f each university and the life o f a student in it. Many o f us were drawn 
into this image-making process and began to modify the pictures Philip 
envisioned. Philip seemed to welcome this interactive process and the insights it 
offered him about the colleges. During the time we were engaged in this activity 
with Philip we were building a spirited, cooperative, inquiring community that not 
only enabled Philip to make a choice, but also enhanced our thinking and 
modified the way we made decisions. Philip once confided to me that he could 
make decisions much quicker i f  he did not spend so much time reflecting and 
engaging others in the critical thinking process, but he truly believed that the 
outcome justified the time he invested.
The ability to think critically is the focus of this dissertation. I believe that 
educators can and must enable young people to be effective thinkers not only in 
academic settings but more importantly in everyday life settings. I underscore the 
necessity for critical thinking instruction because, like Philip, I believe that 
effective critical thinkers can develop the facility to critically address their own 
affairs and can have a positive impact on their peers and their society. In the 
portrait of Philip we have a sense that critical thinking is more than a process of 
constructing and analyzing arguments. It is a dynamic process in which the mind 
seeks various methods of achieving its goal of solving a problem, making a 
decision, or exploring an issue.
As an educator, especially as an English teacher, I have often wondered 
how to make critical thinking more useful and compelling for students, how to
4connect the works of creativity (such as literature) students experience in the 
classroom and the critical thinking they are encouraged to use in analyzing a work 
of literature. As a person responsible for curriculum development school-wide, I 
have often wondered how to encourage critical thinking in all classrooms, as well 
as outside of classrooms. I have pursued these questions for a number of years.
In this dissertation I develop the story of a relationship between two 
seemingly unlikely partners in the mind - critical thinking and the imagination. 
This study is a departure from current studies on critical thinking. Even though 
imagination and reason have been, each of them, extensively studied and either 
connected or contrasted, few theorists have focused on the role of imagination as a 
dynamic specifically in critical thinking. In this study I construct a conception of 
critical thinking that allows for the passion, richness, and meaningfulness of 
critical thinking for use not only in academic settings but in everyday situations as 
well. In this dissertation I contend that there is a necessary connection between 
critical thinking and the imagination, a connection which increases the dynamism 
and vitality of critical thinking. By acknowledging a role for the imagination, we 
form a more coherent and complete critical thinking conception, which leads to 
the positing of a new theory of critical thinking. This new conception has 
pedagogical implications demanding that we alter or augment current approaches 
to critical thinking instruction.
The Problem of the Dissertation
The central problem in education that prompts this dissertation is what I 
shall call the use problem: that is to say, students fail to use critical thinking in 
their everyday lives. As an educator who has taught and served as an 
administrator in several high schools and school districts, I have found critical
5thinking a nearly universal concern for teachers and administrators alike. The 
ability to think critically can be found in almost every high school curriculum 
guide and is normally a part of a school's philosophy and objectives. Teachers 
acknowledge the critical thinking problem, which they observe in their classrooms 
and in contexts outside the school, since few adults think critically in any 
consistent way. Some teachers dismiss critical thinking as too vast a problem for 
them to address, too nebulous a concept to teach in the schools, or something 
inherently possessed by some individuals and not others and therefore incapable of 
being taught. These teachers retreat to the teaching of their subject areas and tend 
to ignore the problem of critical thinking. Most teachers, however, do recognize 
the problem and believe they can and must address it. They tend to do this by 1) 
offering a rich and engaging curriculum; 2) extracting thinking skills, teaching 
them separately, and then highlighting them in a context; and/or 3) creating a 
context in the classroom in which students interact, make decisions, and solve 
problems.
Critical thinking theorists as well as teachers and administrators also 
recognize the problem of young people and their adult counterparts failing to use 
critical thinking in their everyday lives. Their failure to use it appears often to 
result from either a lack of motivation or an inability to use critical thinking in a 
variety of contexts (or a combination of these two causes). In either case the result 
is the same, because we do not see its widespread adoption. Most of the major 
theorists acknowledge the motivational problem and attempt to address it by 
adding dispositions to their conceptions of critical thinking. In his work Richard 
Paul (1990) has outlined positive dispositions and methods to overcome our 
natural disinclination to think critically. Because we tend to be closeminded rather 
than openminded and nonreflective rather than reflective, we must foster critical 
thinking not only as a way of thinking but also as a way of life. Robert Ennis
6(1962) and Barry Beyer (1987, 1988) believe that a more precise identification of 
critical thinking skills will solve the problem, since they believe that 
decontextualized skills can transfer to contexts other than the classroom, including 
everyday life. Nevertheless, both of them also introduce dispositions to address 
the motivational problem. Ennis' most recent definition of critical thinking (Ennis, 
1985), for example, incorporates the disposition of reflective thinking and the 
"aspects" he identifies in his conception include not only skills but also 
dispositions.
Even John McPeck (1981, 1990), the theorist most committed to a 
knowledge-based conception of critical thinking, accepts a role for the 
development of dispositions when he posits a critical component to support his 
knowledge component of critical thinking. However, McPeck is unusual among 
the theorists discussed above in that he believes students fail to use critical 
thinking in everyday life not only because they are not disposed to do so, but also 
because they are unable to do so. They are unable to do so, he believes, first, 
because traditional conceptions of critical thinking, which he equates with 
argument analysis, focus on reconstructing past reasoning and on argument 
validity rather than on the truth of evidence. Second, because McPeck believes 
the knowledge component is paramount in critical thinking, he claims students 
cannot use critical thinking in their everyday lives as a result of critical thinking 
training in schools unless individuals have knowledge appropriate to the situation 
in which the thinking occurs.
I agree with many of the contentions of the theorists above, although I do 
not believe they go far enough in addressing the problem of using critical thinking 
in everyday life. Each addresses the motivational problem by introducing the 
development of dispositions into a critical thinking conception. Each addresses 
the problem of conceptualizing critical thinking by focusing on a particular
7approach to critical thinking. These standard approaches can be limiting in 
everyday life. What I am positing is a theory that draws from and integrates the 
three approaches to critical thinking (the knowledge, skills, and dispositions 
approaches), eschews dichotomies (especially between thought and emotion), and 
acknowledges and draws upon the creative, generative, and constructive qualities 
of critical thinking. The element of critical thinking that I believe is overlooked in 
conceptions of critical thinking is the imagination. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I define the imagination as the mental projection of possibilities, 
which transcend time and space and offer what could be rather than what is. The 
imagination is the element in our thinking that I believe enables critical thinking to 
expand beyond its traditional conception. The imagination can deepen, intensify, 
and enlarge our experiences and our thinking. It, therefore, can empower 
reasoning to employ all three approaches to critical thinking to solve problems and 
make decisions, allow emotion to support and provide the motivation for critical 
thinking use in multiple contexts, spark the creative impulse to serve critical 
thinking, and allow us to envision possibilities that enable solutions within the 
critical thinking process.
Verification of a Conceptual Question:
Is Imagination a Dynamic in Critical Thinking?
In this dissertation I argue for a particular conception of critical thinking. I 
believe that the dynamic in critical thinking that makes it generative, creative, and 
constructive is the imagination. It is a concept not wholly synonymous with logic 
and argumentation, although both are a part of critical thinking, but one that also 
has generative, creative, and constructive qualities that are useful for and energize 
everyday thinking. In order to fully understand this conception of critical 
thinking, then, I must examine and understand the nature of the imagination,
8which is often set in opposition to critical thinking and the closely related concept 
of reason. Of primary usefulness in this investigation are the inquiries of 
philosophers like Edward Casey and Mary Wamock and the reflections of writers 
like William Wordsworth, Wallace Stevens, and Toni Morrison on the imagination, 
individuals who reveal a world “ever unfolding, as long as one can imagine its 
possibilities.. . ” (Dove, 1995, p. 17).
Is the imagination truly a dynamic in critical thinking? The question is not 
solely a factual one; we cannot clearly and unequivocally answer it with a series of 
factual responses as we can if we ask which teachers teach critical thinking. Nor 
is it a question of value, since it is not a question of right or wrong as is the 
question about the danger of teaching critical thinking to young people. It is more 
often regarded as a conceptual question, one which will require conceptual 
analysis to answer it. Conceptual analysis, according to John Wilson (1966) in 
Thinking with Concepts, requires that we focus on the multiple uses of the 
concept, seeking examples to confirm the uses, considering counterexamples and 
related concepts, and posing hypothetical situations to find the limits of the 
concept. The process of conceptual analysis is designed to uncover the layers of 
meaning associated with a concept.
I will examine the concepts of critical thinking and the imagination, both of 
which have common ordinary definitions and technical accounts of them in 
academic discourse as well. Critical thinking, for example, has a philosophical 
heritage that goes back to Socrates and has often been associated with logic and 
argumentation, although contemporary educational theorists have developed more 
expanded conceptions of critical thinking than their predecessors. The 
imagination is used to describe myriad conditions from the creative impulse to the 
generation of pictures in the mind. It, too, has a long philosophical heritage, but 
our culture has also closely associated it with the production of art. This
9dissertation develops an analysis of the concepts of critical thinking and 
imagination as well as related concepts (such as perception and memory), an 
analysis which considers both their ordinary use and influential academic notions 
of them. Through this process I hope to delineate a more complete picture of the 
two concepts, which will afford us grounds for describing and recommending their 
connection in a new conception of critical thinking.
How will I know whether the two concepts are justifiably linked? To make 
the connection, I will need to do more than establish an operational definition from 
which to measure my observations and comments, since the concepts are much too 
complex to be reduced to a single operation or measurement, a concern that 
Michael Scriven (1988) shares as he too advocates for conceptual analysis whether 
or not the researcher establishes an operational definition. Rather, I intend to 
uncover relationships between critical thinking and imagination. One might 
compare this process to a case being built against a person on trial where no 
person witnessed the crime. The prosecution must systematically introduce 
circumstantial evidence linking the individual with the crime. The lawyer 
responsible for establishing such a case attempts logically to prove a person’s guilt 
by offering enough evidence to support the connection between the crime and the 
evidence and to address any questions raised by the defense attorney.
In this dissertation I am the prosecutor trying to offer the evidence to link 
critical thinking and the imagination and to demonstrate the dynamic of 
imagination in critical thinking. Some philosophers find the conceptual 
connections verified if they can be shown to consist of necessary and sufficient 
conditions; that is to say, if a series of links is identified connecting the 
imagination and critical thinking, each of which is necessary for that connection to 
be established and all of which offer sufficient reason to accept the connection. 
Although it would certainly be advantageous to this study if the imagination and
10
critical thinking could be explained by referring to necessary and sufficient 
conditions to verify my claims, many fruitful analyses (including mine) do not 
lend themselves to verification by calling on necessary and sufficient conditions.
The general argument of the dissertation, therefore, goes as follows:
P, Expanded conceptions of critical thinking exhibit certain significant 
characteristics.
P2 Each of these characteristics requires the use of the imagination.
Therefore, the imagination is a necessary part of expanded critical
thinking.
Moreover, in investigating the conceptions of critical thinking and the 
imagination, I discover more than simply the conceptual connections between 
these notions. I believe that, because the imagination’s role in critical thinking has 
not hitherto been fully explored or utilized, we also discover interesting ways in 
which the imagination can bolster critical thinking. Once we begin to explore the 
dynamic of imagination in critical thinking, we find that the imagination can free 
critical thinking to reach the potential its advocates have claimed for it.
The Argumentation of the Dissertation
In this dissertation I am developing an argument that constructs, chapter by 
chapter, a conception of critical thinking that acknowledges the presence of the 
imagination and discloses its role in making reasoning creative and generative.
The following is the line of thinking in the dissertation:
Chapter 2 focuses on the full continuum of critical thinking conceptions, 
emphasizing especially the philosophical perspective on critical thinking. The 
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that contemporary theorists have tried to 
expand the conception of critical thinking beyond the traditional conception,
11
because of their belief that the traditional conception, which generally focuses on 
logic and argumentation, is inadequate for developing young people's thinking 
abilities for use in multiple contexts (including use in everyday life). This chapter 
highlights some of the characteristics of these conceptions and leads into chapter 
3, which examines the way that these expanded conceptions have affected the 
three distinctive approaches to critical thinking. I argue that these expanded 
conceptions of critical thinking, which seem to be more generative, creative, and 
constructive than traditional conceptions, are connected to the imagination.
In chapters 4 and 5 I begin to uncover a conceptual connection between the 
imagination and critical thinking. If my hypothesis is that imagination is that part 
of our consciousness that makes critical thinking generative, creative, and 
constructive, then I need to focus on various conceptions of the imagination to 
determine if this is actually conceptually possible. I begin with philosophical 
conceptions of the imagination because philosophers try to place the imagination 
in the context of the whole mind and being, to analyze and address the tensions 
that tend to emerge in our conceptualizations of the mind, and to develop an 
overall conception of critical thinking. The purpose of these chapters is to prove 
that the imagination is indeed conceptualized as generative, creative, and 
constructive and that this conceptualization can be coherently connected with the 
expanded conceptions of critical thinking.
In chapters 6 and 7 I tease out the relationship between the imagination and 
creativity, reinforce the connections between the imagination and critical thinking 
in the previous chapters, and suggest new possibilities for critical thinking. If we 
correctly assume that the imagination is a generative, creative, and constructive 
capacity and that these creative qualities are important to expanded conceptions of 
critical thinking, then in order to better understand the creative nature of the 
imagination it makes sense to focus on artists' conceptions of the imagination. For
12
them the imagination is their lifeblood; they regularly, systematically even, rely on 
the imagination to create a work of art. Chapter 7, in particular, begins to explore 
how the connection between the imagination and critical thinking leads us toward 
a new conception of critical thinking, which will be explained in more detail in 
chapter 9.
The purpose of chapter 8. then, is to grapple with the problem that the 
imagination can have a deleterious effect in the mind and lives of individuals and 
to assert the possibility of the education of the imagination. The creativity we seek 
in critical thinking is intended to be positive, but there is of course the potential for 
the imagination to be used for evil or wrongdoing. Thus, we need to ask how we 
foster the positive rather than the negative imaginative capacity. In our 
examinations of the philosophical and literary imagination we see that reason is 
often viewed as controlling the more negative tendencies of the imagination.
Since critical thinking is often equated with reason, we need to explore more fully 
the ways in which theorists construe the relationship between imagination and 
reason. Specifically, we need to consider whether reason renders the imagination 
educable.
The purpose of chapter 9 is to argue for the advantages of this new 
conception of critical thinking. With the expanded conceptions of critical thinking 
explained and confirmed, the conceptual connection between critical thinking and 
the imagination established, and the need to educate the imagination to strengthen 
and balance critical thinking noted, I am ready to delineate my own conception of 
critical thinking, which I call integrative critical thinking. It is a critical thinking 
which draws on the imagination's generative, creative, and constructive powers to 
free the mind and to blur the distinctions among the three enduring approaches to 
critical thinking so as to enable them to operate in unison. I argue for the 
advantages of a new conception by showing that such a conception: 1) allows us
13
to integrate the three competing approaches to the teaching of critical thinking and 




THE EMANCIPATION OF CRITICAL THINKING
In June of 1983 the Kappan printed a pair of cartoons (Herzog, 1983) In 
the first we see a custodian removing the statue of Rodin's The Thinker, while a 
group of people are surrounding and admiring a new thinker, a computer. In the 
second cartoon we again see the statue of The Thinker overlooking a class of 
students sitting in rows, holding calculators, and watching a videotape entitled 
"Today: Thinking Skills." The message in these cartoons seems clear and 
disturbing: we are replacing our model for thinking - the reflective critical human 
being - with human-made machines, which ostensibly do the thinking for us.
Thus, we extol the virtues of "thinking" machines rather than our own critical 
thinking. We lose our sense of wonder of our own mind to explore, discover, and 
solve problems. The second cartoon suggests that students do not engage in 
active, critical thinking in their classes or schools, but rather sit passively and rely 
on pre-packaged thinking skills programs. In Rexford Brown's book, Schools of 
Thought (Brown, 1991), he calls these types of programs "talkinbout," a term 
coined by Brown and his fellow researchers because they saw much more talking 
about a subject like thinking than actually doing it; engaging in "a peculiarly stiff, 
jargon-ridden language of process, of how to do things" (p. 234) rather than a 
more open, natural, social process characterized by "mystery, uncertainty, 
disagreement, important questions, ambiguity, curiosity" (p. 234).
We might consider the cartoons instructive in another sense. Finding the 
best way to enable students to discover the ineffable qualities of critical thinking
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may have as much to do with the conceptualization of critical thinking as the 
method of instruction. Certain conceptions may more likely alienate students' 
thinking from their daily lives than others, mainly because some conceptions of 
critical thinking require much training within a particular logical framework and a 
separation from the social context in which thinking occurs. Operating within 
such frameworks has an effect similar to demanding that students master 
grammatical rules before they begin to write - many students will never engage in 
the act of writing. In the case of what I call narrow, specialized, academic 
conceptions of critical thinking, students may never discover the relevance of 
critical thinking to their lives and consequently will not use the tools for thinking 
in contexts other than the classroom.
Edward de Bono (1983) suggests that effective thinking needs to 
incorporate "generative, constructive, or creative elements" (p. 706) - elements 
which traditional conceptions of critical thinking, at first glance, overlook. We 
might compare this effective, generative thinking to generative transformational 
grammar. Like transformational grammar, which takes a set of rules to both 
generate and transform sentences and phrases consisting of a phonological surface 
structure and a semantic deep structure, critical thinking can generate and 
transform our thoughts both at the surface level manifested in our language and 
actions and at a deeper level from which the power and richness of our thinking 
comes.
In this chapter I examine the narrower traditional conceptions of critical 
thinking and show how theorists in almost all of the current approaches to 
teaching critical thinking attempt to reconceptualize critical thinking to make it 
more expansive and generative. I make a case that the reconceptualizations of 
critical thinking are more beneficial for educating young people, more useful in 
multiple contexts, and more likely to have an impact on the society in which
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critical thinkers live and act. This chapter explores the nature and shape of critical 
thinking and argues that critical thinking theorists have developed critical thinking 
conceptions, which render it a more expansive and generative mode of thought.
As we consider the pedagogical effects of expanded conceptions of critical 
thinking on the three significant instructional approaches to critical thinking, we 
find that advocates of initially quite distinctive approaches begin, in their enlarged 
conceptions, to integrate features of the other approaches.
The Critical Thinking Continuum
As happens with most attempts to classify a type of thinking, efforts at 
clarifying critical thinking have yielded multiple definitions, which tend to make 
the territory confusing. While critical thinking has a more limited focus than 
"higher-order thinking," an umbrella term incorporating such concerns as critical 
and creative thinking, problem solving, and strategies to challenge us to use our 
minds more expansively, in actuality we often speak of critical thinking and 
higher-order thinking in similar terms, since the definition of critical thinking has 
tended to expand over the years and the higher-order thinking conception has 
focused more on reasoning elements than the other subsets identified under the 
rubric of "higher-order thinking." Nevertheless, this study uses the "critical 
thinking" terminology because it denotes a more enduring and more commonly 
used label for the kind of thinking we hope to foster in education.
Placing the various conceptions of critical thinking on a continuum helps us 
to understand the relative relationships among the different conceptions and 
creates a typology or framework that will structure our later discussions. We may 
posit two possible continuums to situate various critical thinking theories. The 
first continuum is historical, placing critical thinking conceptions on a continuum
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from traditional conceptions associated with logic and argument analysis to more 
recent expanded conceptions influenced by ideological perspectives related to 
critical theory. Along the historical continuum we find critical thinking 
conceptions that focus on knowledge or content either to situate skills or to replace 
them and dispositions that provide the affective dimension to critical thinking to 
motivate critical thinkers to want to engage in the critical thinking enterprise.
The second continuum, which we may call a breadth continuum 
representing the scope of the conceptions of critical thinking, bisects the first, 
creating quadrants signifying the elements of knowledge or content, skills, 
dispositions, and the imagination. Narrow conceptions of critical thinking on this 
continuum focus on one of the elements - knowledge, skills, or dispositions.
Broad critical thinking conceptions are characterized by a combination of three or 
four elements and often incorporate the imagination. Conceptions at the middle of 
the continuum include some combination of two elements (such as skills and 
dispositions or knowledge and the imagination).
At one end of the historical continuum, which may be defined on the 
conceptual continuum as narrow, we observe conceptions that focus on logic and 
argument analysis and tend to dismiss the affective, emotional, generative 
elements of critical thought. They seem to be more concerned with the surface 
structure relating to the language of logic and argumentation than with the deep 
structure characterizing the complexity and "messiness" of our thought processes 
as they are affected by the emotions and the realities of our lives. They tend to be 
far more focused on retaining objectivity and neutrality - "a critical perspective on 
social norms requiring] a point of view neutral to particular social situations" 
(Hostetler, 1994, p. 135). I focus on conceptions of critical thinking inclined to 
this perspective in the next section of this chapter. In his earlier work Ennis serves 
as the most prominent example of a proponent of this conception of critical
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thinking.
At the other end of the historical continuum we see broader, more 
expansive conceptions, in which critical thinking admits both the cognitive and the 
affective, thought and emotion. These expanded conceptions, which may be 
located on the broad end of the conceptual continuum,incorporate knowledge, 
skills, and dispositions (along with the imagination, which we will discuss in 
chapters four and five). Those who hold these conceptions of critical thinking 
emphasize its usefulness in contexts other than academic ones. They recognize 
that critical thinking occurs in a social context. Some also acknowledge that 
politics, economics, and history all contribute to the features of that social context 
and influence our use of critical thinking. The contentions of theorists holding 
views at this end of the continuum are the focus of this dissertation, for I claim 
that, if we hope to develop critical thinkers who take action based on their 
thinking, we must have the educational framework - the theories - to foster this 
type of thinking in the various contexts in which these young people live. I call 
this type of thinking integrative critical thinking because it demands that we think 
critically by adopting new approaches that may vary radically from traditional 
approaches and represents a change in critical thinking induced by the 
acknowledgement that it occurs in a social context and is in part influenced by the 
dynamics that constitute that context. Integrative critical thinking does not dismiss 
logic as a part of critical thinking (certainly one of several aspects integrated in 
critical thinking), but it does recognize that logic has a more limited role in a fuller 
conception of critical thinking. As we explore these expanded conceptions of 
critical thinking in this chapter, we can locate Richard Paul's prominent theories as 
well as Karl Hostetler, Laura Kaplan, Kerry S. Walters, and Danny Weil at this end 
of the historical and conceptual continuums. The center of gravity of the 
conceptions of critical thinking developed by Richard Prawat, Matthew Lipman,
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Harvey Siegel, Michael Scriven, and Robert Ennis (in his more recent writings) 
draws closer to the midpoint of the continuums. Lipman's and Siegel's 
conceptions tend to lean toward the more expansive conceptions, while Scriven's 
and Ennis' conceptions lean toward more narrow, traditional conceptions.
Traditional Conceptions of Critical Thinking
As I have indicated, then, at what we might call the narrower, more 
traditional end of the continuum we find conceptions of critical thinking 
characterized by the absence of affective qualities, controlled by the rules of logic, 
and concerned with excluding the social context in which individuals engage in 
critical thinking, purportedly to ensure the "illusion" of objectivity and neutrality 
of this type of thinking. As philosophers have traditionally conceived it, critical 
thinking is associated with "the correct assessment of statements" (Ennis, 1962) or 
the"spotting of faults" (de Bono, 1983, p. 706). For Robert Ennis assessment of 
statements demands a mastery of logic. In his book, Logic in Teaching (Ennis, 
1969a), Ennis devotes an appendix to "Selected Texts from which Students Might 
Study about Clear and Critical Thinking." These critical thinking texts examine 
such areas as logical thinking, fallacies, the use of reason, and practical logic. In 
Ordinary Logic (Ennis, 1969b), he uses exercises from ordinary language, but 
continues to focus on formal logic and avoids practical problems. The testing 
program Ennis and Millman (1985) have developed views critical thinking as 
simply a matter of mastering logic. Undoubtedly the assessment of statements 
advocated by Ennis is a useful tool for individuals engaged in the critical thinking 
process, but it restricts our critical thinking to a relatively narrow, rule-driven 
approach that does not easily lend itself to non-academic contexts. In short it is 
hard to see how helpful such critical thinking would be in solving what Paul
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(1990) calls the important problems of everyday life.
John McPeck (1990) suggests that the focus of critical thinking as defined 
in this way is on argument analysis. But he argues that such a focus has limited 
value in everyday life because "argument analysis is always an ex post facto 
reconstruction of past reasoning" (p. 6) and because it purports "to determine the 
validity of arguments, not the truth of premises or evidence" (p. 6). I believe that 
McPeck focuses accurately on the problems with the conceptions of critical 
thinking proposed by Ennis and other similar theorists. His observations explain 
why critical thinking of this sort is not readily applied in other contexts, where our 
arguments must focus on present reasoning and on the evidence to support that 
reasoning. Although we may value this mental operation of correct assessment of 
statements in certain circumstances, McPeck emphasizes its narrowness and 
negativity; he reminds us that such thinking is bereft of the generative qualities so 
essential for reasoning in a person's daily life.
We find a response to these worries if we trace the evolution of the Cornell 
Critical Thinking Test under Ennis and Millman (1985), a test which in 1964 
focused solely on syllogistic reasoning and was later revised to accommodate an 
expanded conception of critical thinking, including a number of dispositions 
essential for the fostering of critical thinking. Ennis includes such dispositions as 
open-mindedness, locating and using credible sources, examining a number of 
points of view, stating a problem or question clearly, being objective, etc. He still 
recognizes the underpinning of logic, but acknowledges that critical thinking 
consists of more than argument analysis.
In his book on critical thinking entitled Reasoning. Michael Scriven (1976) 
also shifts away from syllogistic reasoning and employs only natural language in 
his accounts of critical thinking. He identifies the following seven useful steps for 
analyzing an argument:
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1. Clarify the meaning of the argument and its components.
2. Identify the stated and unstated conclusions.
3. Portray the structure of the argument.
4. Formulate the unstated assumptions.
5. Criticize the premises (given and "missing") and the inferences.
6. Introduce other relevant arguments.
7. Judge the argument in light of operations 1 through 6. (p. 39)
In this seven-step analytical model we may note some of the features associated 
with traditional conceptions of critical thinking, especially those related to the 
construction and judgment of an argument.
Nevertheless, Scriven (1976) emphasizes informal rather than formal logic, 
and he urges us to develop a sensitivity to the context in which argument analysis 
occurs. This sensitivity to context is especially important to a full conception of 
critical thinking, I believe, because it is the context that determines the meaning of 
our thinking. While Scriven adumbrates a more expanded conception of critical 
thinking, he fails to explore the different nature of various contexts and their 
effects on critical thinking. The analysis of arguments can serve the real purposes 
of making decisions, solving problems, and establishing beliefs. Although John 
McPeck (1981) commends Scriven for expanding his conception of critical 
thinking, he also notes that Scriven's seven-step model of reasoning is still 
virtually coextensive with logical reasoning. He observes that Scriven himself 
occasionally abandons his own thesis about the complexity of reasoning and 
equates reasoning with traditional argument analysis. I suspect that Scriven fails 
to honor the complexity of reasoning because the seven-step process he advocates 
limits complexity in order to prescribe a line of reasoning that follows a logical 
process rather than one that interacts with the context in which the reasoning 
occurs.
Although prescriptions for critical thinking may be useful in establishing a 
frame for the thought process, they have a tendency to make the process limiting.
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Whatever benefits we can obtain from the rigors of logic and argument analysis, 
the fact is that this conception of reasoning remains narrow, separates critical 
thinking from other types of thinking (such as creative thinking), is divorced from 
the social context in which thinking occurs, and focuses too much on skills to 
analyze and assess arguments. Accepting McPeck's argument that the skills 
involved are limited, not generalizable, and hence not usable for everyday 
thinking, theorists have offered several different reconceptualizations of critical 
thinking.
Expanded Conceptions of Critical Thinking
The sensed need to recast critical thinking as a more generative process 
useful in everyday life reasoning has encouraged theorists to expand their 
conceptions of critical thinking, to shift their emphasis from a narrow, logic-driven 
approach to one more usable in everyday situations and contexts. On the historical 
critical thinking continuum these conceptions lie on the more expansive end and 
tend to be broad on the conceptual continuum. In this section we first examine 
conceptions that more nearly fall at the center of the continuum and move on to 
consider increasingly expanded conceptions that adopt the use of "critical" as it is 
used in critical theory and critical pedagogy. My own conception of critical 
thinking, which I label integrative critical thinking, is situated at this end of the 
continuum. Its contours will become clearer as I explore other expanded 
conceptions of critical thinking.
Robert Ennis (1985) himself expands his own definition of critical thinking 
to incorporate "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to 
do or believe" (p. 54). He now, I think more correctly, defines critical thinking as 
more of an active process used by thinking individuals. Ideally, critical thinking 
occurs in the context of everyday life decisions, which we resolve through a
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rational, reflective process. Reflection, I believe, is a key component of critical 
thinking, a disposition which transforms "a situation in which there is experienced 
obscurity, doubt, conflict, disturbance of some sort, into a situation that is clean, 
coherent, settled, harmonious" (Dewey, 1933, pp. 100-101). Reflection helps to 
clarify our thinking, which is engaged by perplexity, to solve a problem. If we are 
"willing to endure suspense" during the reflective and critical thinking process and 
"to undergo the trouble of searching" (p. 16), we will be able to reach a powerful 
conclusion. Thus, I think Ennis is on the right track in including this element in an 
expanded definition of critical thinking.
No longer, then, is critical thinking viewed solely as a fault-finding (and 
often esoteric) process. It is primarily an operation useful to individuals in 
everyday life situations. Critical thinking is not simply a matter of recalling facts 
quickly but rather is a process in which we ponder alternatives before making 
choices and decisions or solving problems. In fact, Ennis (1987) contends that his 
revised definition of critical thinking does not preclude creativity that may 
generate alternatives, since "formulating hypotheses, alternative ways of viewing a 
problem, questions, possible solutions, and plans for investigating something are 
creative acts" (p. 10). We may disagree with Ennis' conception of creativity. 
Nevertheless, I believe that Ennis makes a valuable observation about the nature 
of critical thinking as a creative process. During reflective, critical thinking we 
hope to find a creative solution. We often hold up critical thinking, as Ennis has 
more recently begun to conceive it, as an ideal of education. We think it essential 
for citizens in a democratic society, individuals who, at least theoretically, share 
the task of governance.
Ralph H. Johnson (1992) identifies three problems with Ennis' revised 
definition - problems which need to be noted when considering Ennis' conception 
of critical thinking and conceptions of other theorists attempting to respond to the
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need to expand their critical thinking theories. The first is the network problem, 
according to Johnson. Johnson is suggesting that Ennis fails to sort out the 
relationships among a network of terms such as "problem solving, decision 
making, metacognition, rationality, rational thinking, reasoning, knowledge, and 
intelligence" (p. 41) - all related to critical thinking. The second is the scope 
problem, which focuses on the need to identify what critical thinking includes. 
Does it include actions as well as belief formation? Does it enter the realm of 
moral reasoning? The third problem deals with the issue of the proficiencies and 
tendencies that Ennis identifies and uses as the basis of his critical thinking test. 
Johnson asks where these proficiencies have come from and whether or not the list 
of proficiencies and skills is inclusive of all proficiencies and skills. Because 
Ennis tends to equate critical thinking with rationality, he encounters these 
problems, which result from extending his definition of critical thinking without 
significantly modifying his belief in the primacy of logic and argument analysis. 
Thus, he adds dispositions to his growing list of proficiencies, which reveal a 
problem with the scope of his definition and encourages people to question the 
relationship of the different terms he uses in order to justify the inclusion of 
additional proficiencies.
Ennis (1987) expands his own definition of critical thinking without losing 
the more rational elements of his original definition - elements which he regards as 
central to this concept, a belief which other writings of many contemporary 
theorists and researchers echo. Like Ennis, these advocates of expanded 
conceptions of critical thinking do not necessarily dismiss the more narrow 
conceptions (even though they move farther away from them than Ennis does), 
but, rather, they attempt to demonstrate that critical thinking incorporates much 
more than logical analysis and argumentation. I do not believe that Ennis goes far 
enough in acknowledging the various factors that influence and so become a part
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of critical thinking. His conception remains closer to the center of the historical 
and conceptual critical thinking continuums outlined earlier in this chapter; 
however, he has begun to deal with the concerns that our narrow 
conceptualizations of critical thinking keep us from fostering better thinkers who 
think critically throughout their lives. Other theorists, while accepting some of the 
expanded features inherent in his reconceptualization, move beyond Ennis' latest 
definition.
Initially Harvey Siegel (1988) seems to accept a narrow view of critical 
thinking when he declares it "coextensive with rationality" (p. 30). He contends 
that both critical thinking and rationality require "believing and acting on the basis 
of good reasons" (p. 30). In disagreeing with McPeck that critical thinking cannot 
be generalized for use in everyday life situations, he conceives of a type of critical 
thinking that offers more than simply a reaffirmation of the narrow conceptions of 
critical thinking that focus on logic and argumentation.
Siegel (1988) connects critical thinking with actions and beliefs by two 
different but central components of critical thinking - the reason assessment 
component, which emphasizes effective evaluation of reasons, and the critical 
spirit component, which focuses on the dispositions or habits needed to engage in 
reason assessment. Like Ennis, Siegel incorporates dispositions into his overall 
conception of critical thinking; however, he is more methodical about exploring 
the relationship between dispositions and reasoning than is Ennis. Siegel very 
carefully examines the connection between what he calls the critical spirit and the 
reason assessment components of critical thinking. Additionally, Siegel (1988), 
noting the mistaken stereotype of the critical thinker as an unfeeling automaton, 
insists that reasons and emotions must be connected because emotions provide us 
with the passions to engage in reason assessment. For Siegel the critical spirit 
component is a crucial element in fostering rational passions, which will make
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critical thinking a process adoptable in various situations. "Conceptions of the 
reasonable person as one without emotion," Siegel suggests, "and one who 'turns 
off her emotions while engaging in reason, are untenable" (p. 40). Thus he 
emphasizes emotions that foster and promote critical thinking.
We see that Siegel (1988) offers a conception of critical thinking that 
explains how we might empower critical thinking for use outside academic 
contexts. Unlike advocates of more traditional conceptions of critical thinking, 
Siegel acknowledges the role of emotions. When we accept a role for emotions, 
while still recognizing the central role of reason, we begin to construct a fuller 
conception of critical thinking, one which draws from the deep structure of 
thinking with all of its untidiness but with more of its power.
Once we introduce the emotions, however, we need to recognize, as Siegel 
(1988) does, that not all emotions are equally useful in critical thinking. Siegel 
focuses on what he believes are the more desirable emotions for critical thinking - 
rational passions. He accurately acknowledges the role of emotions, primarily 
because I believe they serve as a motivation for action and the development of a 
tendency to act in a certain way. These desirable emotions need to be fostered if 
we hope to ensure that we think critically. Thus, when a person is passionate 
about a cause such as the dangers of a nuclear power plant, she will often seek 
evidence and arguments from a variety of sources to support her own contentions. 
Without properly educating us to use these positive emotions, they may interfere 
with the actual use of critical thinking. The emotions, however, may be powerful 
enough to sustain an ongoing involvement in the issue being examined. In critical 
thinking the passions or emotions are directed toward the reasoning process. The 
emotions will give the person a desire to engage in critical thinking. It is the 
motivational nature of emotions that makes them important to critical thinking 
which individuals want and are able to use in multiple contexts. The motivational
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nature encourages a thinker to be reflective, as Ennis (1987) contends, and to 
discover creative solutions, as Perkins (1991) suggests. Siegel only begins to 
explore the role of emotions. I do not believe he addresses the issue of less 
desirable emotions and their effects on critical thinking, but he has offered insights 
into the emotions contributing to critical thinking, even though we do not gain 
insights into the extent to which positive emotions aid us in understanding the 
social context for critical thinking. Nor does Siegel acknowledge the extent to 
which the emotions diminish the neutral stance he seems to be seeking in his 
conception of critical thinking.
Matthew Lipman (1988), who supports the teaching of philosophy to young 
people, associates critical thinking with "skillful, responsible thinking that 
facilitates good judgment because it (a) relies upon criteria, (b) is self-correcting, 
and (c) is sensitive to context" (p. 39). Although we can observe in this definition 
the rule elements of some of the more narrow, traditional conceptions of critical 
thinking like Ennis (1969a, 1969b) in his original notion about critical thinking, 
we also notice its more generative elements, as the young person monitors and 
corrects his or her own thinking (a metacognitive process) while recognizing the 
context in which that thinking occurs and adjusting accordingly. I believe that 
metacognition is akin to the reflective process that Ennis (1987) identifies in his 
later conceptualization of critical thinking; without reflection, which is an inward 
process with the intention of an outward action, we will not be metacognitive. We 
will not become aware of our thinking and correct it. One of Lipman's more 
valuable contributions is his emphasis on the context in which thinking occurs - an 
emphasis we were first introduced to in Scriven's conception of critical thinking. 
The context grounds critical thinking in actual situations and makes the process 
more meaningful by examining all of the implications of the context on critical 
thinking (namely, the cultural, political, and economic issues that influence our
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thinking).
Lipman (1988) believes in a broader definition of critical thinking than 
Ennis, at least for those trying to develop critical thinking in the schools and 
colleges. He claims Ennis' "outcomes (solutions, decisions, concept-acquisition) 
are too narrow, and the defining characteristics (reasonable, reflective) are too 
vague" (p. 38). Lipman himself designs a definition to "broaden the outcomes, 
identify the defining characteristics, and then show the connections between them" 
(p. 38). Through critical thinking, Lipman believes, we have the promise of 
intellectual empowerment - the promise of independent thinkers and learners - 
especially if we cultivate this type of thinking by engaging in "the raw subject 
matter of communication and inquiry" (p. 43).
Another influential critical thinking theorist, Richard Paul (1984), notes a 
distinction between two notions of critical thinking - critical thinking in a narrow 
or "weak" sense similar to that described as at the core of critical thinking, and 
critical thinking in a broader or "strong" sense - the type of critical thinking that 
Lipman (1988) and Siegel (1988) begin to define. In the weak sense, according to 
Paul, the thinker conceives of critical thinking as "'vocational' thinking skills" - a 
kind of "technical reasoning" not generative or transformative and therefore not 
likely to influence an individual's nature or her intellectual life. Paul's strong 
sense critical thinking, on the other hand, is generative and emancipating; it 
incorporates both the rational and emotional processes that Siegel identifies. Paul 
particularly emphasizes emotions related to egocentrism and sociocentrism that go 
beyond Siegel's rational passions. Strong sense critical thinking, as Paul conceives 
it, entails dialectical reasoning in which one considers a number of different 
viewpoints and weighs the results of their mutual interrogation. Paul claims that 
we require this sort of dialectical reasoning to ensure rational confidence and to 
develop intellectual, emotional, and moral integrity. Paul's conception of critical
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thinking moves us closer to an understanding of its social function, especially in 
enabling a person to function more ably in a democratic society.
Paul (1984) is one of the more prominent theorists discussed so far to have 
shifted the balance from a more skills-oriented approach to a dispositional 
approach. He seems to suggest that, if we can foster positive thinking 
dispositions, we will have motivated students to think critically. Paul goes farther 
than other theorists to discover qualities that will enable critical thinking to be 
used in a variety of contexts. He even goes so far as to suggest that critical 
thinking should become a way of life. Although a focus on dispositions is not a 
panacea for encouraging young people to use critical thinking in multiple contexts, 
Paul has focused our attention even more clearly on the role of dispositions to 
motivate critical thinking.
Social Construction of Critical Thinking As Currently Conceived
Although many other theorists contend that the development of critical 
thinking must occur in a social setting, in a community of thinkers, a direction 
which I believe expands on Lipman's notion of context (Lipman, 1988), this aspect 
of critical thinking and all of its implications for the use and teaching of critical 
thinking is just beginning to be broached in the literature on critical thinking. 
Richard Prawat (1991, 1993), for example, believes that the teacher best develops 
students' critical thinking in a community of thinkers drawing problems not just 
from one discipline but from several disciplines and from everyday life. He too 
insists that this content-area instruction should not separate the intellect from 
emotions (as many of the more narrow conceptions of critical thinking demand). 
Prawat avoids this separation by "immersing" and actively engaging students in 
grappling with what he calls "big ideas."
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In developing a nonobjectivist position (a non-neutral view about thinking 
in social situations), Karl Hostetler (1991) suggests that we foster critical thinking 
in "communal inquiry within and among particular forms of human life, not 
divorced from them. Objectivity is possible within such inquiry, but it is not 
achieved by reference to some perspective that is neutral to all views" (p. 1). The 
essence of critical thinking, he suggests, enmeshes divergent, non-neutral 
perspectives. Michael Apple also underscores the social nature of thinking. When 
asked about his definition of literacy, Apple defines thinking as "a dialogue, both 
with the past and with others at the same time. If you teach it as an individual 
thing, you miss the whole point. A higher literacy would be one that was 
eminently social" (Brown, 1991, p. 33). This dynamic conception of thinking 
acknowledges that the operations of the mind develop, expand, and refine 
themselves as we interact with others. In fact, the social context, I believe, allows 
the critical thinker to ground his or her reflection, creative thinking, and emotions 
by interacting with others. He or she is also able to modify and expand his or her 
ideas, to engage in conversations that may lead to alternative or differing ways of 
approaching problems or issues, and to discover an audience with similar or 
differing views about issues - possibly leading to Paul's dialogical thinking 
(Paul, 1991), in which the thinker identifies with the person who holds an opposing 
position. In a way, I am claiming that the community can significantly change the 
way the mind goes about approaching problems, issues, situations, and belief 
formation.
Critical thinking theorists have traditionally avoided or eschewed the notion 
of the "critical" as it is used in critical theory but a recent collection of essays on 
Re-Thinking Reason argues that new perspectives in critical thinking must be 
"grounded in experience as well as open to alternative ways of knowing, 
evaluating, and appraising" (Walters, 1994, p. 19) by being acutely aware of and
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critically acting on the social context. Some conceptions of critical thinking that 
acknowledge the social context focus on the need to "understand notions of the 
culture of power, domination, economics, educational equity, and the hidden 
curriculum in schooling" (Weil, 1994, p. 10). Danny Weil, for example, is 
concerned with developing a theory for an education for liberation by attending to 
and addressing the issues of power and domination, which have generally been 
absent in traditional conceptions (and some expanded conceptions) of critical 
thinking. Weil concludes that
we must bring our critical thinking to bear on the historical cultural 
assumptions that guide many of our actions, questioning the origin of 
these assumptions, the evidence on which they are based, the implications 
of their practice, and the interests they serve.. .  .[Critical thinkers are] 
conscious protagonists in the construction of a rational and compassionate 
culture and morality, (p. 17)
Although Weil (1994) emphasizes cultural literacy, his underlying 
theoretical framework is critical theory and critical pedagogy. The critical theory 
agenda is one of understanding and acting on the inequities inherent in the social 
context in which inquiry occurs. These inequities ought to be addressed through 
critical activities that allow the social, political, and ideological issues to emerge 
rather than accept unquestioningly the voices that tend to dominate. In recent 
years the critical issues of emancipatory thought have focused on race, gender, 
social class, and (more recently) sexual preference.
Laura Duhan Kaplan (1994) suggests that critical thinking as it is informed 
by critical pedagogy promotes intellectual autonomy by "decod[ing] the political 
nature of events and institutions" and by "envisioning] alternate events and 
institutions" (p. 217). In this collection Anne M. Phelan and James W. Garrison
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(1994) also seek to address the power and domination issues as they affect 
women's issues through a critical thinking that restores "the missing dialectical 
contrary, i.e., belief, in order to overcome the masculine gender biased dogma that 
currently defeats the dialectic of critical thinking" (p. 93).
Karen J. Warren (1994) addresses the critical thinking context from a 
feminist perspective. In her essay she examines patriarchical conceptual 
frameworks, which advocate an oppressive agenda of value-hierarchical thinking, 
value dualisms, and a logic of domination. She explores the features of 
patriarchical conceptual frameworks, features like the priority of the disposition of 
openmindedness, which from a feminist perspective may be cast as biased when 
viewed from a patriarchical framework. "A 'proper understanding' of 
'openmindedness'," according to Warren, "requires an understanding of the nature 
and power of conceptual frameworks, particularly patriarchical ones" (p. 169). All 
of these conceptions of critical thinking share a concern about the social context 
and the power and domination issues that accompany them (whether talking from 
feminist or multicultural perspectives). They do not avoid ideologies nor do they 
attempt to establish a neutral stance on these issues. Critical thinking should entail 
judgment and evaluation, but the personal and social context of one's thinking 
should always be considered.
Conclusion
I contend that the conceptions of critical thinking discussed in this chapter 
lead to thinkers who engage in more than academic exercises; they engage in real, 
untidy inquiries that are not reducible to neat premises and conclusions. As these 
critical thinking theorists move away from the narrow conceptions of critical 
thinking, they become less comfortable with dichotomies and binary thinking,
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especially with the dichotomy between thought and emotion, because such 
dichotomies tend not to exist in real world situations. Some seek to establish or 
restore a dialectic. Siegel (1988), Paul (1984), Prawat (1991, 1993), and to a 
certain extent Hostetler (1991) all share this discomfort and seem to search for a 
conception that will embrace both thought and emotion (or at least will allow the 
two to exist together despite the tension between them). Since theorists concede 
that we cannot divorce thinking from emotion, they tend to emphasize the social 
nature of thinking and demand application and use in the world in which thinkers 
live. Their more generative conceptions of critical thinking demand that the whole 
person, as an individual and member of a community, be acknowledged during the 
critical thinking process. Some theorists go so far as to contend that critical 
thinkers need to break down the political social context characterized by power 
and domination and envision alternatives. They believe that critical thinkers must 
recognize and challenge oppressive patriarchal agendas.
The integrative critical thinking I am trying to develop here, then, is 
engaged in by an individual who does not necessarily dismiss logical reasoning, 
but acknowledges that critical thinking is a much more complex and integrated 
process. Although it must rightly be viewed as a reasoning process, integrative 
critical thinking uses reflection to monitor the thinking process for self-correction 
in order to develop creative solutions. The integrative critical thinker recognizes 
the need to motivate individuals to engage in critical thinking, but acknowledges 
that many emotions other than those Paul (1991) and Siegel (1988) identify as 
rational passions must be accounted for if critical thinking is to become a way of 
life. This type of critical thinking will probably be fostered within a social 
context, a community of thinkers, where critical thinking is encouraged and 
individuals are supported during the thinking process.
The critical thinking I have highlighted in this chapter does not occur
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naturally. We learn critical thinking by interacting with individuals who model 
such thinking and by engaging in critical thinking activities in the classroom, 
especially designed to enable students to think better in their academic subjects. 
Since critical thinking is regularly associated with schools, where professionals 
have adopted it as one of their more prominent educational goals, we must be 
sensitive to the use of critical thinking in the school setting and the approaches 
teachers use to encourage students to think critically and effectively. It is 
particularly important to see the effects that various conceptions of critical 
thinking have on our instruction if we hope to instill critical thinking in young 
people. Chapter three focuses on the implications of alternate conceptions of 
critical thinking discussed in this chapter on our pedagogy.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF CRITICAL THINKING
A Classroom Example
In Ms. Alsop's English classroom, we can observe an evolution in the way 
she has fostered critical thinking in her students that parallels the movement from 
traditional to expanded conceptions o f critical thinking. When she originally 
conceived o f critical thinking in a traditional way, Ms. Alsop focused on the 
development o f logic and argumentation. She encouraged her students to study 
the language o f argumentation (both formal and informal) and to examine a 
number o f common fallacies like ad hominem. two-wrongs-make-a-right. straw 
man, and beseine the question. Students discovered these fallacies in the daily 
newspaper and speeches delivered by public officials. They also wrote their own 
arguments on contemporary issues like gun control, euthanasia, and nuclear 
power, arguments that fellow students and she would analyze. Ms. Alsop found 
that students varied in their ability to master the skills o f logic and argumentation, 
and even those who had mastered it showed little evidence o f using it in contexts 
other than her classroom.
Because o f her increasing dissatisfaction with this approach to critical 
thinking instruction, Ms. Alsop sought other ways to strengthen students' abilities 
to think in multiple contexts. As she attended workshops on this topic and read 
articles in educational journals, she expanded her views about critical thinking. 
She began to focus more on the classroom environment than on a series o f  skills
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(even though she continued to teach the art and craft o f developing and presenting 
an argument). Students were immersed in critical thinking activities, interacting 
with each other and the teacher to solve both hypothetical and real problems in 
the school and community. They were encouraged not simply to accept knowledge 
as delivered by an adult, but to discover the subject fo r  themselves. Ms. Alsop also 
came to regard herself less as the disseminator o f knowledge and more as a model 
and catalyst fo r  discovery, a person as much a learner as a teacher. Students 
shared their discoveries with others (both within the classroom and outside o f it) 
and explored in writing and oral expression other ways o f  synthesizing their ideas. 
During the process Ms. Alsop encouraged habits o f mind like openmindedness and 
self-reflection through both discussion and classroom interaction. She regarded 
this process o f discovery as continual - as a way o f life.
Ms. Alsop's evolution is similar to the changes that occur in many educators 
who have sought during the last several years to teach students to think critically. 
For some educating for critical thinking is a moral agenda. Such thinking is 
concerned with making us better citizens in a democratic society and enabling 
young people to establish beliefs which guide their actions throughout their lives. 
These lofty goals underscore the reasons for demanding that young people are 
taught to think critically and for expecting educators to incorporate it into their 
pedagogy. For others the reasons for teaching critical thinking are more mundane 
- namely, to enable students to think more effectively about the subject an 
instructor is teaching. Whatever the reasons, educators feel challenged to improve 
students' ability to think. The debate over critical thinking conceptions and their 
pedagogical implications exists and is ongoing, mainly because of the lack of 
evidence that students are thinking effectively. In this chapter I focus on the 
knowledge, skills, and dispositions approaches to the teaching of critical thinking 
and identify the effects of alternate conceptions of critical thinking on these
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approaches in particular and critical thinking instruction in general. Traditional 
conceptions of the knowledge or skills approach are narrow on the conceptual 
continuum outlined in chapter two, because they focus on a single element or 
approach to the exclusion of others. Expanded conceptions of the knowledge or 
skills approach are broad on the conceptual continuum, because they emphasize 
the integration of the three approaches (and include the imagination, as we will see 
beginning with the next chapter).
Integrative Critical Thinking and Pedagogy
As Ms. Alsop expanded her views about critical thinking, she moved closer 
to accepting a conception of critical thinking that I call integrative critical 
thinking. Integrative critical thinking inherits much from both senses of the word 
"critical" examined in this chapter and the previous one. Evaluation and judgment 
are certainly important to critical thinking, but the notion of objectivity and 
neutrality is replaced by a recognition that evaluation must be seen in terms of 
biases and ideologies formed in a social context constructed by domination, 
power, and cultural history. "Critical" in this sense is associated with the "critical" 
in critical theory. Closely associated with critical theory is critical pedagogy, 
which is constituted of instructional approaches to put into effect critical theory 
and which helps to inform our understanding of critical thinking. Critical theory 
requires an educational process that fosters reflection, which is combined with 
action "enlivened by a sense of power and politics" (Beyer and Apple, 1988, p. 4). 
This reflective action may be undermined by a hidden curriculum, which tends to 
maintain the existing power structure of society. Those who are educating for 
critical thinking must critically examine the hidden curriculum in a newly formed 
context, in which individuals interact and respect each other's perspective.
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An integrative critical thinking pedagogy has a strong connection with 
critical pedagogy in that it seeks to inform critical thinking instruction with a sense 
of the context in which critical thinking occurs and provides young people with 
the tools to understand that context as they are making judgments and evaluations; 
however, integrative critical thinking pedagogy cannot forego an exploration of 
the enduring thinking approaches to the teaching of critical thinking - approaches 
which provide a framework for critical thinking instruction and which have 
developed a separate line of research from critical pedagogy. The approaches 
focus on knowledge, skills, and dispositions, some of which emerge in the account 
of Ms. Alsop's classroom, where we observe an evolution in her conception of 
critical thinking and her instructional approach.
Teaching the Skills of Critical Thinking
Traditional conceptions of the skills approach. If a teacher like Ms. Alsop 
adopts a particular conceptualization of critical thinking in the classroom, then her 
approach to instruction will often be determined by the conception. In the case of 
a traditional conception of critical thinking that emphasizes logic and 
argumentation, the teacher is more likely to teach the skills needed to use logic and 
argumentation than to emphasize either the teaching of a content area without the 
explicit instruction of skills or to consciously foster the disposition of thinking. 
When Ms. Alsop first started to teach critical thinking, for example, she focused 
on the teaching of the skills of logic and argumentation. In this traditional, narrow 
approach to the teaching of critical thinking, dispositions are generally ignored, 
because they detract from the instruction of necessary skills and because our 
ability to foster them is highly questionable. Logic may be regarded as a subject 
in itself, but it is taught as a series of skills to be mastered.
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Expanded conceptions of the skills approach. The debate among thinking 
skills proponents has gone in two directions. Some theorists emphasize the need 
to abstract skills and teach them separately. Those who advocate for critical 
thinking as logic and argumentation tend to accept this thinking skills approach. 
Others emphasize the need to identify skills, but then to teach them consciously 
within the context of a subject matter. The latter approach challenges us to 
discover a balance between the teaching of skills and the teaching of the subject so 
that skills do not become submerged in content instruction. Prawat (1991) labels 
these approaches as the "stand-alone" orientation and the "embedding" orientation. 
Although Beyer (1988) encourages the use of both orientations, he generally 
advocates embedding skills in the subject matter. That orientation, he argues, is 
more useful. I suggest that it is an attempt of skills theorists to make their thinking 
approaches more generative.
Despite the value of different strategies, the limitation of a skills approach 
results, I believe, from its emphasis on performances abstracted from the context 
of thinking itself. When we try to teach thinking skills directly, we notice this 
limitation. For this reason most thinking skills advocates have tended to shift 
toward the teaching of these skills while also teaching a content area, so that 
students can apply the skills to real situations. In addition, they are more likely to 
advocate functional thinking and metacognition (see Beyer, 1988) than they once 
did - a notion consistent with expanded conceptions posited by theorists like 
Lipman (1988) and Paul (1991). The shift in conceptions about the teaching of 
thinking to a less limiting and confining approach has occurred because of 
research observations which have revealed that students are "not engaged in active 
thinking or problem solving or creativity" (Brown, 1989, p. 31) when they break 
down thinking into a series of skills. Robert J. Sternberg (1987) sees advantages 
to the teaching of skills both separately and infused in the curriculum. He admits,
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however, that the infusion of thinking skills encourages the application of skills 
rather than "fostering inert knowledge about thinking skills" (p. 254) and 
reinforces the use of skills in multiple contexts.
Perkins' theories and research expand the skills approach beyond simply 
teaching skills in the context of a subject area. Perkins (Brandt, 1990) regards 
skills as "tools" for reorganizing thinking. He seems conscious of the dangers of 
becoming reductive in focusing on thinking skills, especially since we might 
believe that we can improve thinking skills by drill and practice. Since skills help 
to reorganize our thinking, he moves from the term "thinking organizers" to 
another term, "thinking frames" - "anything you use to guide, direct, or shape your 
thinking..."  (p. 52). He suggests that thinking frames may help to empower 
students' thinking, but such empowerment demands the active involvement of 
adults, who help students to acquire and build a repertoire of frames, practice their 
use until they are internalized, and transfer them to contexts other than the one in 
which we teach them (Perkins, 1986a). He emphasizes that this empowerment 
does not occur simply by providing "an intellectually enriched environment" (p. 8) 
nor does it come when "we teach skills and concepts disconnected from the 
purposes, the models, and the arguments that make them meaningful, that weave 
them into a larger tapestry of flexible and functional knowledge" (Perkins, 1991, 
p. 7). From this view Perkins acknowledges what I believe is essential to a rich 
conception of critical thinking - a recognition that the various approaches interact 
during the thinking process, which operates powerfully when various aspects of 
the mind are allowed to connect. Thus, while Perkins is emphasizing the need to 
develop and internalize skills, which he sees as shaping and framing our thinking, 
he has blurred the distinctions among the three approaches to critical thinking. He 
has given us what I would suggest are valuable insights into a way of thinking that 
acknowledges the complexity of our thinking and therefore the complexity of our
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approaches to the teaching of critical thinking. Skills alone are inadequate, but 
skills as reorganizers in a thinking community with a meaningful content will 
begin to provide a type of thinking usable in our daily lives.
Sternberg (1987) agrees with much of what Perkins (1991) says. Wanting 
to guard against simplistic conceptions of thinking skills, Sternberg suggests three 
categories of thinking, all of which the teacher of thinking must attend to. The 
first - executive, meta-skills - help us to "plan, monitor, and evaluate [our] 
thinking" (p. 252). He contends that we need this component for the successful 
transfer of skills to other contexts. It also coincides with Lipman's definition and 
supposes the reflection Ennis (1987) identifies as an aspect of critical thinking.
The second and third - nonexecutive skills - focus on performance and the 
acquisition of knowledge. These categories, he claims, must all operate together 
for effective thinking, once again suggesting the extent to which we must 
consciously use all three approaches to teaching critical thinking. They aid us in 
following through on our thinking and they actually help us develop the ability to 
think. They enable us to use strategies, like the ones explored by Perkins (1991), 
to develop adequate mental representations to solve problems and to effectively 
use the subject matter or knowledge base we deal with.
As I have emphasized, the skills advocates, attempting to expand the 
conceptions of critical thinking to make them more generalizable, do not reject the 
teaching of knowledge or the instilling of dispositions in individuals, as we can see 
in the theories of Perkins (1991) and Sternberg (1987). Rather, as Beyer (1988) 
argues, we need all of the three components to tap the depths of our complex 
thought process. By contending that critical thinking needs these three 
components, Beyer is moving toward a conception of critical thinking that I have 
identified as broad on the conceptual continuum. Because the three interrelate, I 
have contended, we must not ignore any of them. In fact, Beyer devotes a section
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in his book to an exploration of thinking dispositions and methods teachers may 
use to teach them. Nevertheless, the skills advocates contend that we should focus 
primarily on thinking skills when teaching critical thinking, even though their 
approaches acknowledge the need to embed skills in the teaching of a subject and 
to encourage the development of dispositions in order to make thinking more 
generative and more useful in contexts outside of the academic setting.
Teaching Knowledge As Critical Thinking
Traditional conceptions of the knowledge approach. Although advocates of 
narrow conceptions of critical thinking often reject approaches focusing on being 
engaged in content as a way to develop the ability to think critically, theorists like 
John McPeck (1981, 1990) object to the teaching of skills because they are 
separated from a subject matter. Advocates of this approach, like those of the 
skills approach, accept that effective reasoning is central to critical thinking and 
may even acknowledge the benefits of developing the ability to analyze 
arguments. The theorists part company when they focus on the means of 
developing critical thinking. Whereas the skills advocates believe that teachers 
must isolate discrete mental operations in order to teach critical thinking, theorists 
supporting a knowledge approach believe that the only way to teach critical 
thinking is to teach a subject. If logic or argumentation is to be developed, it is the 
peculiar logic of the subject and not some generalized logic or argumentation that 
must be emphasized. Thus, critical thinking, according to knowledge advocates, is 
not generalizable to other contexts either within the school or outside of it in our 
everyday life situations, since each circumstance requires understanding of a new 
or different subject.
This approach to the teaching of critical thinking tends to be narrow. It
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focuses on one approach to the exclusion of others and relies upon the richness of 
the subject to generate critical thinking. This approach may indeed encourage 
such thinking, but there is little guarantee that such thinking will occur. In 
addition, because it is so strongly tied to the subject, it does not encourage critical 
thinking in multiple contexts.
Expanded conceptions of the knowledge approach. For David Perkins 
(Brandt, 1990) "good thinking in a domain depends on a very rich knowledge base 
in that specific domain" (p. 50), a knowledge base which will demand immersion 
in the subject area in order to construct meaning. However, he warns against 
"immersion in content to enhance thinking" (Perkins, 1987, p. 46), suggesting it 
"the conventional ploy of education" (p. 46). Perkins is expressing concern about 
a focus on knowledge that is too narrow and does not allow for the development 
and use of thinking frames. This narrow perspective on knowledge regards 
knowledge as information delivered directly rather than knowledge built or 
invented (Perkins, 1986a, 1986b). Knowledge as information tends to lead to a 
disconnected curriculum, whereas knowledge as invention tends to be more 
integrated. A thinking frame, which Perkins (1986a) defines as "a representation 
intended to guide the process of thought, supporting, organizing, and catalyzing 
that process" (p. 7) enables knowledge as invention. These frames as catalysts 
help to move the knowledge approach away from knowledge as transmission by 
recognizing process frames, cognitive styles, and analogies. Perkins' conception 
heralds the next generation of the skills approach, as suggested in the previous 
section of this chapter, but also suggests a generative knowledge approach as well. 
Once again, we see a conception that blurs the distinctions among the various 
approaches to critical thinking and provides a conception of critical thinking as a 
dynamic process. Perkins acknowledges valuable connections, I believe, because 
he realizes that critical thinking is as complex as the mind itself. He observes the
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central place of knowledge in the instruction of critical thinking, but this is not 
inert knowledge that we absorb. It is constructed knowledge that we build using 
reorganizing thinking frames. Perkins is building a conception of critical thinking 
that I contend is essential to every conception of critical thinking - one in which 
knowledge and skills are interrelated and interact to construct meaning. These 
frames guide our thinking about the content, but content itself is discovered in the 
process.
Although Perkins (1987) cautions against immersion in a knowledge base, 
some theorists and researchers have discovered the benefits of immersion in an 
appropriately constructed environment. When we immerse students in thoughtful 
activities and content that encourage higher-order and critical thinking, we 
positively affect their thinking. Like the talented and creative people whom Vera 
John-Steiner (1985) has studied, students in these immersed classrooms explore, 
study a topic with intensity, and discover their inner resources. While John- 
Steiner focuses on gifted people and the development of their thought processes, 
the implications of her discoveries reach beyond this small segment of society to 
include other people, gifted or not. John-Steiner refers to Mozart, who benefitted 
from being immersed completely in music as a youngster. I believe that all young 
people can benefit from such complete and extensive experiences in developing 
their potential as thinkers, since critical thinking is more than a mastery of 
knowledge. It is discovering the meaning of that knowledge - inventing it, if you 
will. It is making critical thinking a part of us, so that we will be disposed to use it 
when framing our thinking.
Richard Prawat (1991) contends that his conception of immersion provides 
a sound basis for developing students' ability to think and also for transferring 
their thinking from one context to another. In "The Value of Ideas: The 
Immersion Approach to the Development of Thinking," he characterizes the
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immersion approach as the raising of ideas for thinking. We use these ideas in 
context as tools for understanding. In the immersion approach students do not 
self-consciously focus on the thinking process or thinking skills, but they actually 
actively engage in thinking, not simply talk about it (as a skills approach might 
emphasize). According to Prawat, "the perceptual schemata" represented by ideas 
allow us to take information from the environment, transform it, and use it to 
extend our present knowledge. We succeed at an immersion approach, if we have 
the freedom to pursue knowledge and the concepts or ideas that allow that to 
occur. In contrast to skills advocates who believe that decontextualized skills (all­
purpose tools) can transfer from one situation to another, for those accepting the 
immersion approach, the transfer from one domain to another will more likely 
occur when we connect ideas in a specific and enriched context in the classroom 
and use them for various purposes. From this approach to learning, transfer more 
likely results, because we adopt different methods of representing ideas and, as the 
variety of ways of representing ideas increases, students improve their ability to 
make meaning in different contexts. Although Prawat carefully underscores the 
need for more research on the immersion approach in general and transfer in 
particular, I believe we should note the promise of an immersion approach as a 
method for promoting sound thinking and fostering thoughtful dispositions in 
students.
Prawat dismisses the teaching of thinking skills (expanded or otherwise), an 
omission which I believe is extreme since skills as reorganizing tools may be 
needed at times, but his immersion approach provides some valuable insights on 
how to use Perkins' knowledge for invention. Invention, discovery, and 
construction are all metaphors which accurately describe Perkins' conception. 
Students are engaged in a constructivist environment and "big ideas" provide the 
powerful focus of the class. This approach demands that we view instruction as
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much more a shared experience with students involved in constructing a 
meaningful curriculum and dynamic environment. It also demands that we regard 
the classroom as much more interactive than the traditional classroom in order to 
allow students to draw from their environment, to grapple with the big ideas which 
equate with perceptual schemata, and to use the mind for thinking rather than 
talking about discrete skills that may develop during the process anyways. The 
environment or social context once again becomes paramount in our discussions 
of the development of critical thinking and one that we must grapple with in 
educating young people.
Teachers "develop a global view, focusing on the network o f ideas that help 
define the domain o f inquiry" (Prawat, 1991) in a collaborative manner. In Ms. 
Alsop's English classroom, fo r  example, she moved away from being tied to a 
study o f an anthology (such as an American Literature anthology) that she came to 
believe examines literature in a superficial way period by period; she moved 
toward a focus on "the big ideas" evolving from a literary piece in a "much looser 
and more flexible" way. For example, when students studied Thoreau's Walden. 
they immersed themselves in Thoreau's notions about the relationship between 
humans and the environment. They wrestled with the ideas Thoreau developed, 
this effort leading to an exploration o f other literature on this topic. As a result o f 
an agreement among teachers throughout the school, students and teachers 
explored these same ideas in other subject areas (such as examining 
environmental issues in their science classes and exploring the political and social 
implications in their social studies classes). These "big ideas" also comprised the 
conversations that teachers and administrators engaged in both with students and 
among themselves. When the school sought to build a community o f thinkers, it 
began to value and respect students' ideas, discuss and debate them openly, and 
act on them. Because the school valued and respected students' ideas and the
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adults modeled these qualities, many students began to develop a disposition o f 
respect fo r  the ideas o f others.
Teaching Critical Thinking Using Dispositions
We need only look at the evolution of Ted Sizer's conception of critical 
thinking in the two books he wrote as part of his study of high schools to observe 
the way that our conceptions of thinking evolve and expand. In the first part of his 
study, Horace's Compromise (Sizer, 1984), he conceives of thinking, for the most 
part, as a series of skills, an approach which theorists strongly supported in the late 
seventies and early eighties when Sizer conducted his study of high schools. By 
the time he published his second book, Horace's School (Sizer, 1992), the 
conception of critical thinking, while not dismissing skills, shifts toward an 
emphasis on intellectual habits and dispositions. In general, Sizer's evolution, I 
would suggest, reflects a similar shift by theorists, who have continually searched 
for ways to cultivate critical thinking in students in such a way that they will carry 
critical thinking with them and use it in multiple contexts throughout their lives. 
Although we may define the dispositions approach by itself as narrow on the 
conceptual continuum, it seems to have gained popularity among theorists and 
researchers in this decade because of some of the generative, creative, and 
constructive elements highlighted in the expanded conceptions of critical thinking 
outlined above.
Although all of the approaches are important, many theorists have focused 
on the dispositions approach in recent years, appropriately, I believe, because it 
serves as the foundation for the other approaches. Without the inclination to 
engage in critical thinking, as I see it, individuals will be unlikely to learn skills or 
immerse themselves in subject areas in a critical way. Because they are seeking
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ways to encourage young people to adopt critical thinking as a way of thinking on 
a regular basis, all of the theorists examined in this section adopt a dispositions 
component to their conceptions of critical thinking. Dispositions provide critical 
thinkers with the desire and willingness to engage in such thinking. They touch 
the emotional level, where our motivation exists. If individuals naturally draw on 
these dispositions, some believe, then they will think critically in all situations 
without the teaching of specific skills in every subject area. Although some 
dispositions advocates may believe that a focus on dispositions alone leads to the 
development of effective thinking in students, more often than not they conceive 
of dispositions as integral to other approaches. The dispositions approach 
represents the efforts of critical thinking theorists to focus on the more affective 
qualities of thinking. Consequently, theorists supporting the other two approaches 
to critical thinking, a skills or knowledge approach, often incorporate dispositions 
in their theories in order to expand their conceptions of critical thinking to 
incorporate the more affective qualities of our thinking.
Some theorists and researchers call dispositions thinking habits, traits of 
mind, or ways of thinking. Lauren Resnick (1987) talks about dispositions for 
higher-order thinking developed in a community which engenders and shapes 
these dispositions. Harvey Siegel (1988) identifies thinking dispositions as the 
critical spirit or critical attitude, Francis Schrag (1988) suggests that we might 
regard dispositions, taken collectively, as 'thoughtfulness', and Richard Paul 
(1987) labels them "passions." Few theorists today dismiss these characteristics of 
critical thinking, although they do not have any certainty about how to instill or 
evoke them in students. Even Barry Beyer (1987, 1988), with his strong emphasis 
on thinking skills, admits the essential role of dispositions for an effective thinker, 
who has the inclination and desire to become knowledgeable about and skilled in 
the use of thinking operations. In "What Philosophy Offers to the Teaching of
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Thinking," Beyer (1990) emphasizes that "thinking is much more than simply 
technique or skill, that in addition to criteria, rules, and procedures, critical 
thinking is a particular mental set that calls for distinct, habitual ways of 
behaving" (p. 58). Dispositions allow for the affective and emotional qualities of 
critical thinking, qualities that tend not to exist in narrower conceptions of critical 
thinking.
The nature of dispositions. Dispositions "seem to establish both the will to 
think and to cultivate ineffable qualities of judgment that steer knowledge and 
skills in productive directions.. .without dispositions of thoughtfulness, neither 
knowledge nor the tools for applying it are likely to be used intelligently" 
(Newmann, 1991). If we instill the dispositions for students to engage in critical 
thinking, this line of reasoning suggests, then students will likely "thirst" for the 
knowledge and skills that enable them to improve their thinking. However, we 
may doubt that we can foster critical thinking dispositions in students unless they 
have discovered the power of critical thinking, which will only come when we 
expose them to the use of critical thinking in a real context and understand the 
social implications of that context, as I have suggested in our discussion of the 
conceptions of Lipman (1988), Prawat (1991, 1993), Hostetler (1991), and Apple. 
(Brown, 1991)
If we expect the adults of tomorrow to engage in critical thinking, then the 
teacher of today needs to focus on the dispositions that encourage students to think 
in this way. But such dispositions are fostered only if the teacher is acutely aware 
of the need to cultivate dispositions, and clear about which dispositions are central 
to critical thinking. John Dewey, one of the earlier American educational 
philosophers to emphasize dispositions, is aware of the tremendous challenges that 
educators face in trying to instill them in students. In one of his philosophical 
discussions (Dewey, 1933), he addresses open-mindedness, a disposition that we
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often associate with an effective critical thinker. He characterizes open- 
mindedness as liberation from habits, like prejudice, that inhibit (or close the mind 
to) new concepts and ideas. He distinguishes this vibrant concept from empty- 
mindedness and uses the metaphor of hospitality to suggest that a person invites 
new issues, problems, or queries. He hastens to assure us that hospitality to new 
ideas need not imply empty-mindedness. Dewey underscores that open- 
mindedness demands of students a willingness to listen to various sides of an issue 
and gather facts, to consider alternatives, and to recognize problems in anyone's 
beliefs, even those whom one respects or about whom one cares. Through a 
process of providing examples, contrasting some terms with others, and making 
fine discriminations among related ideas and words, Dewey helps the educator to 
envision what open-mindedness looks like when exhibited by an individual. I 
would suggest that this is a useful model for exploring dispositions with young 
people, who need to engage in a dialogue about positive qualities and then practice 
them with others, as long as we understand how open-mindedness is conceived in 
a context of power and domination.
More recently, Richard Paul (1984) has explored the tendency of humans to 
engage in its negative counterpart, close-mindedness. Paul contrasts close­
mindedness to the more emancipatory dialectical thinking, he proposes. Although 
we have the ability to think critically, we do not naturally demonstrate the 
disposition of open-mindedness - "thinking critically and reciprocally within 
opposing points of view" (p. 14), reasoning dialectically and dialogically. Rather, 
we have a tendency toward close-mindedness and tend to pass this characteristic 
on to our children, who grow up reasoning this way. Paul regards the home and 
the school as crucial to the development of adults who engage in debate and 
discussion and who can appreciate various perspectives; thus, he finds it 
distressing that schools have focused on technical problems and technical
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reasoning. He argues that schools implicitly reward ethnocentrism and 
egocentrism - narrow reasoning and the sense that one holds the only appropriate 
and correct positions on issues or problems. Moreover, schools develop 
techniques to defend these positions. We can overcome this closed-minded 
reasoning, according to Paul, if we create schools with environments in which we 
encourage and nurture dialectical and dialogical thinking. Both Paul and Dewey - 
two theorists of human dispositions - have demonstrated the multiple dimensions 
of a single disposition and have suggested activities and methods useful to begin 
to instill it in students. Their discussions suggest the multifaceted and complex 
nature of critical thinking dispositions. Neither has prescriptive methods of 
encouraging dispositions, but both view their development as evolutionary. As we 
engage in openmindedness, explain it, discuss it, see it modeled, it becomes a way 
of thinking. However, I would suggest that dispositions will mean little if students 
do not have a rich subject in which to develop such dispositions and capabilities to 
organize ideas in a meaningful way.
When teachers look at the dispositions they want to see cultivated in young 
people, they identify the characteristics of the good thinkers they have known and 
conjecture the kinds of intellectual habits - the thinking qualities - students will 
need to live and cope in the next century. They hope these young people, as 
adults, will think, reflect, search when necessary, adopt rational approaches, accept 
ambiguity and problematic situations, seek alternatives and support thinking with 
evidence when being self-critical, and try to discover and revise goals (Glatthorn 
& Baron, 1985). They also hope that the students will exhibit the intellectual 
equivalent of humility, courage, integrity, empathy, perseverance, faith in reason, 
and a sense of justice (Paul, 1988). We need to cultivate thinking dispositions in 
the classroom through the building of a community (Resnick, 1989; Brown, 1991), 
as I have suggested, creating "widening circles of meaning, through which
52
individuals can understand themselves and their condition and construct coherent, 
purposeful lives" (Brown, 1991, p. 56). The socialization that these theorists 
advocate for the development of dispositions is consistent with the role of 
community building advocated by Prawat (1991, 1993), Hostetler (1991), and 
Apple (Brown, 1991) for the development of critical thinking in general.
Because of the affective nature of dispositions, they play a very different 
role from knowledge and skills - other elements of critical thinking. I believe that 
the dispositions approach better enables us to focus on "critical" as it is used in 
critical theory and critical pedagogy. Such critical inquiry incorporates the 
cognitive, but it also remains open to and in fact openly courts the affective. 
Although the language to describe the role of the affective and cognitive sounds 
like I am highlighting a dichotomy, in reality I am opposed to establishing such 
dichotomies. I would contend that recognizing the social context fraught with 
issues of power and domination and working out these issues in an inquiring 
community will develop the disposition to think critically. In such a context 
students grapple with significant problems and issues that affect their lives and the 
lives of others in a larger community. They feel compelled to engage in critical 
thinking because it is more than an academic exercise. Ultimately it seems it is 
more than the rational ability to analyze an argument that fosters dispositions; it is 
the emotional commitment to solve problems, address issues, or establish beliefs 
that lead to the lifelong disposition to think critically.
Conclusion
As much of the literature of chapter two and three attests, educators have an 
enduring concern with effective, useful thinking and methods of educating people 
to employ such thinking. I have argued that, upon close examination, we can see
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that theorists and researchers have expanded their conceptions of critical thinking 
in order to make it more flexible, adaptable, and usable in contexts outside of the 
academic setting. The preponderance of evidence central to the contention in this 
chapter suggests that more narrow, presently inadequate conceptions of critical 
thinking do not enable young people and adults to think effectively in multiple 
contexts, especially in situations people face on a daily basis. If we accept the 
narrow conception of critical thinking, then we see it as synonymous with 
reasoning in a limited sense, the reasoning associated with logic and 
argumentation (Ennis, 1969a; Ennis, 1969b; Scriven, 1976). We see knowledge as 
information transmission (McPeck, 1981; McPeck, 1990; Onosko, 1991; Perkins, 
1991), and we see skills separate from the rich context of content (Beyer, 1987; 
Beyer, 1988). If we accept a more expanded conception of critical thinking, we 
begin to feel uncomfortable with dichotomies (Paul, 1984; Paul, 1990; Prawat, 
1991; Prawat, 1993), exhibit more sensitivity to the context in which thinking 
occurs (Scriven, 1976), recognize the value of a community of thinkers to refine 
and hone thinking (Brown, 1991; Hostetler, 1991; Resnick, 1987), work toward 
developing dispositions (such as reflection and open-mindedness) more conducive 
to critical thinking (Dewey, 1933; Paul, 1984; Paul, 1988; Paul, 1990), see skills as 
frames that guide and shape our thinking (Brandt, 1990), view critical thinking as 
a creative process (Ennis, 1987; Perkins, 1986a), look for the deep understanding 
underlying the knowledge structures that provide the content of our thinking 
(Perkins, 1986a; Perkins, 1986b; Perkins, 1987), and recognize that the critical 
thinking enterprise occurs in a social context that cannot be separated from 
ideologies, politics, and issues of power and domination.
Our exploration of theorists' attempts to expand the knowledge and skills 
approaches to make them more usable for critical thinking in various contexts 
reveals a fascinating pattern: in most expanded conceptions of critical thinking,
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dispositions or habits of mind that represent the affective characteristics of critical 
thinking emerge and the distinctions between one critical thinking approach and 
another are less evident. As we expand the skills approach, we must more 
consciously integrate skills in a rich knowledge base; as we expand the knowledge 
approach, we find skills, as thinking frames, enmeshed in rich content. In short, 
advocates of expanded conceptions of critical thinking recognize the complexity 
of our thought process and the role that the "deep structure" of critical thinking 
plays in our thinking and lives. There is an effort to incorporate both thought and 
emotion and to make critical thinking part of our way of living. What I have 
argued is that theorists can no longer solely accept narrow conceptions of critical 
thinking, but must continually search for the generative, constructive, and creative 
in it in order for critical thinking to have a personal, social, and pedagogical effect 
on the lives of young people and adults. It is my contention that these expanded 
conceptions include aspects of thinking that may best be explained as elements of 
the imagination. In order to persuade the reader of this claim, I turn first to 
philosophical and then to literary accounts of the imagination.
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CHAPTER FOUR
IMAGINATION IN THE THEATRE OF THE MIND: 
PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE IMAGINATION
Philosophers, some of whom are critical thinking theorists and all of whom 
are critical thinkers, seem to be conflicted about the role of the imagination in their 
theories and practices. Edward Casey (1976) calls these conflicts "denial-cum- 
acknowledgement," because, as he notes, philosophers denigrate the imagination 
on the one hand, as a key component of the philosophical investigations of the 
world, and then use it as part of their methodologies on the other. Casey focuses 
on such philosophers as Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Descartes - all of whom, he 
says, downplay any role for the imagination in their theories. Nevertheless, Casey 
argues, for Aristotle imagination is necessary for thinking, for Hume it is an 
ingredient of understanding, for Kant it is "the source of intellectual synthesis in 
the understanding" (p. 222) leading to knowledge. Descartes' use of the 
imagination comes in his method of systematic doubt, which is characterized by 
"the methodological suspension of belief" (p. 223) - an act effected "not through 
the discovery of new evidence or by adducing logical reasons for doubt, but by an 
act of imagination..."  (p. 223). Descartes' systematic doubt and the role of 
imagination in suspending belief serve as a model for phenomenologists like 
Husserl in their methodology, which is characterized by phenomenological 
reduction designed to free the philosopher from preconceived assumptions and 
beliefs.
This conflict Casey notes can equally well be said to apply to critical 
thinking theorists, even though most of them tend to ignore the role of the
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imagination. As I have indicated in the previous chapters, although critical 
thinking theorists have expanded their conceptions of critical thinking to 
incorporate many of the qualities we associate with the imagination, few have 
overtly and explicitly embraced the imagination as a dynamic in critical thinking. 
There are two prominent theorists who have alluded to a role for the imagination 
in our thinking; however, disappointedly, they do not expand on those allusions. 
Drawing on the work of Mary Wamock (1976), Richard Prawat (1993) intimates a 
connection between imagination and the thinking process, a connection that he 
says "allows us to apply our thoughts or ideas to things" (p. 6) and helps keep "the 
thought alive in the perception by connecting emotion and intellect" (p. 6). This 
latter connection he claims is not recognized in the thinking skills movement. 
Richard Paul (1990) also mentions our need to imagine ourselves in different 
roles, taking opposing viewpoints in order to understand them so that we can 
respond to them dialogically and critically. For Paul critical thinking and 
imagination support each other.
Not that the imagination is completely separated from traditional 
conceptions of critical thinking. The imagination is often integral to the 
development of premises in an argument and is especially evident in the creation 
of counterexamples to disprove contentions, examples which may be as real or as 
fantastical as our imagination will allow. Nevertheless, the more prominent 
evidence of use of the imagination emerges in the expanded conceptions of critical 
thinking, even though theorists who propose these conceptions may not recognize, 
acknowledge, or promote the use of the imagination to enhance one’s thinking. It 
is, I shall argue, the imagination that enables the critical thinker to be self- 
reflective; to engage in a mental dialogue designed to understand the critical 
perspectives of others; to develop the affective or emotional side to our thinking in 
order especially to instill critical thinking dispositions in individuals; to envision
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multiple possibilities; to generate and integrate ideas and concepts; and to "hold 
ends-in-view within a continuum of ends and means" (Howard, 1992, p. 15). The 
ends or products of our thinking may be viewed as either public or private.
In the next two chapters I will explore two philosophical conceptions of the 
imagination, which constructs "the infinite variety of pictures and situations" (p. 
301) Hume (1969) observes in the theatre of the mind. I will assume the burden in 
these chapters of conceptually clarifying one notion of the imagination in order to 
demonstrate that it is an aspect of expanded conceptions of critical thinking, an 
aspect that endows critical thinking with life and vitality.
Philosophical Conceptions of the Imagination
Imagination has traditionally been associated with the artist, who often 
views it as the impetus for the creative act. If this is so, then why begin an 
exploration of the imagination with a philosophical conception of it?
Richard Paul (1990) distinguishes three distinct but interrelated uses of the 
word "philosophy." The first focuses on philosophy as an area of study, the second 
as a mode of thinking, and the third as a framework for thinking. In this 
dissertation I am not so much interested in philosophy as an area of study, except 
to acknowledge that any philosophers commenting on the imagination have 
chosen to be part of a critical dialogue that constitutes the field of philosophy.
More pertinent to this dissertation are the senses of philosophy as a mode and 
framework for thinking. The mode of thinking is the method of philosophy, which 
is characterized by "critical discussion, rational cross examination, and dialectical 
exchange" (p. 457). The framework for thinking is thinking within "a self­
constructed network of assumptions, concepts, defined issues, key inferences, and 
insights" (p. 457). Thus, if I am a philosopher who is a rationalist, my
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assumptions and views are likely to differ from my colleagues who are idealists or 
empiricists. By using the philosophical mode of thinking within a particular 
framework, the philosopher not only gives us insight into the nature of the 
imagination, but she or he can give us some sense of its role in the total 
philosophical enterprise, which tends to be a rational and critical enterprise.
Of course there is a negative side to the philosophical perspective on the 
imagination. Generally the imagination is viewed as instrumental to the 
philosophical enterprise of discovering meaning and understanding. With a few 
notable exceptions, such as Jean-Paul Sartre (1966), Edward Casey (1976), and 
Mary Wamock (1976), philosophers have not examined the imagination in its own 
right, but always as an adjunct to another process. In attributing a particular role 
for the imagination, then, the philosopher may overlook or omit some of its 
important characteristics or may distort its qualities to fit into the philosopher's 
schema or framework. I believe the benefits of focusing on the disciplined 
thinking of the philosopher, who is able to see the imagination as part of a larger 
context, outweigh the liabilities.
If the philosophical enterprise is important to our understanding of critical 
thinking, then philosophical conceptions of the imagination may provide clues to 
the ways that the imagination operates in critical thinking. Philosophy has been 
significant to our understanding of critical thinking and to developing methods of 
fostering it. The philosopher John Dewey (1933), for example, equates reflective 
thinking with critical thinking and educational philosophers as diverse as Richard 
Paul (1990) and Robert Ennis (1985) regard themselves as members of a critical 
thinking movement that associates critical thinking with Informal Logic.
One might argue successfully that the entire philosophical enterprise is a 
critical thinking process, as does Paul (1990) in his book on critical thinking. He 
points out that philosophy "can be approached from multiple points of view and
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invites critical dialogue and reasoned discourse between conflicting viewpoints. 
Critical thought and discussion are its main instruments of learning" (pp. 450- 
451). Paul follows a long tradition of critical philosophers. Certainly Socrates' 
method of inquiry by posing refining questions was designed to force his listeners 
and students to be more critical about their claims and observations. Later, 
Descartes' dictum to doubt everything, while a highly skeptical process, could be 
characterized as critical thinking intended to dissolve the fagade of perception and 
discover inner truths. Several critical thinking theorists today have even adopted 
philosophy as a method of teaching critical thinking. Matthew Lipman (1984), for 
example, has created a program called Philosophy for Children, which is intended 
to use the investigations of philosophy to develop students' abilities to think 
critically about the world they live in.
If we do not accept the whole philosophical enterprise as a critical thinking 
enterprise, at the very least we may want to associate critical thinking with the 
branch of philosophy called logic. As we have seen, more traditional conceptions 
of critical thinking equate critical thinking with logic. From the perspective of 
traditional conceptions critical thinking is a structured form of thought designed to 
discipline one's thinking in order to reach a conclusion. As I pointed out in the 
previous chapter, conceiving of critical thinking as logic and argument analysis 
limits the way critical thinking operates, but the connection between these two 
processes underscores the pervasive relationship between critical thinking and 
philosophy. For this reason I believe it useful to initially review the speculations 
of two contemporary philosophers on the imagination before focusing on artists' 
perspectives.
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Philosophical Approaches to a Study of the Imagination
I restrict my discussion of philosophical conceptions of imagination to an 
exploration of two contemporary philosophers - Edward Casey (1976) and Mary 
Warnock (1976) - both of whom have written significant and influential books on 
the imagination. I have selected their accounts for examination for the following 
reasons:
1) Unlike most philosophers who have written about the imagination as part 
of a broader philosophical investigation, Casey and Warnock both focus solely on 
the imagination. I believe they uncover many of the characteristics of the 
imagination missed by other philosophers and also effectively dispel some of the 
misconceptions about the imagination. At the same time, both pursue their 
examination of the imagination in order to better understand how the imagination 
enhances our understanding of the world and our own mental capacities. I also 
choose these two accounts in part because they use contrasting approaches in their 
investigations of the imagination.
2) Casey's phenomenological approach grounds the concept of the 
imagination in first-hand experience through phenomenological description before 
moving us into the realm of theory - an approach which assures us of a focus on 
the imaginative act and imaginative object. Casey begins his study by offering 
three scenarios which he himself has imagined. He then extracts the features of 
the imagination by analyzing his own imaginings. As the study progresses, he 
moves away from the original scenarios, but he continues to use them as anchors 
for his further observations and theorizing.
3) By contrast Warnock's analytical approach begins with a historical 
perspective, in which she examines the traditions that have shaped our views about 
the imagination. She begins with David Hume and Immanuel Kant and concludes
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with the contemporary philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
She focuses particularly on the nature of the imagination as a pervasive element in 
perception. Wamock’s observations about the operation of the imagination in 
perception, I believe, offer us insights into the ways that imagination can 
profoundly affect other cognitive processes. Specifically, I believe that her 
contentions about the characteristics inherent in the imagination enhance our 
understanding of the role that imagination plays in the affective dimension of our 
thinking and particularly in the development of critical thinking dispositions.
Although each of these philosophers uses a different approach, their 
studies, I believe, complement each other. Casey seeks to uncover the 
characteristics of the imagination by focusing on how imagination operates in our 
everyday lives. In so doing, he hopes to support his contentions that the 
imagination is a capacity with its own distinctive qualities, which are different 
from the qualities of other mental capacities (such as reason and memory) but are 
neither superior or inferior to other capacities. The distinctions he draws in 
connection with the imagination are helpful as we examine Warnock's study, 
which synthesizes the work of a variety of philosophers and writers, all of whose 
work demonstrate the pervasiveness of the imaginative capacity.
In this chapter and the next the imagination is broadly conceived, yet Casey 
and Wamock are both effective in isolating important features of this elusive 
capacity. I am interested in both the cognitive and affective dimensions of the 
imagination, because I believe both contribute to our understanding of the 
imagination's role in critical thinking; however, in this chapter I will start with the 
cognitive nature of the imagination, since this aspect of the imagination is 




Edward Casey (1976) claims two purposes in writing his book on the 
imagination. Primarily he intends to describe the distinctive nature of the 
imagination. Secondarily, he claims for the imagination its rightful place as a 
human capacity free from the characterizations of philosophers who denigrate the 
imagination and free from the misconceptions of the Romantics who elevate it by 
claiming it is the creative inspiration of the deity. He proceeds to prove his 
contentions by examining the phenomenon of the imagination.
Like others who adopt the phenomenological method, Casey regards the 
phenomenon he is studying, the imagination, as intentional. As an intentional 
process, it consists of two phases - the act phase and the object phase. Husserl 
(1931), who was one of the more significant progenitors of the phenomenological 
approach, calls these phases noetic and noematic aspects. Identifying and 
describing the two phases is part of what phenomenologists call "philosophical 
reduction" (or epoche. as Husserl labels it) - a reduction in which "we 'bracket' or 
'suspend' any.. .commitment" (Casey, 1976, p. 190) to present or past reality 
which interferes with our discovering the origins of our knowledge about a 
phenomenon like the imagination which can be lost in everyday thinking. The 
bracketing is also designed to enable the philosopher to examine the phenomenon 
without being unduly influenced by other accounts of the phenomenon. For Casey 
this entails making "more thematic what is otherwise merely implicit and taken for 
granted in human experience" (p. 8). This is accomplished by "firsthand or direct 
description" (p. 8) that ignores what came before and describes "the phenomenon 
as it now appears" (p. 9).
Although Casey does not identify the broad philosophical basis for his 
argument, phenomenology is often closely associated with idealism. Idealists
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contend that the reality in the world we perceive depends upon our consciousness. 
If we were to remove consciousness, the reality would have no meaning, since 
consciousness gives the objects of the world meaning and sense. We may believe 
that reality exists even when our consciousness is not present, but we cannot 
conceive of such a reality through our consciousness.
A phenomenologist like Casey (1976) or his mentor, Edmund Husserl 
(1931), accepts by implication some of the tenets of idealism. In phenomenology 
the focus is on the consciousness. We "bracket" the world to free ourselves of 
assumptions and beliefs about the object we are examining. It is consciousness, 
then, that exists and determines the meaning of the phenomenon. It is important to 
recognize that in order to understand Casey's preconceptions when exploring the 
nature of the imagination.
Phenomenologists share some common beliefs about their approach, but 
often differ about its application. When we consider Casey's descriptive approach, 
we begin to notice a limitation of this method (at least as Casey has interpreted it). 
Casey describes three imaginative scenarios - the first an imagined school of 
dolphins, the second the sight and sound of a flamingo, and the third an imagined 
seminar to occur the following day. These three scenarios are the basis of what is 
to be his more complete description of the act and object phases of the 
imagination. I believe the personal scenarios to be useful, if we can accept their 
being based on real imaginings of the author; however, the very personal nature of 
these reports makes them problematic. We must accept the scenarios as fully 
representative of imaginative experiences in order to accept Casey's contentions 
and descriptions based on these scenarios. But even if we accept the scenarios, we 
must acknowledge that the idiosyncratic reports may represent Casey's peculiar 
imaginings, which may not represent the imaginings of others. In addition, they 
may not give us a complete picture of the imagination.
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Casey (1976) acknowledges some of these issues, noting Husserl's 
admonition to draw examples from history, art, and especially literature - examples 
which Casey acknowledges "possess a complexity and subtlety often lacking in 
everyday, garden-variety acts of imagining" (p. 25). Nevertheless, he restricts 
himself to his own imaginative examples. Although Casey's descriptions might 
have been strengthened by a combination of imaginative examples from sources 
other than personal experience, this would violate his expressed purpose to 
describe everyday imaginings, which he believes will show some of the distinctive 
characteristics of the imagination often overlooked in philosophical investigations. 
Since each scenario can be conjured up by Casey's readers, we have the 
opportunity and the expectation at each stage of our examination of Casey's 
argument to test the arguments against our own experiences and historical sources. 
The significance of the opportunity for correction will be especially evident when 
we examine his observations on the connection between the imagination and 
creativity.
Sensuous and Nonsensuous Imagining
Casey (1976) contributes to our understanding of the imagination in several 
ways. The first is the important distinction between sensuous and nonsensuous 
imagining. Because of imagining's intentionality, Casey claims it is helpful to see 
that imagining consists of two phases - the act phase and the object phase. The act 
phase is the enactment of imagining while the object phase is the "total 
imaginative presentation" (p. 49) - that particular something we imagine.
Although the two phases cannot be separated during imagining itself, I will 
specifically focus on the act phase in the discussion of Casey's work because he 
delineates characteristics of the imagination that are particularly useful to our
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understanding of how the imagination operates in critical thinking.
It is important to note Casey's observation that an individual is capable of 
controlling the imagination, which can often be regarded as a spontaneous process. 
When we control the imaginative act, we conjure images through the act of our 
wills. The imagination is voluntarily called upon and voluntarily ended - that is to 
say, we can initiate it, guide it, and terminate it at will, although Casey would 
suggest that we cannot consciously imagine contradictory concepts, cannot create 
the existence of something that does not already exist, and cannot guarantee that 
everyone has identical capacities to imagine. If we try to evoke an image of a 
classroom in the early 1900s, we would be engaged in controlled imagining. By 
controlling the imagination, we can more reasonably expect that it will have the 
effect on our thinking that we desire it to have.
In the act phase the imagining act (whether controlled or spontaneous) can 
take three different forms - imaging, imagining-that. and imagining-how. Often 
equated with the imagination, imaging creates a presentation characterized by 
sensuousness. Although images are more often than not viewed as visual, in 
reality we "image" other senses as well. When my son writes "imagine" on a 
score, he may be visualizing the placement of his fingers to play a chord or a 
particular sequence of notes; however, he also uses the imperative to hear the 
music in his mind when a musical instrument is not available. This, I believe, is 
audialized imaging.
Imagining-that presents a state of affairs by envisioning that a relationship 
among imagined events taken collectively constitutes an imaginative act. In the 
act of imagining-that, the imaginer is not necessarily part of the imaginative scene 
being imagined but he or she observes it. An example of this type of imagining 
might be prompted by the command, "Imagine that the teacher is reading to 
students." We imagine a teacher in an elementary classroom, sitting on the floor
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with students around her - all of them listening to her reading a story. We might 
even imaginatively observe the interaction among the students and between the 
students and the teacher.
Casey contends that this imagining process may be either sensuous or 
nonsensuous. He suggests that non-sensuous imagining-that is similar to 
intellection, because one can imagine an object of thought without appealing to the 
senses to do this. We might imagine nonsensuously, for example, when we 
envisage the steps in a challenging mathematical problem before we actually 
complete the computation on paper. In fact, the discipline of mathematics might 
be viewed as nonsensuous imagining - "a figment of the imagination. All its 
elements, objects, axioms, theorems, definitions.. .describe objects which do not 
actually exist in our world. The worlds created by mathematicians are imaginary" 
(Pappas, 1995, p. 1).
Casey himself offers two examples of nonsensuous imagining-that, neither
of which are particularly illustrative. The first is drawn from one of the three
scenarios he imagines and uses as the basis of his phenomenological study. In the
scenario Casey imagines that he is listening to a seminar lecture by a man named
Dworkin; even though his perspective in the seminar room changes occasionally,
he continues to imagine the lecturing and the lecturer in front of the class. That
aspect of his imagining is nonsensuous - 1 assume because of the ideas Casey
imagines Dworkin is lecturing about. The lecture itself, to which he is listening, is
sensuous, since it requires sound to hear it. This example is not persuasive
because it fails to demonstrate clearly how the imagination is operating at a
nonsenuous level. Casey's second example of nonsensuous imagining-that is even
more problematic. In a footnote he refers to Descartes' example of a chiliogon - a
thousand-sided figure. Descartes (1951) points out our ability to conceive of this
figure, but our inability to imagine it no matter how hard we try. Any attempt to
-60-
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imagine a chiliogon would be inadequate. Casey (1976) suggests that this 
conception cannot be identified as imaging, but it can be viewed as "imagining- 
that there can be such a figure" (p. 43). This nonsensuous imagining-that and 
conceiving, Casey believes, are both engaged in Descartes' example.
Descartes (1951) would object to Casey's explanation of the chiliogon, 
since Descartes clearly and specifically identifies the process of apprehending this 
figure as conception. Unfortunately Casey's explanation of why we should accept 
the conception of the chiliogon as imagining-that is somewhat vague. Descartes 
might very well ask what advantage there is to calling this process imagining-that 
rather than simply conception, since conception seems to be a more encompassing 
term. Casey (1976) does tackle this question later in his study when he briefly 
discusses modal logic. He argues that modal logicians use the imagination even 
though they do not acknowledge its impact on their methodology. According to 
Casey (1976), modal logic is a discipline that analyzes "the logical properties and 
peculiarities of necessity and possibility" (p. 226) - in particular, they attend to 
"possible worlds" or "states of affair across the range of possible worlds" (p. 226).
Casey (1976) points out that modal logicians believe that their type of logic 
is guided by pure intellection or conceivability. He accepts the role of intellection 
in conceiving of the idea of possible worlds and engaging in the logical problem 
incumbent upon this discipline. He believes, however, in two senses of 
conceivability, and asserts that the imagination differs from conception and still 
operates in modal logic. In the first sense, Casey speaks of sheer conceivability by 
which he means "the employment of intellection proper, that is, with the pure 
conception of possible worlds - the idea per se of such worlds" (p. 227). The 
second sense, sometimes referred to as "the 'stronger' sense of conceivability," 
deals with the conception not of the idea of a world but a particular world itself (or 
clusters of worlds). "To do this," Casey argues, "requires imaginative activity,
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even though the imagining in question need not be imagistic or sensory" (p. 227).
I accept the usefulness of Casey's distinction in understanding both 
conception and imagining-that, even if I question the strength of the examples he 
offers. When we imagine nonsensuously, we are generally conceiving in the 
second sense. For example, as Vernon Howard (1993) proposes, if we are able to 
hold the ends in view while attending to the means of solving a problem, we are 
also conceiving in the second sense and imagining nonsensuously - that is to say, 
we are conceiving of a state of affairs or a thinking process more particular and 
practical in nature than sheer conceivability; this type of thinking is nonsensuous 
imagining.
Even if we grant that the imaginative act might operate simultaneously 
with conception, this possibility still wouldn't provide a counterexample to the 
claim that we are really talking about conception and that the imagination is 
secondary or irrelevant. I believe that what we need to focus on is the nature and 
role of these two capacities. Conception is characterized by the relative ease of 
the operation; it is an intuitive process, which is represented by a type of thinking 
that is logical and non-contradictory. When we conceive of a chiliogon, we 
apprehend it without detail and without its being placed in a context that would 
enable us to understand how it might operate. As long as we are able to think of a 
chiliogon without contradition, we are conceiving it. The imagination, on the 
other hand (at least, non-spontaneous imagining), requires "a special mental effort 
in order to imagine" (Descartes, 1951, p. 69). Unlike conception, the imagination 
envisions a mental object "by the force and the eternal effort of [the] mind" (p. 
68). The relative ease of an intuitive capacity like conception, then, is 
contrasted, according to Descartes, with the effort of the imaginative capacity.
The imagination has the capacity to create and rehearse possible situations and to 
combine knowledge in unusual ways - all characteristics of nonsensuous
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imagining that conceiving alone could not accomplish. The imagination is capable 
of being sustained for extended periods of time, part of the effort of the 
imagination that helps to shape the direction of our thinking. Most of all, unlike 
conception, which is characterized and bound by thinking without logical 
contradiction, nonsensuous imagining is not bound by such thinking. With 
conception, then, we are bound by "logical" possibilities. Thus, we may conceive 
of another person's perspective in a logical way; that is to say, we think his or her 
view possible because it entails no contradiction. But, when we envisage another 
person's perspective, engage in an imaginary debate between that person and 
ourselves, and entertain possibilities that may be illogical and contradictory as 
well as logical, we are imagining nonsensuously and not necessarily conceiving. 
Nonsensuous imagining enables us to deal with the messiness and complexity of 
our practical thinking because it can do multiple things and see the whole process 
(both the ends and means) operating at the same time.
Imagining-how. as Casey (1976) describes it, retains the distinction 
between sensuous and nonsensuous imagining. This imagining, however, is 
characterized by the imaginer actually assimilating himself or herself into - doing, 
thinking, or feeling within - the imagined state of affairs, such as my actually 
being present in the imagined elementary school mentioned above, interacting 
with students and the teacher. There is a sense of personal agency which makes 
the form of imagining active and engaging. I often find that, when I imagine 
nonsenuously how to solve a challenging mathematical problem, for example, I 
enter into the imaginative process sensuously as well, discussing or debating the 
problem in my imagination with other mathematicians also trying to solve the 
problem.
Sensuous and nonsensuous imagining-that and imagining-how are both 
important if we wish to accept a role for the imagination in critical thinking. We
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often think of the imagination as sensuous and frequently as visual. Sensuous 
imagining, which generates a series of connected images that utilize many of the 
senses, can provide our thinking with a context. That is to say, it allows us to see 
with our senses the individuals in their habitats engaging in the act of critical 
thinking. Philip, for example, in selecting a graduate school, imagines he is at the 
college, sometimes even imagining a literary figure like James Joyce as a tour 
guide. Albert Einstein, (1946) who placed a high priority on imagination and 
intuition in his scientific thought process, often employed sensuous imagining-that 
and imagining-how to solve cosmological problems. Einstein’s thought 
experiments, for example, were useful in his germinating ideas and in moving 
from some form of thinking experience to fully developed theories like the theory 
of relativity. In his most famous thought experiment, Einstein imagined a person 
riding beside a light wave. The experiment provided the germ for the theory of 
relativity. Although the imagination is normally not used this overtly in the critical 
thinking process, the sensuous imagining can give abstract concepts such as those 
used in reflective thinking some grounding by imagining individuals who exhibit 
reflection.
More than simply a sensuous experience, however, Einstein's thought 
experiments (Einstein, 1946) also incorporate non-sensuous imagining-that and 
imagining-how. He "sees" a person riding next to a beam of light, but also 
imagines the thinking that would accompany the visual image. The imagining in 
this case is more cognitive than visual and begins to move us into the realm of 
ideas - that realm where critical thought is generated and sustained. When I am 
writing this dissertation, I am engaging in a rather complex form of critical 
thinking in which I imagine how imagination might operate in critical thinking. I 
perform the exercise both by generating sensuous images of a critical thinker 
involved in the critical thinking activity and by creating non-sensuous imagining
71
of critical thinking as I conceive it at its best. The imaginative process, as I see it, 
enables me to generate ideas, to dissolve blocks to my thinking, and to envision a 
conclusion to the critical thinking process. Sensuous imagining helps me to 
envision individuals reacting to my dissertation topic; non-sensuous imagining 
enables me to clarify the debate about the topic and some possible solutions, all at 
a level that does not appeal to the senses.
Nonsensuous imagining-that and imagining-how also provide us with the 
capacity to be self-reflective and to apprehend another person’s critical 
perspective. Reflection, according to John Dewey (1933), is “the kind of thinking 
that consists in turning a subject over in the mind and giving it serious and 
constructive consideration” (p. 3). Dewey further identifies reflective thinking as 
the consecutive ordering of ideas, each of which is connected to a subsequent idea 
as an appropriate outcome and “in turn leans back on, or refers to, its 
predecessors” (p. 4). This kind of thinking “involves (1) a state of doubt, 
hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act 
of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle 
and dispose of the perplexity” (p. 12). Nonsensuous imagining allows us to see 
ourselves as subjects engaged in a thinking process. Through imagining we can 
mentally represent the ordering of ideas and the conclusion we are trying to reach. 
We imaginatively project ourselves into the minds of those engaged in doubtful 
states in order to help create in our minds alternatives that might resolve the doubt.
The search to resolve doubt - a reflective process according to Dewey 
(1933) - demands what Richard Paul (1984) calls dialogical thinking. In Richard 
Paul's theory of strong sense critical thinking we are introduced to his conception 
of dialogical thinking - a crucial aspect of critical thinking. According to Paul, 
dialogical thinking is "a dialogue or extended exchange between different points 
of view, cognitive domains, or frames of reference" (p. 254). It is closely
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associated with dialectical thinking, which assesses the different points of view for 
their relative strength. Paul admits that this thinking cannot be done without 
calling forth the imagination. By the nature of the self, we cannot easily (if at all) 
step outside ourselves and experience another point of view. We are able to 
engage in this form of critical thinking only by the imagination, which allows us to 
move "up and back between categorically different imagined roles" (p. 219).
We must first of all imagine ourselves in a given frame of reference.
Then we must imaginatively construct some reason to support it. Next 
we must step outside it and imagine ourselves responding to those 
reasons from an opposing point of view. Then we must imagine 
ourselves back in the first point of view to respond to the opposition we 
just created. Next we must change roles again and create a further 
response, and so on. The imagination and its creative powers are 
continually called forth, (p. 219)
The imagination that Paul recognizes as a crucial part of critical thinking is non­
sensuous imagining-how in which the thinker imagines himself or herself in the 
mind of the person who has an opposing point of view. The dialogue is an 
ongoing process which Paul intimates is not possible without our imaginative 
capacity.
Possibilizing Nature of Imagination
Casey (1976) also contributes to our understanding of the imagination by 
uncovering “the possibilizing activity of imagination” (p. 206). Possibilizing itself 
refers to the contention that, when we imagine, “everything appears purely 
possible” (p. 206). In sensuous imagining-that possibilizing may take the form of 
placing an imagined character in a setting totally foreign to him or her. Or it may 
take the form of multiple imagined acts and diverse conclusions to our imaginings.
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In nonsensuous imagining-that the imaginer may conjure up in his or her mind a 
number of possible routes to a solution, may be “sensitive to aspects or nuances 
w hich.. .have not yet [been] apprehended” (p. 207), or may generate numerous 
ideas, from which to reach a conclusion. This possibilizing power of the 
imagination, I suggest, operates in critical thinking. During the process of 
critically evaluating and analyzing, the imagination is actively engaged during 
critical thinking in presenting multiple ideas (some of which may even be 
outlandish) and various alternatives to help us reach different conclusions. If the 
possibilizing power of the imagination is suppressed during the critical thinking 
process, our options for making decisions or solving problems tend to be limiting 
and fragmentary and the solution we select can be superficial and obvious. If we 
are assisting young people in their decisions about academic schedules, for 
example, we are thinking critically. Without the imagination, the schedules would 
not reflect students' imagining what they might want to do when they finish school 
or what other long-term goals they may have. The result of such thinking would 
be decisions about students' schedules with courses selected without strong 
reasons for their selection. If my son is in the process of thinking critically about a 
controversial topic (such as abortion) with the intention of establishing a belief 
about it, I hope he is using the possibilizing power of the imagination to generate 
multiple perspectives on the topic of abortion before he establishes a belief he is 
comfortable with and can defend. If he fails to do this, he is likely to accept a 
simplistic answer to this complex problem and may be susceptible to the influence 
of other people who use passionate rhetoric on the topic of abortion. When we 
embrace the possibilizing activity, our critical thinking becomes richer and we are 
more likely to reach a conclusion that has resulted from an exploration of various 
options and an understanding of the ramifications of the choices we have made.
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Casey's Views About the Imagination's Connection With Creativity
When we engage the possibilizing power of the imagination, we are being 
creative. The association between the imagination and creativity has had a long 
tradition (most notably evident in the connection that artists have made between 
their creative acts and the imagination). Casey (1976), however, rejects the 
necessary connection posited by some philosophers and artists. He contends first 
that the imagination is not necessarily creative and in fact may even be banal and 
repetitive. Certainly when we imagine items on a grocery list we want to 
purchase, we generally do not call that act creative. Further, many people use the 
imagination in obsessing about some troubling problem. For example, if I am 
afraid of engaging in conversation with people, I might construct a stilted 
conversation and endlessly repeat it prior to meeting them or try to boringly 
reconstruct my every move with the help of my memory and my imagination. The 
imagination, therefore, can be ploddingly controlled as well as spontaneous and 
may not establish "a new synthesis of previously experienced elements" (p. 186). 
Yet it would seem that we cannot dismiss the creativity of the imagination when 
recognizing the need to find a new way to treat cancer or to develop a metaphor to 
explain a connection between a scientific concept and its implications for our daily 
lives.
Casey (1976), however, does want to sever the link between imagination 
and creativity. He argues that a "genuine" creativity does not require the 
imagination "in any crucial way." This is a contention I do not accept. I highlight 
"genuine" and "in a crucial way" in Casey's own statement because it seems to me 
to significantly qualify his claim. These qualifying phrases suggest that there are 
instances in which imagining enters into some false creative act (although Casey 
does not indicate how we might identify such creative acts) and that there are
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examples of creativity in which the imagination enters in some non-crucial way. 
Casey claims that we have abundant examples of creativity in which the 
imagination plays no significant part. He offers only one, however, the work of 
Poincare, a mathematician, whom Casey claims does not acknowledge an 
imaginative influence on his mathematical creativity. I do not believe that 
Poincare's writing provides a convincing example.
We need to return to Poincare's assertions about creativity in order to judge 
the aptness of Casey's example. Casey (1976) observes that, "when Poincare 
arrived at a creative solution to a problem in higher mathematics as he stepped on 
an omnibus, no specific acts of imagining had preceded the moment of discovery" 
(p. 186). From reading Poincare's account we see it is true he does not 
acknowledge the imagination in his creative thinking. Poincare (1952) focuses 
primarily on the role of intuition, inspiration, or sudden illumination in 
mathematical creation. But this does not show imagination is not involved. 
Poincare simply omits all discussion of the imagination. Intuition, according to 
Poincare, is a feeling that enables us to "divine hidden harmonies and relations" (p. 
35) specifically for mathematics. There is no reason not to consider the possibility 
that imagination plays a role in the generation of intuition so I still regard it as an 
open question whether imagination is required for creativity.
What is missing from Poincare's discussion (Poincare, 1952) is a role for 
the imagination in his description of mathematical creation. He makes two 
references to the imagination, neither of which is intended to provide illumination 
on mathematical creation. Does this mean that Casey (1976) is correct in his 
contention that Poincare's observations support his belief that the imagination is 
not necessarily a part of creativity? I would suggest that simply because the 
imagination is not highlighted as an aspect of mathematical creation does not 
mean that the imagination is not operating in a significant way in Poincare's
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creative thinking. Poincare talks about the intuition needed to discern a 
mathematical order to solve a problem. Intuition certainly plays a role but, when 
Poincare talks about discerning order to syllogisms in mathematical 
demonstrations and envisaging the choices needed to be made to identify useful 
combinations, he seems to be engaging in nonsensuous imagining.
Using Casey’s own contentions in his book, we can conclude (although not 
guarantee) that imagination may have indeed existed in Poincare’s creative 
thinking, even if he fails to describe the link. First, it opens up the possibilizing 
power, which Poincare probably used to generate diverse options in order to 
determine the direction his thinking would take and what solution would be 
suitable. Second, Poincare’s thinking seems to be replete with nonsensuous 
imaginings during the cognitive process. They enable him to generate ideas, to 
imagine the culmination of the creative-cum-critical act, and to call to mind a 
means to reach that conclusion.
Without the imagination, I believe, creativity is not possible. The creative 
individual uses the imagination throughout the creative process. When the 
creative individual disengages at times and allows for the thought process to 
emerge in a free-flowing way, he or she is allowing images to emerge and serve as 
a catalyst for ideas. The imagination enables a person to envision the next step or 
steps in the creative process, to see alternate possibilities, and to picture the 
creative product. The imagination is a catalyst for the creative mind because the 
images it produces do not have to be bound by the rules of the world in which we 
live, can be combined in an infinite number of ways the imaginer wishes (and 
sometimes in ways the person does not wish), and can represent ideas in a variety 
of ways.
Casey (1976) contributes significantly to our understanding of the 
imagination and its effects on critical thinking in his focus on nonsensuous as well
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as sensuous imagining and the possibilizing nature of the imagination. As I have 
argued in this chapter, nonsensuous imagining aids the critical thinker in 
generating ideas, being self-reflective, and apprehending the critical perspective of 
another. Because of the possibilizing nature of the imagination, the critical thinker 
can envisage as many possible ideas and scenarios for making those ideas 
applicable to the situation as his or her mind is capable of. Casey, however, 
provides only one perspective on the imagination. In the next chapter we will 
examine the perspective of another philosopher, Mary Wamock, whose writings 
on the imagination have been influential, in order to gain a more complete picture 
of the imagination and its role in critical thinking.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMAGINATION IN THE THEATRE OF THE MIND: 
PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE IMAGINATION
Marv Warnock
Mary Warnock published her philosophical work on the imagination during 
the same year Edward Casey published his phenomenological study. Wamock's 
book, however, has a different purpose and uses a different philosophical approach 
from Casey's. Warnock asserts two broad themes for her study: that the 
imagination operates in our perception of the world and that this imagination can 
be educated, thus enriching our perception. The imagination, according to 
Warnock (1976), "enables us to see the world, whether present or absent, as 
significant, and also to present this vision to others for them to share or reject" (p. 
196). Although some might regard this process as intellectual, Warnock 
underscores her point that emotions play an equal role in the process.
To make her case for the role of the imagination in everyday perception, 
Warnock adopts the techniques of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy does 
not ignore the phenomenon being studied, but analyzes its nature and purpose in 
the context of the traditions from which it comes - attempting "to elucidate 
complexes [like the imagination] by reducing them to their simpler elements and 
the relations between those elements" (Shand, 1993, p. 203). The approach is 
usually characterized by linguistic analysis, which is thought to assist in 
uncovering the underlying structure of the complexes. Warnock carefully 
examines the arguments of predecessors writing on the topic at hand and builds an
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argument to support her own contentions.
In contrast to Casey (1976), whose phenomenological perspective tends to 
place his beliefs and assumptions in the broader philosophical context of idealism, 
Warnock's analytic approach tends toward realism. Unlike idealism, realism 
accepts the reality of the world independent of our senses and consciousness. If 
we accept the existence of material objects and the world of which they are a part, 
then we do not attempt to narrow or "reduce" our perspective on reality in order to 
find meaning in a phenomenon. Nor do we place complete trust in our 
consciousness when seeking meaning in the world. Rather, we tend to be 
expansive in our interpretations and analyses, locating evidence drawn from 
various sources such as other individuals or public objects like other philosophical 
studies in order to demonstrate relationships, connections, and meaning.
Warnock's analysis of the imagination is historically based, beginning with 
an investigation of Hume and Kant, exploring the poetic conception of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, and concluding with Sartre and Wittgenstein. She 
introduces the poetic perspective in this philosophical argument because she sees 
that perspective as demonstrating the interpretive role of the imagination assisting 
us in perceiving our world with new insight and meaning. She acknowledges the 
need to examine the phenomenologist's perspective, since philosophers like Hume 
fail to address the intentionality of the image. She too emphasizes that there is an 
imaginative object and that a feature of an image is "a kind of consciousness, a 
way of thinking of something" (Warnock, 1976, p. 162). She concludes by 
focusing on the connection between the imagination and feeling and suggests that, 
in order to provide a spark in students for learning and to encourage feeling, in 
other words, to overcome a sense of boredom in students, the imagination needs to 
be educated.
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Warnock's View About the Connection Between the Imagination and Creativity
Unlike Casey (1976), Warnock (1976) strongly connects the imagination 
and creativity. In examining David Hume’s theory about the imagination, she 
notes that “there is a sense in which the imagination is creative, in that it can 
construct what it likes out of the elements at its disposal” (Warnock, 1976, p. 16). 
Although Warnock generally refers to what we have described as sensuous rather 
than nonsensuous imagining-that and imagining-how, I believe her observations 
apply equally to all three sorts of imagining. Superficially, her contention that 
there is a strong connection between the imagination and creativity may seem to 
contradict Casey’s assertions about the creativity of the imagination; however, by 
introducing the clause with “there is a sense.. . ,” Warnock is also suggesting that 
there may be senses in which the imagination is not creative. Nevertheless, in 
Warnock’s study of the imagination she persistently strives to connect the 
imagination and creativity, asserting that “if imagination is creative in all its uses, 
then children will be creating their own meanings and interpretations of things as 
much by looking at them as by making them” (p. 207).
The benefits of acknowledging the link between the imagination and 
creativity are much more evident to Warnock than to Casey, who believes that we 
muddle the true nature and value of the imagination if we too strongly connect it 
with creativity. It should be noted, however, the different purposes of the studies 
of the two philosophers. Casey intends to make clear the nature of the 
imagination, while Warnock is arguing for the cultivation of one form or use of the 
imagination specifically in perception.
I accept Casey’s contention that the imagination and creativity must be 
disentangled if we hope to recognize the way our imagination truly operates in our 
mind and accurately record the functions that make it powerful in our lives.
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Warnock herself frequently chooses to label the imagination she is exploring as 
“creative imagination,” a phrase that more aptly describes the type of imagination 
she is interested in. Casey I believe rightly notes that imagination can be not only 
creative but also banal and repetitive. Warnock assumes that the imagination is 
necessarily a part of creativity, and does not discuss the nature of the connection. 
But of course claiming imagination is a necessary part of creativity does not entail 
that the imagination is itself always creative. Nevertheless, Warnock focuses on 
what she calls the creative imagination, which she views as active, liberating, 
enabling perception and creating symbols “to express the ultimate nature of the 
world” (p. 70), and inducing “deep feelings in the presence of the image” (p. 82). 
Unlike Casey, she sees the imagination as a powerful force in all aspects of our 
lives and therefore the most important focus of the education of young people.
Imagination and Meaning
An underlying theme of Warnock's study (and one that will be useful in our 
understanding of the role of the imagination in critical thinking) is the idea of the 
imagination's giving meaning to our experiences. Although Warnock (1976) sees 
the imagination as providing meaning in our lives constantly and persistently, 
primarily because the imagination operates in ordinary perception, Warnock is 
suggesting that this meaning-making capacity takes essentially two forms. The 
first deals with an imagination that "ascribes.. .meanings" (p. 207) to ordinary 
perception. Thus, the imagination enables us to see the relationship between two 
objects of the same kind. According to Warnock, through the imagination we are 
able to recognize a daffodil. The imagination also enables us to recognize that the 
daffodil I have on my desk is the same one I had on my desk a day ago or week 
ago. The imagination is operating in ordinary perception to provide connections
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that enable us to perceive the world in a continuous way. It makes meaning of 
what we see by connecting one item with another. This capacity of the 
imagination will not concern us in this dissertation. Warnock's contentions about 
the operation of the imagination in these situations seem highly questionable, 
however, since perception itself would seem to be able to make sense of our world 
without the intermediary of the imagination. This form of meaning making allows 
us to see the world as familiar.
The second form, which I believe is more pertinent to the subject of this 
dissertation, regards the meaning-making capacity of the imagination as making 
meaning because it enables us "to see the world as significant of something 
unfamiliar" (Warnock, 1976, p. 10). This form of meaning is necessary "if we are 
ever to treat the objects of perception as symbolizing or suggesting things other 
than themselves" (p. 10). Warnock calls this "the interpretive function of the 
imagination" which provides "new meaning" (p. 103). When we render 
experiences unfamiliar and mysterious, we are forced to find meaning that goes 
beyond what presently exists and allows us to explore "vast unexplored areas, 
huge spaces of which we may get only an occasional awe-inspiring glimpse, 
questions raised by experience about whose answers we can only with hesitation 
speculate" (p. 208). This form of meaning making provides depth to our thinking 
because it allows us to take something familiar (such as a common problem we are 
facing) and to see that problem in uncommon ways by envisaging its many 
dimensions. I would agree with Warnock that it is the imagination that allows us 
to take something familiar and make it completely unfamiliar. Such use of the 
imagination has the potential of moving our thinking to another level.
83
Imagination and Emotions
It is the elaboration of the connection between the imagination and feelings 
or emotions (that is to say, the affective side of our thinking) that is Warnock’s 
most significant contribution to our understanding of the imagination and its role 
in critical thinking. I have already underscored in chapter two the belief of many 
contemporary critical thinking theorists that critical thinking must acknowledge 
the role of emotions in our thinking and even to encourage rational passions. 
Harvey Siegel (1988), for example, emphasizes that critical thinking cannot (and 
should not) be divorced from emotions specifically fostering a desire to engage 
reason. He emphasizes the efficacy of violating "the time-honored distinction 
between cognition and affect (or thinking and feeling, or thought and value, or 
reason and emotion)" (p. 40). What is more important, according to Siegel, is to 
foster appropriate attitudes, passions, and interests - to acknowledge that reasoning 
is passionate.
Richard Paul (1990) sees emotions as key to the development of critical 
thinking dispositions. In particular, Paul identifies both a cognitive and affective 
dimension to critical thinking. Although the cognitive dimension has traditionally 
been the primary and often sole focus of critical thinking, the affective dimension 
is important enough in Paul’s conception of critical thinking that it must be 
regarded as playing an equal (not superior or inferior) role. He particularly 
focuses on the need to cultivate rational passions, which move us away from 
egocentric emotions (such as jealousy, fear, anger, and envy) preventing us from 
engaging in critical thinking. He points out that "emotions and feelings 
themselves are not irrational; however, it is common for people to feel strongly 
when their ego is stimulated" (p. 548). We need to free ourselves of irrational 
emotions and develop in individuals "a passionate drive for clarity, accuracy, and
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fairmindedness, a fervor for getting to the bottom of things, to the deepest root 
issues, for listening sympathetically to opposition points of view, a compelling 
drive to seek out evidence, an intensive aversion to contradiction, sloppy thinking, 
inconsistent application of standards, a devotion to truth as against self-interest"
(p. 218).
Although neither Siegel (1988) nor Paul (1990) distinguishes between 
emotions and dispositions, I believe it important to note how the two operate 
together. In discussing affective characteristics, these critical thinking theorists 
have tended to blend the two. An emotion, however, is "a feeling aroused to the 
point of awareness, often a strong feeling or state of excitement" (Paul, 1990, p. 
548), while a disposition is a habitual frame of mind that is closely tied to the way 
one responds emotionally. Dispositions themselves are not emotions, but we can 
be motivated to cultivate rational dispositions or habits of mind by emotions and 
certain dispositions encourage emotions. Indeed, it can be argued that emotions 
are essential to the development and sustenance of dispositions. We may be 
capable of being reflective (of demonstrating this disposition), but if we don't have 
the motivation or strong feeling to perpetually engage in such thinking, it will, at 
the least, atrophy and can fail to prevent us from degenerating into a tendency to 
think superficially and in ways characterized by bias.
Before focusing on the role of the imagination in developing the affective 
dimension of critical thinking, I believe it necessary to examine the relationship of 
the emotions to the imagination. I agree with Paul's depiction of an emotion as "a 
feeling aroused to the point of awareness" (Paul, 1990, p. 548). I also appreciate 
Paul's contention that emotions are as important to critical thinking as reason. 
Related to this contention is a belief that I accept: namely, that emotions, which 
need not be identified as irrational, are sometimes important to the construction of 
knowledge. Of course the role they play depends upon the kind of knowledge at
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issue. For example, emotions are more relevant to our knowledge of persons than 
to our knowledge of physics. The point here is that the emotions need not be, as 
Hume suggests, servants to reason. It is likely that, when we engage in the 
construction of knowledge, both emotions and reason, the subjective and the 
objective, need to be involved in the process.
When we imagine, we evoke emotions. Although the imagination isn't the 
only capacity to evoke emotions, as we may note when we remember an emotional 
scene from our past or perceive the results of a car wreck, the imagination plays a 
powerful role in creating and even shaping emotions. One image of child abuse, 
for example, can elicit emotions of outrage, anger, or sympathy. The emotions we 
elicit may vary in intensity, but have the potential to affect us deeply in either a 
positive or negative way. If we continue to use our imagination to understand a 
number of possible perspectives on child abuse, our emotions may be modified 
and the subject may be more meaningful to us. This process is necessary to the 
building of knowledge along with the reasoning process, which takes our 
imaginings (and the emotions that accompany them) as integral when we organize 
and analyze what we have been discovering. By maintaining an interaction 
between emotions, some of which are elicited and shaped by the imagination, and 
reason, we avoid identifying knowledge solely with objects divorced from the 
knower; we also avoid making knowledge so subjective that it has meaning only 
to the knower. The integration between the affective and the cognitive, promoted 
by the possibilizing nature of the imagination, is crucial to our understanding of 
critical thinking.
But what is imagination’s role in the development of the affective 
dimension of critical thinking? We have already seen in our examination of 
Casey’s conception of the imagination that the imagination enables us to generate 
ideas, to envision differing directions for our thinking and products that steer us in
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particular directions, to create a mental dialogue in which we come to understand 
an opposing perspective or idea in relationship to our own, and to provide for a 
creative imagination to influence our critical thinking. Most of our observations 
have been concerned with the cognitive dimension rather than the affective 
dimension of thinking. This emphasis has been more mine than Casey’s, since I 
wanted initially to make the less obvious connection between the imagination and 
the cognitive dimension of critical thinking, even though our general views of the 
imagination are often associated with its affective or sensuous side.
Warnock (1976) claims not only that the imagination is connected to the 
emotions but that it “gives rise to the passions” (p. 37) as well. In fact the 
intensity of our feelings is directly proportional to the vividness of the 
imagination. The imagination enkindles our feelings, the more so with the 
development of related images (probably akin to Casey’s imagining-that and 
imagining-how). Warnock draws these ideas from Hume, but finds support in the 
writings of Kant and Coleridge. For Warnock the connection between the 
imagination and feelings is so strong that she claims we can direct feelings by 
educating the imagination.
Warnock's work focuses on the cultivation of positive emotions through 
education of the imagination. Although we need to recognize that the imagination 
is capable of generating negative emotions and feelings as well, we are seeking to 
nurture particular types of positive emotions during the critical thinking enterprise 
- namely, those that generate critical thinking dispositions or habits or traits of 
mind. Warnock is not specifically talking about these types of emotions, but her 
general observations are applicable. When we imagine a scene which includes a 
deceased family member, we are often overwhelmed by emotions. When we are 
in the midst of writing an original musical score, which has absorbed us 
personally, the use of the imagination to envision what the final score would sound
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like can be replete with feelings. Likewise, when we think critically in order to assess 
our belief in support of genetic engineering, we must exercise fairmindedness about those 
opposed to genetic engineering by “imaginatively put[ting] ourselves in the place of 
others to genuinely understand them” (Paul, 1990, p. 311), explore our feelings (such as 
fear and awe about the consequences of genetic engineering) as well as related thoughts, 
have the courage to take a stand on what some might consider a controversial issue, and 
recognize that in the face of the information about genetic engineering we should be 
humble and unpretentious. The imagination enables us to be fairminded by constructing 
other perspectives, including the feelings that "go with" or prompt those views. Once we 
apprehend various perspectives, then we have a more complete idea of how another 
person thinks and feels and can make more just decisions. Without the imagination our 
decisions would be based on our own perspective alone, and even that would be limited 
since the imagination aids us in apprehending our own point of view and mindset. As we 
employ the imagination during our thinking, we are in a way “exciting” ideas in our 
minds of qualities that may not exist and “shaping” ourselves both emotionally and 
intellectually to realize these qualities.
The significance of the imagination’s role in developing and fostering dispositions 
should not be underestimated. The cognitive dimension of critical thinking will mean 
little if we fail to foster the affective dimension. Warnock suggests that intense 
imaginative experiences affect our natures. When we intensely experience the 
imagination, we are enticed to want to experience the emotions once again throughout 
our lives. If we accept the power of such experiences, we must educate the imagination 
in order to ensure that our emotions are directed positively. In critical thinking that 
education will take the form of encouraging experiences that empower young people not 
only to imagine-that and imagine-how nonsensuously in order to propel their thinking, 
but also to imagine various rational passions.
Conclusion
Although our conceptions o f the imagination and its relationship to reason 
and critical thinking are influenced by the culture and heritage in which we are 
immersed, there is little doubt that within the Western intellectual tradition 
imagining is regarded as a powerful mental operation, which is viewed by some as 
either limiting or damaging on the one hand or by others as liberating and 
transformative on the other. In Ms. Alsop's English classroom, she had a difficult 
time separating the imagination from other thinking activities. When she focused 
on critical thinking as argumentation, however, the students saw imagination as an 
entirely separate activity very much distinct from critical thinking. In her mind 
she conceived o f imagination as the wellspring fo r creative acts that resulted in the 
creation ofKeat's "Ode to a Nightingale" or Shakespeare's King Lear. Although 
this mental capacity greatly fascinated her, especially since she herself enjoyed 
writing fiction, she could not envision clearly how to cultivate the imagination in 
the classroom. She seldom saw it as a concept applicable to nonfiction writing, 
even though she recognized the techniques from fiction applied to nonfiction 
pieces. At this stage o f her career she engaged students in exercises in which they 
imagined themselves seeing in their mind's eye a scene like a beach where they 
could view Mount Chocorua and its reflection on Chocorua Lake. She asked 
students to draw on all o f their senses to reconstruct the scene and then to "sketch" 
it on paper. She designed this exercise and other similar ones to invest in students 
an appreciation o f the process that a poet or creative writer undergoes in writing a 
poem, short story, or novel. Eventually these activities would lead to the writing 
o f fictional pieces.
Just as Ms. Alsop's views about critical thinking expanded during her years 
as an English teacher, her views about the role o f imagination also changed.
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Although she continued to encourage students to envision scenes and images 
before they wrote, she realized the potential o f the imagination to expand students' 
understanding o f the world they lived in as they explored the imaginative worlds 
writers created. Students could discover how people view the world they inhabit 
in different ways. As students read literary works and as they projected themselves 
into various scenarios, they observed and perceived their worlds differently. She 
also saw the potential fo r  the imagination to enable students to construct other 
peoples' perspectives in a way similar to what Paul (1984) suggests occurs in 
dialogical thinking. In one exercise students imagined themselves in a scenario in 
which they projected themselves into the psyche o f a person not accepted in our 
society. Ms. Alsop thought that such an exercise o f the imagination might educate 
students about tolerance and respect i f  they could gain some understanding o f the 
perspective o f  another person.
In the process o f expanding the educational use o f the imagination, Ms. 
Alsop's imaginative activities began to resemble some o f the expanded critical 
thinking activities she had tried. Nevertheless, she seldom noticed the connection 
between critical thinking and the imagination and continued to associate the 
imagination with artistic endeavors like the writing o f a novel. However, students 
engaged in activities designed to explore the perspectives o f other people and to 
generate ideas useful during the critical thinking process. As students wrote from  
different perspectives, they found the experience o f discovery more than simply an 
intellectual exercise, more than an exercise in argumentation. Rather, the exercise 
demonstrated that thought and emotion could operate together fo r  a common 
purpose as students immersed themselves in the process o f discovering through 
thinking.
The powerful role of the imagination, as Ms. Alsop discovered, can create 
images to stir the emotions, to generate ideas, to free our mind, and to transform
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our thinking about ourselves and the world we live in - all often at will and 
frequently simultaneously. The workings of the imagination appear to revitalize 
the rational by introducing emotions (Warnock, 1976) and potentially bridging a 
gap between thought and emotion which expanded critical thinking has also tried 
to bridge (Paul, 1990; Prawat, 1993; Siegel, 1988). Those embracing expanded 
conceptions of critical thinking feel uncomfortable with dichotomies like thought 
and emotion (Paul, 1984; Paul, 1990; Prawat, 1991; Prawat, 1993) because the 
imaginative influence that Casey (1976) describes eschews dichotomous thinking. 
As we reduce dichotomies, we begin to link disparate ideas and invent novel ways 
of approaching and expanding our knowledge base (Perkins, 1986a; Perkins, 
1986b; Perkins, 1987; Perkins, 1990; Prawat, 1991; Prawat, 1993). The 
imagination operates in our mind and affects our critical thought processes, 
helping us to find meaning in our thinking and our world (Warnock, 1976); it 
transforms our thinking into habits of mind or dispositions, which entice us to 
explore and discover our thinking and its relationship to the world we live in. We 
plumb the depths of understanding through the imagination and discover a 
transformative reality.
As we examine the imagination in light of our discussions of critical 
thinking, we see a network of ideas that connect imagination to reason and to 
critical thinking, a network that seems to transform our thinking, moving it to 
another level through the power of images that never abandon us even when 
reason itself may. In many ways the role of imagination as a dynamic of critical 
thinking is like Maria Lugones' notion of mestizaje (Lugones, 1994). Imagination 
resides in the midst of either/or, that space where multiplicity can exist and can 
operate to free our thought and ourselves.
But before we can fully understand the role of imagination in critical 
thinking, or feel confident we understand exactly how it works, we need to turn to
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consider what some literary artists have to say about the imagination, for it is they 
who most obviously employ the imagination and live ultimately with it.
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CHAPTER SIX
HEROES OF THE IMAGINATION - 
THE LITERARY CHARACTER OF THE IMAGINATION
Maxine Greene (1991) suggests that education occurs when we become 
"the friends of one another's minds" (p. xi). We experience such friendship when 
we tell stories, which enable us to hear "the sound of many discourses, many 
voices" (p. x), the voices of everyone in our educational process. The poet and 
other literary artists explore the imagination by telling its story. They demonstrate, 
as they probe the imagination, its power to transform a person's thoughts and to 
initiate creativity. They do not directly tell a story about critical thinking, but they 
offer pertinent insights for our discussion in this dissertation.
Although I believe that writers of literature support the contentions of the 
philosophers examined in chapters four and five, their insights emerge from a 
different (often more intuitive) source than the philosophers' conceptions. They 
see the imagination less as an object of study to comprehend than as a subject they 
apprehend as part of the creative process. Many writers choose not to 
depersonalize the subject of the imagination, because they believe it constitutes so 
much of what they are as artists. Consequently the imagination is often revealed 
through the literature as well as through exposition. In spite of its personal nature 
for writers, as we shall see, literary artists present an imagination we may connect 
with characteristics identified with expanded notions of critical thinking. They 
also offer insights into qualities that I am arguing ought to be aspects of critical 
thinking. I will explore these connections throughout this chapter and then 
summarize the connections in chapter seven in preparation for a redesigned
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conception of generative, creative, and constructive critical thinking in ensuing 
chapters.
Why Focus on the Literary?
As we noted earlier, in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method of 
philosophical study (Husserl, 1931), he admonishes those adopting a 
phenomenological approach to use literary examples to illuminate and support the 
phenomenon being examined. The phenomenological researcher in Husserl's case, 
like the writer of literature, is able to "associate, and finally to identify, the human 
mind with what goes on outside it" (Frye, 1964, p. 33) through the use of 
literature. Literature is the language of the imagination, according to Frye, 
providing "a vision or model in [the] mind of what [we] want to construct" (p. 21). 
I focus on the literary, which enables us to make connections between the mind 
and the world we live in, for the following reasons:
1) Husserl's admiration for the role of literature in the phenomenological 
approach is justified, I believe, because writers are able to articulate the nature of a 
phenomenon by placing it in the context of a plot or setting. Thus, if we are 
examining the phenomenon of imagination, we might focus on an episode of 
discovery made by Stephen Daedelas in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man to 
uncover the imagination at work in a character brought to life by the author, James 
Joyce (1964). Similarly, I would suggest that the literary artist is an appropriate 
and important focus for an understanding of the imagination in this dissertation 
because of his or her ability to express the thoughts that all of us think and to 
convey ideas that many of us find difficult to grasp or express. We find support 
for this view of the literary artist from Toni Morrison (1992), who contends that 
"writers are among the most sensitive, the most intellectually anarchic, most
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representative, most probing of artists. The ability of writers to imagine what is 
not the self, to familiarize the strange and mystify the familiar, is the test of their 
power" (p. 15). In short, writers are attuned to and immersed in the imagination 
and are able to use it to motivate and shape their writing.
2) Many writers of literature believe that language is a vehicle for 
expressing the imagination and they regard the imagination as a mental capacity 
that provides life and vitality for their writing. Because the imagination is 
believed to be so important to the artists' being and creativity, they devote much 
time and energy to understanding how the imagination operates and what effects it 
has on the lives and works of artists and others. The insights of those who take the 
imagination seriously as the lifeblood of their art may very well reveal qualities 
that might not be discovered in other ways.
3) Gaston Bachelard (1943) sees literature as central to "the fulfillment of 
human desire as it emerges in imagination" (p. 284). The literary work, as a 
product of the imagination, gives a voice to human activities, provoking us to want 
to communicate about human experience. When we examine the creative works 
of poets, we are also learning about human experience as it is revealed by the 
imagination at work in literature.
The Romantic Imagination
I believe I would be remiss if I were to examine the literary imagination 
without looking at the Romantic conception of the imagination. More than any 
other tradition in Western culture the Romantic tradition is characterized by a 
preoccupation with the role of the imagination and its effects on creativity. It is 
the subject of many of the Romantic poems and Romantic poets like William 
Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge expound on it at length as a catalyst for
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the creative process. Consequently, I have focused on the writings of two 
prominent poets of the Romantic period - Wordsworth and Coleridge - before 
examining a 20th century writer - Wallace Stevens - who has a distinct conception 
of the imagination but who is influenced by the views of Romantics.
The writers during the Romantic period were captivated by the imagination, 
which they believed inspired and shaped their writing. Romantic writers believed 
that imagination is "the basis of all significant human creation" (Casey, 1976, p. 
184). Their Romantic notion that the imagination is essentially creative has 
become so pervasive, even in contemporary parlance, that ordinary language often 
equates the imagination with creativity. When we talk about an imaginative child, 
we are often talking about her creative abilities - her capacity to paint or draw, for 
example.
Romantic writers like William Wordworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and 
John Keats engaged in a revolt against the mechanistic and rational worldview of 
18th century writers, who rejected a role for the imagination in the creative act, in 
favor of a more expansive, progressive, and emotional worldview. The metaphor 
for the poet and the imaginative process during this artistic period, as M.H.
Abrams (1953) points out, changes from the mirror, which reflects and imitates 
life passively, to the lamp, which views the poet as using the imagination to 
illuminate the world in which we live. For thinkers during the 19th century 
reliance on the rationality of humans was questionable; they sought to emulate the 
workings of nature and idealized the natural purity of the primitive mind freed 
from the perilous effects of civilization. Consequently, their poetry tended to be 
less concerned with poetic language than the communication of ideas in a freer 
way. The Romantic poets constantly sought to capture through the imagination the 
strength and richness of nature and the primitive mind; they also sought to 
recapture their child-like minds, which were considered to be more in tune with
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the imagination and better able to uncover the true meaning or significance of the 
world in which they lived.
The Romantic writers focused on the imagination in order to uncover the 
passionate side of thinking in one's writing and daily life. Because of the 
emphasis on the individual, each of these writers had a different view about the 
imagination. Generally, however, they viewed the imagination as enabling them to 
observe the ordinary in nature and everyday lives, to discover the extraordinary in 
it, and, in some instances, to reveal a transcendent order. The Romantic writers 
were not necessarily interested in escaping from the world in which they lived but 
rather in transforming it by rediscovering its true nature freed from the artifices 
created by civilization and adult minds. This process, in turn, was meant to be 
liberating. The imagination, then, was important not only for the creation of 
Romantic poetry, but also for heightening the experience of one's life. Romantic 
writers' views about the imagination as a vital force and energizing capacity in the 
mind of individuals have much to contribute to our understanding of sensuous and 
nonsenuous imagining and for critical thinking which employs the imagination.
Writers Selected For this Chapter
In this study we need to understand the power and qualities of the 
imagination in order to intentionally employ it. While telling imagination's story, 
artists constantly try to probe the depths of the mind and being to discover the 
nature of the imagination and the source of their creativity. Their primary motive 
is a simple one - to learn how to draw upon it to add life and vitality to their 
writing and lives.
I have selected three writers - William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, and Wallace Stevens - to provide insights into the nature of the
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imagination and its role in our lives. I have opted to look at the writings of 
William Wordsworth because he (along with his compatriot Coleridge) provides 
the foundation for the English Romantic movement. In addition, Wordsworth 
writes biographical and personalized poetry to explore his discoveries about the 
imagination and his feelings when it seemingly abandons him. Because he makes 
more modest and balanced claims for the imagination than many other Romantic 
poets, he offers insights on the imagination that will be valuable in understanding 
the role of the imagination in critical thinking where the imagination often 
operates subtly to inspire and motivate our thinking. Wordsworth's entire opus is 
often regarded as the story of one man's discovery, nurturing, and loss of the 
imagination in his life and work. He discovers and reveals the nature of the 
imagination to modify, synthesize, and integrate. He does not seek to use the 
imagination to abandon the world for a transcendent reality but, rather, to discover 
meaning within the reality in which he lives.
Coleridge shares a kinship with Wordsworth, even though his poetry tends 
to be more fantastical and less connected with nature than Wordworth. He 
articulates his views in philosophical prose and poetry - thoughtful analyses 
helpful to our understanding of the imagination. The combination of poetry and 
prose is not surprising since Coleridge (1907) believes that "no man was ever yet a 
great poet without being at the same time a profound philosopher" (vol. 2, p. 19). 
Because of his facility with both genres, Coleridge shows us the imagination 
realized in his poetry and the theory behind his creativity in his prose. As William 
K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Cleanth Brooks (1957) point out, although Coleridge's and 
Wordsworth's conceptions of the imagination are not substantially different, 
"Coleridge no doubt may be conveniently accepted as the more articulate and 
more theoretical spokesman of the two" (p. 389). In particular, his thinking 
provides a framework for Wordsworth's observations about the imagination and
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therefore makes Coleridge an appropriate selection for this study. His efforts to 
delineate concepts like the imagination and to examine their implications for 
creative acts complement more intuitive insights and make his observations 
pertinent for this study.
Wallace Stevens sees poetry as "a way of discovering and crystallizing what 
he calls 'the objects of insight, the integrations/Of feeling'" (Sukenich, 1967, p. 1). 
Stevens places as high a value on the imagination as his Romantic counterparts, 
but explores how the imagination operates in a 20th century society where the 
imagination is impoverished because of cynicism. The imagination for Stevens is 
less a creative capacity generated from something not naturally existing than a 
constructive capacity built from what already exists. His insights on the 
imagination in some instances complement and in other instances contrast with 
those of Wordsworth and Coleridge; however, Stevens' observations are valuable 
for our understanding of the imagination as it operates in critical thinking because 
he provides new directions for the imagination particularly suited for the 21st 
century.
William Wordsworth
William Wordsworth (1956) uses the phrase the "colouring of the 
imagination" (p. 358) to identify a process for which a poet has a particular talent 
or gift. A poet can peer at situations in everyday life and, through his or her 
imagination, bring life to the observed reality by making it unusual. Through 
reasonable insight the imagination, according to M.H. Abrams (1953), illuminates 
reality with the "color" of the poet's feelings. Wordsworth does not envision 
imagination released like bright splotches on a canvas but rather more like subtle 
strokes subdued and balanced. When the imagination operates in our thinking, it
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suffuses the activity by putting a new light on what we have observed; it "produces 
impressive effects out of simple elements" (Wordsworth, 1933, p. 899).
Coleridge's appraisal of Wordsworth's qualities provides us with insights 
into Wordsworth's subdued and balanced imagination:
It was the union of deep feeling with profound thought; the fine 
balance of truth in observing, with the imaginative faculty in modifying 
the objects observed; and above all the original gift of spreading the 
tone, the atmosphere, and with it the depth and height of the ideal world 
around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the common view, 
custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dew 
drops (Coleridge, 1907, vol. 1, p. 59).
Unlike many of the Romantic poets of the era Wordsworth is more concerned with 
balance. He sees the importance of the imagination in his life and regrets its loss 
as he ages. Coleridge initially notes the deep feeling Wordsworth exhibits. In his 
"Preface to the Lyrical Ballads," Wordsworth (1956) observes that the product of 
the imagination - poetry - is "the spontonaneous overflow of powerful feelings" (p. 
358). The spontaneity, which we may recall is one of the characteristics of the 
imagination identified by Casey, is important to Wordsworth because it enables 
him, as a poet, to get a sense of the power of the imagination, which operates in 
each of us but especially in the hearts and minds of sensitive poets. In reflecting 
on what to look for in poetry Wordsworth couples emotions and imagination and 
suggests that a critic of "higher poetry" seeks the wise "heart" and the grand 
imagination. He qualifies the "spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" by 
claiming that "it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity" (p. 358). 
Wordsworth seems to be talking here about the aspect of the imagination that 
Casey calls controlledness. Wordsworth suggests that we can direct and shape the 
imaginative overflow of feelings through recollection. Unlike Casey, who regards
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spontaneity and controlledness as mutually exclusive characteristics, Wordsworth 
sees the two as part of the total imaginative process, both working together. We 
might conclude from this statement that Wordsworth believes in the power of 
emotions sparked by the imagination, but not uncontrollable emotions. Rather, he 
seems to be emphasizing the role of reflection - a less excitable and more balanced 
view of emotion than other Romantic poets.
Because of this need for balance and order, Wordsworth is less likely than 
other Romantic poets to establish dichotomies in his thinking since dichotomies 
often result from viewing ideas as extreme. We see once again in Coleridge's 
observations the emphasis on the blend or union of deep feeling and profound 
thought. Wordsworth alludes to the problem in a volume of epitaphs, where he 
observes:
Energy, stillness, grandeur, tenderness, those feelings which are the pure 
emanations of Nature, those thoughts which have the infinitude of truth 
and those expressions which are not what the garb is to the body but what 
the body is to the soul, themselves a constituent part and power or 
function in the thought - all these are abandoned for their opposites, - as if 
our countrymen, through successive generations, had lost the sense of 
solemnity and pensiveness (not to speak of deeper emotions) and resorted 
to the tombs of their forefathers and contemporaries, only to be tickled and 
surprised (Wordsworth, 1876, vol. 2, pp. 63-65).
Wordsworth is focusing on the extremes of his predecessors (such as Dryden and 
Pope) who eschew emotions and feelings in favor of reason and do not respond to 
the imagination's call. To Wordsworth their poetry, which imitates ancient writers 
and is characterized by rhyming couplets, is artificial and superficial. Unlike other 
Romantic writers, however, Wordsworth does not eschew reason in response to the 
contentions of poets in the 18th century. The quality of one's writing (and 
probably the quality of one's thinking), he suggests, "consists in a conjunction of
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Reason and Passion, a conjunction which must be of necessity benign.. 
(Wordsworth, 1876, vol 2, p. 65). He does not denigrate reason, but seeks to 
transform it. In The Prelude Wordsworth (1971) offers some insight on the 
relation of reason and imagination, when he says that the imagination:
Is but another name for absolute power 
And clearest insight, amplitude of mind 
And Reason in her most exalted mood. (XIV, 11. 190-192)
His ability to see the imagination as reasonable distinguishes him from other 
Romantic poets who have very little use for reason, which they often view as 
interfering with the imagination. Not only do imagination and reason operate 
compatibly "to elevate the more-than-reasoning mind," but also represent 
inseparable and inspired processes in our minds that elevate our insights about the 
ordinary world and actively become the source of creativity.
It should be noted that Wordsworth has more than one conception of 
reason. Raymond Haven (1941) in The Mind of a Poet highlights three different 
kinds of reason that Wordsworth uses. The first is akin to intuition, the second 
logic and analysis (a type of reasoning that can be dangerous if left unchecked), 
and the third "judgment, sanity, instinctive wisdom, common sense" (p. 363). The 
first and third senses of reason would seem to be closest to the senses Wordsworth 
is using in talking about the unity and reconciliation of reason with emotion and 
imagination. What we see of the imagination through Wordsworth's sensibility is 
a capacity for evoking feelings and emotions (as Warnock further delineates in her 
study of the imagination), for drawing on reason to write effectively, and for 
reconciling the two capacities.
If we refer back to Coleridge's comments about Wordsworth, we also 
discover Wordsworth's ability to observe and the imaginative capacity to modify
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the observations, to imbue these perceptions with vitality. Thus, Wordsworth can 
talk about his knowledge being "impregnated" by the imagination, which "made it 
[knowledge] live" (Prelude, VIII,11. 796-799). What does Wordsworth mean by 
impregnating knowledge with the imagination? The whole notion of impregnating 
suggests creating. In this case the imagination gives knowledge an energy akin to 
procreation. As conception results in the growth of a child so too the imagination 
encourages the growth and expansion of knowledge. According to Wordsworth 
(1876), the imagination "shapes and creates" (vol. 3, p. 465) - often shaping 
something not presently in existence.
In summary, I find that Wordsworth provides a balanced view of the 
imagination, which is certainly a significant capacity but not the only useful 
capacity affecting our thinking. Wordsworth shows us an imagination that colors 
the world with feelings, balances most everything but especially spontaneous 
feelings with recollection and reflection, intimately connects reason and the 
imagination, and is able to modify and revitalize observations, impregnates 
knowledge, and shapes and creates. Wordsworth lays claim to a conception of the 
imagination that, in many ways, Coleridge provides a theoretical framework for in 
his prose.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge
Samuel Taylor Coleridge believes in the synthesizing power of the 
imagination, which "reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or 
discordant qualities" (Coleridge, 1907, vol. 2, p. 12). He sees it as the "shaping 
spirit," that force which brings unity from diversity. Coleridge's desire to uncover 
a dialectic that draws opposites together frames his discussions about the 
imagination.
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He discusses the imagination under two headings - the primary and 
secondary. The primary imagination represents "the living Power and prime Agent 
of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite world of the eternal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM" (Coleridge, 1907, vol. 1, p. 202). This imagination 
looks to the divine as its model; it "reenacts God's original and eternal creative 
moment" (Wordsworth, 1985, p. 25). The alternate imagination, secondary only in 
degree and not in kind, "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate" what 
ideally the primary has already created. The secondary imagination fuses 
unconsciously the subjective (the human mind) with the objective (the particular) 
to enable the creation of art and poetry. According to Coleridge (1907), the poet 
"diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into 
each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which I would exclusively 
appropriate the name of Imagination" (vol. 2, p. 12). The primary imagination 
seeks a unity with the divine, with God, while the secondary imagination seeks 
through the power of writing to reach the heights of the primary imagination by 
duplicating that unity with God.
It is important to examine the secondary imagination closely, since it is the 
focus of the imagination evident in the thinking of most individuals and, at its 
most intense, tends to transform our thinking. Although the secondary 
imagination is not as pure as the primary imagination, it is more important to 
humans because it is the capacity that allows us to aspire to God's creative 
impulse. This is a particularly Romantic notion. In Coleridge's terms the 
secondary imagination does not create but recreates. He uses three verbs to 
identify what that process entails. All of them relate to the idea of scattering, 
dispersing, breaking up, or disintegrating. Coleridge seems to be suggesting that 
the imagination enables us to observe and work with (to envisage) the parts, which 
are then drawn together into an integrated whole. Thus, when we imagine a series
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of scenes for a play, our mind envisions the parts of the play while simultaneously 
imagining what they look like integrated into a whole.
Coleridge (1907) also differentiates between the imagination and fancy. 
Fancy takes images of "fixities and definites" (vol. 1, p. 202). These images might 
include my friend Jerry and a street in Boston. Through the "mode of memory" 
we might attempt to place these images together without forcing them to lose their 
initial identities. Thus, we may see Jerry and the Boston street, but Jerry's 
presence does not truly seem to be present in Boston. As a consequence, we may 
regard fancy as superficial. However, we cannot dismiss fancy immediately, 
regardless of Coleridge's contention of its inferiority to imagination, because, as 
Coleridge himself says, fancy operates with and does not exclude the imagination 
any more than the imagination excludes fancy. Coleridge suggests that a person 
"may work with two very different tools at the same moment; each has its share in 
the work, but the work effected by each is distinct and different" (vol. 1, p. 194).
So the "aggregate and associative power" of fancy may operate in tandem with the 
energizing and fusing power of the imagination. "Good sense," Coleridge 
contends, "is the Body of poetic genius, Fancy its Drapery, Motion its Life, and 
Imagination the soul that is everywhere, and in each; and forms all into one 
graceful and intelligent whole" (vol. 2, p. 13).
It should be noted, in conclusion, that Coleridge (1907), when talking about 
Shakespeare, believes that "images become proofs of original genius only so far as 
they are modified by a predominant passion" (vol. 2, p. 76). He tries to hold to 
this passion as he seeks reconciliation or synthesis through a dialectic. Coleridge's 
passionate intellect helps us to understand the role of the imagination in dissolving 
and diffusing while developing an integrated whole - this in contrast to fancy, 
which is unable to integrate or reconcile the parts. Coleridge's secondary 
imagination presages Wallace Stevens' constructive imagination.
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Wallace Stevens
The magic of the Romantic movement and particularly the Romantic 
imagination is evident in Wallace Stevens' poetry and prose. For Stevens (1951) 
the imagination is "the only genius" (p. 152). Through this genius "we project the 
idea of God into the idea of man" (p. 150). Extolling the virtues of the 
imagination would certainly place Stevens in the lineage of the Romantics and his 
connecting the imagination with the divine is a Romantic notion. Yet we must be 
careful not to make this connection too strong, since Stevens paints a particularly 
20th century color on the imagination, which is not inspired by and modeled by 
God but is in fact intended to replace the divine. The imagination, he suggests, is 
like a light, illuminating the world in which we live, observe, and interact. It 
provides meaning to our perceptions of the world.
Although Stevens' poetry has a decidedly Romantic flavor, he himself seeks 
to "cleanse the imagination of the romantic" (p. 138). In fact, according to 
Stevens, the imagination is a great human power which is "the liberty of the mind" 
(p. 138) - bold and courageous as well as capable of achieving abstraction.
Stevens claims that the Romantic "belittles" the imagination, fails to use its 
liberating nature, and achieves "minor wish-fulfillments.. .incapable of 
abstraction" (p. 139). He suggests that the Romantic is "a failure of the 
imagination precisely as sentimentality is a failure of feeling" (pp. 138-139).
In the essay, "The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet," Stevens (1951) 
makes a startling assertion that "the best definition of true imagination is that it is 
the sum of our faculties" (p. 61). What are we to make of this statement? Are we 
to assume from the statement that Stevens believes that imagination is made up of 
intelligence, memory, and perception? In fact it would seem that Stevens actually 
believes this, since he continues by focusing on "the acute intelligence of the
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imagination, the illimitable resources of its memory, its power to possess the 
moment it perceives" (p. 61). By equating the imagination with the sum of our 
faculties, Stevens has indeed made it a powerful capacity that may affect nearly 
everything we do.
Reading Stevens, we may more readily see how memory and perception are 
related to the imagination, since our memories often rely on images of the past and 
our perceptions of the world we observe may be colored and framed by the 
imagination (so much so that we may perceive a shadow as threatening when it 
represents nothing at all). These are important associations that we do well to 
remember in trying to understand the influence of the imagination on our minds. I 
understand intelligence - one of the faculties Stevens refers to - to be the capacity 
all of us possess to engage in mental activities enabling understanding and 
meaning. I believe this is akin to nonsensuous imagining posited by Edward 
Casey. According to Stevens, imagination "colors, increases, brings to a beginning 
and end, invents languages..."  (p. 62). Many of these characteristics are not 
sensuous but nonsensuous. When a science fiction writer imagines a new 
language for her alien characters, she often imagines it nonsensuously. The 
imagination is her intelligence which (to use Stevens' imagery) constructs meaning 
of the unfamiliar from what is familiar (namely, our own language); it sheds light 
(to borrow another of Stevens' images) on our activity and makes it more intense 
than what actually exists.
It is not surprising that, if Stevens (1971) accepts the imagination as the 
sum of all faculties, he should also focus on thought and feeling operating and 
influencing each other through the active role of the imagination. In the poem 
"Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" he talks about this relationship as
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. .  .the strong exhilaration
Of what we feel from what we think, of thought
Beating in the heart, as if blood newly came,
An elixir, an excitation, a pure power (p. 209).
Stevens sees the imagination as providing us with an exhilaration that comes from 
constructing a new reality by coupling thought and feeling. In Stevens' mind the 
two are both part of the imagination's domain, contributing to the imagination's 
capacity to make meaning of the world we live in.
In focusing on poetry and painting, Stevens (1951) makes another claim 
closely associated with the imagination as the sum of all capacities. The operating 
force within us, according to Stevens, when we write a poem or paint a painting, is 
the imagination, which may be characterized as a "constructive" capacity. 
"Constructive" suggests that the imagination is involved in building or framing 
something new from what exists. Inherent in the adjective is the idea of 
improvement, as opposed to destruction, which results in tearing down rather than 
building up and improving. Stevens does not seem to associate the imagination 
with creativity, which suggests bringing something unique into being that may not 
otherwise naturally exist. The construction metaphor makes the imaginative 
process much less ethereal, because the transforming power of the imagination 
comes from what exists. In fact the imagination "makes its own constructions out 
o f . . .experience" (p. 164). This experience is what Stevens calls "the familiar"; 
the imagination uses the familiar "to produce [or construct] the unfamiliar" (p.
165) - something new from what already exists in reality. The constructive nature 
of the imagination, then, tends to "rebuild the world's significance" (Sukenick, 
1967, p. 17).
When we construct using the imagination , we are building meaningful 
experiences. If we return to the metaphor of light, which Stevens (1951) uses to
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aid our understanding of the imagination, we find that "like light, [the 
imagination] adds nothing, except itself (p. 61). But light makes visible what is 
invisible and reveals the mysteries that often exist when light is not present. The 
imagination, Stevens suggests, reveals the significance of a reality that we exist 
and often take for granted in our daily lives. Stevens contends, however, that the 
imagination is actually stronger than the light since "what light requires a day to 
do, and by day I mean a kind of Biblical revolution of time, the imagination does 
in the twinkling of an eye" (pp. 61-62). Thus, what we construct using the 
imagination is a more meaningful reality which is at once more clear and more 
intense than the reality we inhabit. In using the constructive metaphor to describe 
the meaning-making process, Stevens adds an element to the process that Warnock 
(1976) only alludes to when she talks about imagination's capacity to make 
meaning. Stevens sees the imagination as building a new reality with added 
significance, whereas Warnock leaves open the nature of the meaning-making 
process.
Stevens' statement (Stevens, 1951) that the imagination is "intrepid and 
eager and the extreme of its achievement lies in abstraction" (p. 139) sounds 
counterintuitive. When we think of the imagination, we normally think of images 
more particular than abstract, especially if we are thinking of the image in 
sensuous terms. As we have acknowledged a role for nonsensuous imagining, we 
are beginning also to acknowledge the possibility that the imagination is 
responsible for abstracting as well. Stevens suggests that "the poet abstracts 
reality by replacing it in the imagination." If we return to Stevens' claim about the 
constructive imagination consisting of the sum of other faculties, we may assume 
that the imagination is constructing or building abstractions from the experiences 
it helps to perceive. Stevens underscores that the Romantic is unable to achieve 
abstractions, but settles for "minor wish fulfillments" (p. 139). Thus, we have
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established a contrast between the traditional Romantic notions, which tend to be 
formed in the concrete, and Stevens' belief in the role of the imagination to 
abstract.
In the poem "Description Without Place" Stevens (1954) offers us a 
characteristic of the constructive imagination which I believe is also valuable for 
our understanding of the role of the imagination in critical thinking. In this poem 
he focuses on an important role for description in creating a new, vital reality. 
According to Stevens (1954),
Description is revelation. It is not
The thing described, nor false facsimile.
It is an artificial thing that exists,
In its own seeming, plainly visible,
Yet not too closely the double of our lives,
Intenser than any actual life could be (p. 344).
Stevens seems to be suggesting that the ability to describe reveals a new reality 
because of the imagination. Because of its intensity, we have a sense that 
description, which is empowered by the imagination, illuminates reality with 
meaning, constructing a more lively reality.
As we have seen in this discussion of the imagination, Wallace Stevens 
compares the imagination to a light illuminating the world, and insists that the 
imagination should not be mistaken for a romantic imagination, which he claims 
diminishes the liberating power of the imagination. Stevens claims that the 
imagination (both sensuous and nonsensuous) is the "sum of all faculties," has a 




THE IMAGINATION AND CRITICAL THINKING:
NOTES TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF CRITICAL THINKING
What have we discovered in our efforts to learn about the literary artist's 
conception of the imagination? How will this inform our understanding and use of 
critical thinking? When we examined the philosophers' conceptions of the 
imagination, we learned from Edward Casey (1976) about the possibilizing 
imagination, which acknowledges the great latitude the imagination has for 
envisioning in ways that perception cannot, and we encountered a distinction 
between sensuous and nonsensuous imagining. Sensuous imagining is more 
familiar to us because the images formed by the imagining process are based on 
the senses. Nonsensuous imagining is more controversial because it is a process 
of envisaging that does not rely on the senses. When we talk about the 
imagination in critical thinking, the imagination we often focus on is nonsensuous, 
because it relates to the world of ideas. Richard Paul's call (Paul, 1990) for an 
individual to imagine another's perspective and engage in an imaginary dialogue 
among perspectives in his conception of critical thinking might be labelled as 
nonsensuous imagining. From Warnock we learn how the imagination is able to 
generate and harness emotions and discover how imagination might be connected 
to creativity. The literary artists we have explored in chapter six provide insights 
into the imagination that complement, supplement, and extend the conceptions of 
the imagination posited by philosophers.
What do we discover from Wordsworth about critical thinking? Mainly, I 
believe, we learn that 1) the imagination is not necessarily incompatible with
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reason and that, in fact, 2) the imagination can energize reason by providing it 
with an emotional connection. As imagination and reason operate in critical 
thinking, 3) the imagination enables reason to see further possibilities in the usual, 
and 4) empowers reason to expand ideas and insights.
One o f Ms. Alsop's students, Melinda, found she had a difficult decision to 
make - whether or not to attend the advanced studies program at St. Paul's School 
in New Hampshire or a prestigious music camp. Ms. Alsop learned o f the need for  
Melinda to make the decision in her weekly journal, where she shared the 
challenges o f making the decision. Ms. Alsop was fascinated by the process which 
Melinda shared. She began the process by reasoning about the two schools by 
analyzing the features o f each experience and evaluating what she learned. 
Analyzing the data was not enough fo r  Melinda who remembered her previous 
experience at the music camp, the new friends she made, and the musical activities 
she got involved with. She imagined what the upcoming summer experience would 
be like and emotions o f joy that would accompany the experience. She was less 
certain about the St. Paul's experience but knew that the experience could not be 
repeated. She imagined what the St. Paul's summer program would be like from  
what her friends had described to her and from her own experiences with similar 
summer programs. She liked the atmosphere o f St. Paul's and knew some o f her 
fellow students from the high school she attended. Both imaginative exercises 
generated a number o f  questions, evoked emotions, and made the reasoning 
process richer by offering a variety o f possibilities and choices to analyze and 
assess. Throughout the process she went back and forth between the two summer 
programs but finally decided to attend St. Paul's.
The imagination also allows for deep feeling, which is balanced by 
profound thought - a balance which critical thinking characterized by evaluation 
and reflection can provide. As a source of creativity, the imagination brings to its
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natural capacity this creative impulse. In critical thinking where imagination is 
encouraged, creativity allows the critical thinker to engage in greater divergent 
thinking. Wordsworth seems to emphasize recollection and reflection as a means 
for obtaining this balance. Critical thinking theorists like Harvey Siegel (1988) 
and Richard Paul (1990) seek to obtain a balance in critical thinking by inviting a 
critical spirit component that is passionate in its support of the critical process, but 
that operates to give energy to the critical, analytical, and judgmental process. 
"Deep feeling" about the issues being addressed and "profound thought" are 
needed in critical thinking as much as in poetry.
The presence of the imagination in critical thinking evokes emotions which 
may facilitate or impede the thinking process as suggested above and as we saw in 
our discussion of Mary Wamock (1976) in chapter five. Its positive use can result 
in the rational passions that Richard Paul (1990)talks about, passions which 
promote the critical thinking process. I believe it important to acknowledge 
Wordworth's contention about the need to integrate the emotions into our thinking 
when we discuss the imagination in integrative critical thinking. The imagination 
can elicit emotions (both positive and negative) and draw them into the whole 
imaginary process; it is the critical or evaluative process in critical thinking, 
however, which allows us to use the emotions during the reflective process. Thus, 
if we have a problem we are asked to solve, the imagination enables us to envisage 
the problem in emotional ways as well as to bring passion to the process of solving 
it. As we imagine the solved puzzle and possible steps to reach that vision, we 
allow the imagination to begin to fuse the emotions and reason in order to reach 
the solution.
There is a shaping of critical thinking that occurs when the imagination 
emerges and actively operates in critical thinking. In Wordsworth we see an 
analogous shaping of reason by infusing it with the imagination. This imaginative
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shaping may be useful in critical thinking. For example, when we think critically 
about the prospect of having a child, we obviously want to have a knowledge base 
which may include an understanding of children, their development, the costs, etc. 
However, the knowledge tends to remain inert until we imagine its use in projected 
situations. Generally critical thinking that features a strong knowledge base used 
in imagined situations does not promote dichotomous thinking, because we are 
operating dialectically as we move from the sensuous to the nonsensuous and from 
the imaginative enterprise to the evaluation of it during the critical thinking 
process. This dialectical process reduces dichotomies while simultaneously 
allowing the imagination to operate in critical thinking.
Coleridge also seeks to reconcile dichotomies by locating a dialectic 
through the imagination, which is the source of creation and re-creation in the 
artistic work. We are particularly interested in secondary imagination in our 
discussion of critical thinking. Coleridge (1907) seems to be suggesting that 
humans recreate rather than create by using secondary imagination. This 
imagination takes what already exists and "dissolves, diffuses, and dissipates"
(vol. 1, p. 202). Thus, the imagination disperses, scatters, or breaks down in the 
imaginative process and then unifies the parts into a whole. That the imagination 
might be involved in the breaking down as well as the synthesizing provides a new 
insight into the role of the imagination. In critical thinking the imagination may 
enable us to envision the parts of a complex problem, for example, and then help 
us to see those parts in a new whole.
The constructive imagination, on which Stevens (1951) focuses, is akin to 
Coleridge's secondary imagination. "Construction" provides a very different 
metaphor for use in critical thinking. Earlier, we talked about one of the qualities 
of expanded conceptions of critical thinking as being constructive in nature. An 
imagination, which can be drawn from various capacities, is able to construct
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something significant from mundane or disparate ideas. In the realm of critical 
thinking this means that the imagination may enable critical thinking to take a 
problem with its elements all known and construct it in a different way. Thus, 
when we formulate a belief about the education of young people, we may begin by 
looking critically at various views about education. As we are doing this, we are 
imagining possible beliefs with which we are comfortable. We are not creating 
that belief system, however, but rather constructing it by envisioning possibilities, 
trying them out, envisioning other possibilities, trying them once more, and 
continuing the process until we reach a level of acceptability. The belief that 
evolves is imaginatively constructed and is more inclusive than the ideas from 
which they are formed. The imagination is a builder which finds stasis but may 
constantly be seeking another level of change.
The distinction between the imagination and fancy may account for the 
difference between more mundane critical thinking and integrative critical 
thinking. Coleridge's imagination (Coleridge, 1907) is concerned with the fusing 
and blending power of the imagination, a power that we might find useful in our 
discussions of critical thinking. When we think critically, we do not simply 
analyze and criticize; we seek to go beyond the superficial, to generate and create 
new ideas. We seek to transform the ideas we analyze and make them new.
Critical thinking, then, as an ongoing process in which we analyze and synthesize, 
blends disparate ideas in order to discover new possibilities (perhaps like the 
possibilities Prawat [1991] explores in his conception of thinking), expand our 
thinking, and solve problems in multiple situations. The imagination explored by 
Coleridge represents the quality of critical thinking that enables us to engage in 
such dynamic and flexible thinking. The whole concept of strong sense critical 
thinking described by Paul (1984), for example, seems to be infused with the kind 
of imaginative power that Coleridge posits. Strong sense critical thinking, which
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draws on both the rational and emotional and is integrative and emancipatory 
(qualities especially prominent in this dissertation), demands the fusing and 
completing power of the imagination (the "poetic" hidden in critical thinking). 
This imagination transforms our thinking by enabling us to synthesize, to bring 
together the objective and subjective. This thinking is holistic, unified, and 
integrated without losing the identity of the parts (a type of thinking this 
dissertation has explored).
A more narrow conception of critical thinking, which does not release the 
imagination (weak sense critical thinking, for example), tends to resemble 
Coleridge's views about fancy (Coleridge, 1907). Like fancy, it is more 
superficial, less unifying, and less powerful. Disparate ideas may coexist, but are 
seldom fused or unified. This thinking may be useful in certain situations, 
especially since it would be impossible to perpetually sustain critical thinking 
strongly infused with imagination. Critical thinking in a narrower sense, however, 
would seldom be synthesizing or integrative and would rarely generate new, more 
powerful ideas. When we call on fancy during critical thinking, we are trying 
artificially to force disparate ideas together without transforming them so they can 
become a new idea. Under these circumstances we can solve a problem or make a 
decision, but the solution may not have resulted from various possibilities and may 
not have drawn the parts of the puzzle into a whole. The imagination is designed 
to do this whether it is operating to create a poem or to engage in a critical 
thinking activity.
In critical thinking, the thinker might imagine ideas relating to a belief 
about gun control. Before the belief becomes a coherent whole greater than the 
sum of its parts, the imagination enables us to envision different positions and 
different issues relating to gun control (such as its effect on victims of violent 
crimes, the danger of guns in the home, the differences between guns for hunting
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and other types of guns, etc). The transformative power of the imagination in 
critical thinking occurs, however, after the parts are envisaged and analyzed and 
we are able to draw the ideas together into a whole belief about gun control that 
makes sense of the disparate parts. Thus, we might conclude that gun control is 
part of a larger belief about the role of violence in society and our need to educate 
individuals about the causes of violence and the relationship of the use of weapons 
like guns not as a cause of violence but as a symptom of the larger problem.
If we accept that the imagination is "the sum of our faculties," as Stevens 
(1951) contends, we may begin to see how its holistic presence might affect 
critical thinking. We have already seen the imagination's role in bringing emotion 
to our thinking (Warnock, 1976; Wordsworth; Prawat, 1991), in drawing from 
multiple possibilities (Casey, 1976; Prawat, 1991), and in generating ideas through 
nonsensuous imagining-that and imagining-how (Casey, 1976). Stevens sees the 
imaginative capacity as comprised of other capacities. When the imagination 
operates in critical thinking, it becomes the vehicle for drawing on other 
capacities. How does the imagination do this? When we imagine, the imagination 
draws on the parts (such as memory, perception, and intelligence) and "colors" 
them with its constructive capacities. Thus, when I am engaged in the critical 
thinking problem of choosing the best school for my son to attend, I create images 
from my memories of other schools, perceive schools I encountered based on the 
goals I envision, and imagine nonsensuously what kind of school is best suited for 
young people in general and my child in particular. The mind during the critical 
thinking process, then, continually and simultaneously engages in a critical 
process of evaluating the imaginative evocation and systematizes our imaginings. 
In other words the mind balances the capacities through the critical thinking 
process in much the same way as Wordsworth seeks such a balance.
Stevens suggests that the imagination plays an important role in abstraction
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- the process of abstracting being akin to Prawat's constructivist approach and his 
notion of "big ideas." We might ask what the imagination's role in abstraction has 
to do with critical thinking. When we enter the realm of ideas (as we must to a 
certain extent in order to engage in critical thinking), we also enter the world of 
abstraction. Our ideas must have a concrete center but ideas themselves tend to be 
abstract by definition. The idea of freedom may conjure up images of individuals 
in a democratic society being able to vote for their leaders, slaves being released 
from their bondage, and people attending churches of their own choices in order to 
worship as they please. These images tend to be concrete, but the word 
"democracy" is an abstraction, which is made real by imagining the concrete. If we 
adopt Stevens' conception of the constructive imagination as the type of 
imagination operating in critical thinking, then, as we think critically about a 
workshop we are presenting on critical thinking instruction, we might reflect on 
critical thinking as it presently exists and begin to project what instruction would 
look like if critical thinking were actually the guiding principle of the classroom. 
During this process we would be constructing meaning and significance as we 
imagine the classroom reality. As we generalize about critical thinking in the 
classroom and envisage our ideas about such instruction for any classroom, we are 
beginning to abstract our ideas, which in turn must then be capable of 
implementation in any individual classroom setting for it to be viable. The 
essence of critical thinking, then, is the ability to imagine both the abstract ideas 
and the concrete application of those ideas (thus coupling the nonsensuous and 
sensuous in one's thinking) and the interaction between the ideas and the world we 
live in. In a way Stevens’ constructive imagination, which contributes to the 
generation of abstractions, may offer a similar transformative or accommodatory 
effect to our thinking that Prawat (1991) recounts in his study, even though 
Prawat's constructivist perspective is based on a cognitive psychology paradigm.
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Because of the imagination, critical thinking has a vitality and richness that 
may otherwise be absent. This vitality and richness can come from the critical 
aspect in critical thinking (namely, through analysis and judgment), but not from 
the critical alone. It is always tinged with our emotions (both positive and 
negative) and our ability to imagine the parts of a critical thinking problem and 
how the parts relate to create a whole that solves the problem. Using the 
imagination, we are able to construct meaning from the parts, draw upon a variety 
of mental capacities (including perception, memory, and intellection), and 
envisage abstractions that help us to theorize and generalize - all of this in order to 
reach a successful conclusion to the critical thinking process. Critical thinking, 
therefore, is a complex and dynamic process that enables us to discover meaning 
and significance in many situations we may encounter.
If we accept that the imagination is indeed an important aspect of critical 
thinking, then we may want to accept a role for description as a means of 
heightening or intensifying the critical nature of our thinking. According to 
Stevens, the intensity of the imagination when we describe makes the description a 
new reality. In critical thinking description allows us to construct meaningful 
possibilities to solve problems, to establish beliefs, or to make a decision. In 
Melinda's journal, for example, her descriptions during the imaginative process, 
she uncovered numerous dimensions to her problem of choosing a summer 
experience. It helped to reveal new ideas (including the possibility of enrolling in 
both summer experiences).
Ludwig Feuerbach (1957) focuses on the "truth and the necessity of the 
imagination," in which "an object of thought becomes an object of sense, of 
feelings" (p. 81). The critical thinking I am trying to conceptualize in this study 
welcomes the notion of an imagination that enables thought to become feeling, but 
also feeling to become thought or at least allows thought and feeling to operate
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together. As we have explored the literary imagination, we have observed some of 
the features of expanded conception of critical thinking, such as the imagination's 
role in creativity, constructing meaning, recognizing and debating other 
perspectives, allowing emotion to accompany reason in empowering thinking.
As we encourage individuals to respond in a detached and critical way to a 
product of the imagination, we foster certain dispositions - certainly an offshoot of 
our discussion of the imagination. We also foster dispositions when we encourage 
an individual to imagine another person's perspective (to empathize with that 
person) in order to see alternatives and possibilities in situations. We should 
especially note the attempt of each of these writers to uncover a "deep" 
understanding of our thinking. The Romantic writers, for example, seek to explore 
the "deep" understanding of thought by exploring the imagination, which they see 
as connecting them to the divine. For them, the imagination, which enables 
"deep" understanding, also serves as the source of creativity. This is the same 
creativity that Perkins (1987) focuses on in his theory about thinking.
Wallace Stevens (1951) suggests that the imagination "makes its own 
construction out of experience;.. .  .what it really does is to use it as material with 
which it does whatever it wills." When it operates in critical thinking, it constructs 
meaning from all aspects of experience - rational, emotional, and intuitive 
meaning that empowers the thinking process. Before we can bring these insights 
into a coherent new conception of critical thinking, we need to address a deep 
suspicion of the imagination that persistently arises, at least since Plato in the 
Western canon, when we wish to emphasize the imagination. A suspicion arises 




AND EDUCATING FOR CRITICAL THINKING
In my exploration of the imagination in the last two chapters, I have 
characterized a propitious capacity. It constructs, encourages creativity, presents 
endless possibilities for our thinking to shape and mold, uses emotions as well as 
reason, and enables emotions and reason to operate together (often in creative 
tension). It should not be surprising that I would emphasize the more positive 
dimensions of the imagination in this dissertation, since I wish to argue for its 
productive and constructive effects on critical thinking. The imagination, which is 
pervasive and omnipresent, possesses certain characteristics which, at the least, 
ought to be seen as constitutive of critical thinking and, at the most, make critical 
thinking a powerful force in our lives and society. Can we always say that the 
imagination is a positive capacity? If so, then why do some philosophers regard 
the imagination with suspicion? If not, then can we be certain that the imagination 
will operate positively during the critical thinking process?
There is little doubt that the imagination can be a dangerous capacity and 
sometimes a liability. The problems or dangers associated with the imagination 
are generally of two kinds, which in operation can overlap. The first is 
epistemological. In this category we mistake the imaginary for the real, the true, 
the known. Thus, I might imagine that someone is stalking me. Based on this 
imagined action, I claim I know someone is following me and imagine that he or 
she intends to do me harm. Consequently, I have a belief that the stalking is 
occurring; however, if the emotions of the situation do not prevent me from
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reflecting on this situation, I might realize that this belief is untrue (or probably 
not true) because the only justification is my imaginings. I may uncover a number 
of explanations to discount my unfounded belief. This imagining would be 
particularly insidious for me if I choose to continue my belief and purchase a gun 
with the intent of using it. I am engaged in an imaginative act that confuses the 
real and the unreal, the known and the unknown.
The second kind of danger is moral. The imagination can be an instrument 
of evil. In its more horrific uses the imaginer may envision damage or destruction 
to something or someone. Such a person might imagine a scheme to defraud a 
client. Another individual who harbors jealousy toward a friend might constantly 
imagine the friend's failure and unconsciously say or do things that make that 
happen. Hitler and his followers might be regarded as exercising a truly diabolical 
imagination. They envisioned the 1000 year reign of the Third Reich in a 
conquered world populated by Aryans and free of Jewish people. Imagination, in 
this case, became an instrument for doing evil. They imagined different ways to 
torture their captors, the magnitude and power of the Reich, and numerous 
scientific breakthroughs designed to further many of their nefarious visions for the 
world they imagined. These examples illustrate the possibility of an imagination 
which destroys rather than constructs, envisions multiple terrible possibilities, and 
allows deleterious emotions like jealousy and hatred to emerge and dominate. On 
the contrary "the ethical imagination," according to Richard Kearney (1991), 
"allows the other to exist 'without why' - not for my sake, or because it conforms 
to my schema of things, but for its own sake" (p. 225).
If the positive possibilities of the imagination are so important for my 
conception of critical thinking, then why discuss the negative possibilities at all? I 
believe that, just as we often contend that we cannot appreciate goodness without 
having experienced evil, we cannot fully utilize the positive dimension of the
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imagination without recognizing the negative dimension. That is to say, we cannot 
call on the imagination to empower critical thinking if we are unable to recognize 
and neutralize (or turn to our advantage) the negative uses of the imagination that 
may inhibit our ability to think critically. We cannot gloss over the negative 
dimension of the imagination in order to present a tidy picture of the imagination 
that may be sabotaged by our own lack of knowledge.
In this chapter I employ the writings of Samuel Johnson, Toni Morrison, 
and Deanne Bogdan both to elucidate the dangers the imagination can pose and to 
explore possible preventative measures we might consider if we intend to employ 
the imagination in critical thinking. This chapter is a logical followup to the 
previous two since it examines the negative side of critical thinking. Samuel 
Johnson's creative treatment of the dangers of the imagination in Rasselas deals 
with both epistemological and moral problems. Characters in the romance are 
deluded into believing that the unreal is real and vice versa, as we see in the 
"vexations" of the astronomer, who allows the imagination to have free reign in his 
life. Johnson also suggests a moral problem with the imagination, because of its 
deleterious effects on young people like Rasselas. Toni Morrison's contemporary 
examination of the imagination in American Literature explores the use of the 
Africanist presence to outline and define the whiteness of the main characters in 
American fiction. The imagination is used to perpetuate negative African- 
American stereotypes, metaphors, and symbols for the purposes of defining the 
selfhood and strength of the white characters. After I focus on these two 
depictions of the negative effects of the imagination, I examine Deanne Bogdan's 
arguments. A literary critic who focuses on the imagination from a feminist 
perspective, Bogdan highlights the limitations of the educated imagination 
outlined by Northrop Frye, at least in its application to the lives of some women. 
For Bogdan, the imagination, even one educated in a way defined by Northrop
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Frye, can become an instrument for ill rather than good, particularly when the 
imagination is used by the dominant elements in a society. Bogdan proposes to 
extend Frye's conception of the education of the imagination in order to 
enfranchise women as readers and critics of literature.
Samuel Johnson and the Dangerous Prevalence of the Imagination
The eighteenth-century writers of the neoclassical period (writers like 
Samuel Johnson) have little use for the imagination. For them, the pursuit of 
reason is the highest human aim. These writers regard the pursuit of imagination 
as a dangerous quest, as Samuel Johnson suggests (1971) in Rasselas. where he 
depicts the fictional effect of turning imagination loose, a process which inevitably 
results in disastrous moral consequences for some of the characters. For this 
reason Johnson identifies fiction - a product of the imagination - as a morally 
dangerous activity, even as he effectively uses this genre to explore the dangers of 
the imagination.
Johnson shares with his contemporaries a belief that flights of fancy we 
might associate with the imagination compel us to see the misuse of this capacity 
as a moral issue. Because of imaginative efforts likely directed to the young, 
adults must scrupulously attend to the moral consequences of using the 
imagination. Young people, according to Johnson, "listen with credulity to the 
whispers of fancy, and persue [sic] with eagerness the phantoms of hope;... 
expect that age will perform the promises of youth; and [believe] the deficiencies 
of the present day will be supplied by the morrow..."  (Johnson, 1971, p. 607). 
From Johnson's worldview the imagination may lead to epistemological problems, 
since the young person may be unable to discern the real from the unreal, but the 
imagination may also prevent young people from making morally appropriate
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choices because of the possibility of their being mesmerized by those who would 
manipulate young people's imagination for evil or misguided purposes. For this 
reason Johnson tempers the imaginative "flights of fancy" in his romance, 
Rasselas. with a balance of realism. He seems to regard the control of the 
imagination and the nurturing of reason in young people as a moral imperative.
In the figure of the central character, Rasselas, Johnson depicts the 
consequences of youthful imagination and the road one must transit to reach an 
adulthood characterized by reason. Rasselas' youthful fancies are "in keeping with 
the romantic idealism of his sheltered upbringing," exemplifying "'the dangerous 
prevalence of the imagination' in its most naive condition" (Bronson, 1971, p.
615). The maturing adolescent, whose discontent arises from confinement, must 
exercise the imagination to project himself or herself into the alien environment of 
the adult world. The dangerous images prevent the young individual from 
considering "by what means he [sic] should mingle with mankind [sic]" (p. 614).
Johnson specifically places Rasselas in situations in which he has the 
opportunity to misuse imagination. At one point, when Rasselas seeks a way to 
escape the happy valley (representing the confinement of his youth), he imagines 
soaring over the mountains after meeting an artist who believes he can fly. Not 
mature enough to resist the artist's convincing arguments, Rasselas succumbs to 
them. Inevitably, according to Johnson, in trusting oneself wholly to the 
imagination, the disappointment of failure crushes Rasselas' enthusiasm, as the 
artist completes his exploit "half dead with terrour and vexation."
Before Rasselas leaves the happy valley he meets an adult, Imlac, who 
warns him about the society he wishes to enter. Imlac realizes, however, that an 
adolescent must experience and interact with this society in order to temper "the 
dangerous prevalence of the imagination" with reason. "Ignorance is mere 
privation, by which nothing can be produced," according to Johnson. "It is a
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vacuity in which the soul sits motionless and torpid for want of attraction; and 
without knowing why, we always rejoice when we learn, and grieve when we 
forget" (p. 631). The imagination can lead to ignorance, Johnson suggests, if we 
allow it to dominate in our thinking. He contends that reason is the superior 
mental capacity.
As Rasselas's quest for happiness draws to a close, Johnson creates a 
pathetic figure for Rasselas to encounter, a man who has succumbed to the 
imagination and as a result has become insane. This man's belief that he can 
influence the tides exemplifies this disordered state. Although "no human mind is 
in its right state," an individual tends to imagine (as does Rasselas in the happy 
valley) that he or she has extraordinary powers, when alone. The astronomer's 
extreme degree of insanity arises from the extent and length of his isolation, where 
reason loses control and imagination comes to dominate his contact with reality. 
When he has a degree of reason restored, the insanity lessens. Johnson presents a 
lesson indicative of the entire work at this point: namely, that an indulgence of the 
imagination creates unhappiness and that a person intermingling with other 
individuals and society restores a degree of happiness and reason. For Johnson, 
then, interaction with other humans facilitates the appropriate balance of a human 
being who controls his or her imagination. Although Johnson sees a role for the 
imagination in the lives and minds of individuals, he sees danger in an 
uncontrolled imagination. He observes a moral imperative to control this 
"wayward" operation of the mind by introducing reason.
The Reason/Imagination Tension
While acknowledging the power of the imagination, Samuel Johnson 
relegates it to a secondary role and sees it as dangerous. Although he recognizes
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the futility of eliminating the imagination, he wishes to severely control it. The 
relationship Johnson depicts represents the inherent tension between these two 
capacities of the mind. Johnson reconciles the two by subjugating imagination to 
reason.
The character of imagination and its relationship to reason, as we have 
noted in our discussion of Johnson, have been discussed for centuries. Going back 
as far as Plato we begin to see how the subservient role of imagination is already 
taking form, since Plato holds the imagination, which he sees as a lower and baser 
operation of the mind that human beings share with the animals, as suspect. 
Reason, he declares, is the highest mode of thought, and the mode of thinking for 
which all humans should strive. Although Aristotle sees imagination in a less 
pejorative sense, he nevertheless postulates a dichotomy between reason and 
imagination and uses the analogy of the master and slave to describe the 
relationship between the two concepts. The master/slave image with reason 
controlling the imagination (and often attempting to suppress it) has persisted to 
the present. Johnson's view represents a traditional conception of the relationship 
between reason and the imagination, but it does a disservice to both concepts. The 
belief in the dichotomous notion of these two capacities persists today, however, 
and may suggest why critical thinking theorists have rarely focused on the role of 
imagination in critical thinking.
In contrast, a Romantic poet like William Blake emphasizes the power of 
the imagination as a positive force. To him reason may endanger the human mind 
(especially the human creative mind) and imagination will save it. All of Blake's 
images for reason - "the ugly," "an Incrustation over my Immortal Spirit," "a false 
body" (Blake, 1956) - underscore his enmity toward reason, which he thinks 
prevents humans from intuiting the divine and eternal in each of us. Once again 
this tension is reconciled by making one capacity superior to the other, in this case
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the supremacy of the imagination over reason.
William Wordsworth, whose view about the relationship between 
imagination and reason places him between Johnson and Blake, as we have seen, 
admits a role for reason in his overall conception of the creative act. We find 
Wordsworth's conception of the imagination especially helpful in our study of 
critical thinking (as I suggested in chapter four), primarily because it explores the 
relationship between reason and the imagination. As we noted, Wordsworth 
actually conceives of the two as inseparable, almost as blended. The poet uses 
reasonable imagination (or imaginative reason) to "color" the world. That kind of 
blending, which transforms our thinking, is supported by current brain research as 
reported in studies like Descartes' Error (Damasio, 1995). It is a closer, supportive 
relationship between the imagination and other mental capacities operating in 
critical thinking that I am arguing for in this dissertation. By consciously 
acknowledging connections (rather than artificially severing the connection 
between imagination and reason or imagination and critical thinking (or making 
one subservient to the other), we can make critical thinking a more powerful way 
of thinking and perceiving our world.
We may find some merit to Johnson's notion of introducing reason as a 
capacity that can influence the imagination. If reason is viewed as a dominant 
capacity designed to suppress the imagination, however, I don't see that we can use 
either capacity effectively. If we hope for both imagination and reason to operate 
in critical thinking, we must consciously use them purposefully. This means that 
we must enable the imagination to envisage both sensuously and nonsensuously 
and reason to analyze and evaluate in a dialectical fashion.
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Toni Morrison's Literary Imagination
As I've noted, in the romance, Rasselas. Samuel Johnson (1971) portrays a 
dangerous imagination. Toni Morrison (1992) offers us an equally devastating 
picture of the imagination when she shows us "the sources of [black] images and 
the effect they have on the literary imagination and its product" (p. x). In her 
monograph, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination. 
Morrison leads us through a maze of literary characters created by authors as 
diverse as Willa Cather and Ernest Hemingway. These authors use the 
imagination to create an Africanist presence (as she calls it) that helps to define the 
white heroes. She believes it necessary to uncover the imaginative use of African 
characters pervasive in the literature of the United States, because "the 
contemplation of the black presence," she asserts, "is central to any understanding 
of our national literature and should not be permitted to hover at the margins of the 
literary imagination" (p. 5). To allow the use of blacks to remain at the edges of 
our literary imagination impedes our understanding of literature and conceals our 
character that entices us to envision blacks and whites the way they do.
Relegating African-American figures to stereotype in order to better define the 
white characters in American literary works presents a truly moral danger of the 
imagination, because it enfranchises one group of people at the expense of another.
We can learn a great deal about the imagination from Morrison's short study 
of the literary imagination. From the title of her monograph we learn that the 
imagination plays rather than works. The word "play" seems like a fitting word 
choice since the imagination, even when it has a serious purpose, can be seen as 
amusing and diversionary. At another point Morrison describes the imagination as 
"becoming" (p. 4) more than "merely looking or looking at" (p. 4) or "taking 
oneself intact into the other" (p. 4). She envisions this becoming as "what happens
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w hen.. .writers work in a highly and historically racialized society" (p. 4). One 
might even infer from Morrison's discussion that the process of becoming requires 
some educating of the imagination, which may play with the negatives of a 
racialized society or play with the positives allowing us to surpass the racialized 
elements.
It is evident that Morrison has a high regard for the imagination as a 
powerful, but playful, capacity. To say nothing more of the conception of the 
imagination, however, is not wholly satisfactory since the imagination is used by 
American authors in a devastating way - namely, to create two-dimensional 
African American individuals as a counterpoint to three-dimensional white 
characters. Morrison uses strong images. The "imagination sabotages itself, locks 
its own gates, pollutes its vision" (p. xi - the emphasis is mine). In this sense we 
see the flipside of the possibilizing imagination Edward Casey describes. We may 
imagine numerous possibilities, but on the imagination's playground the 
imagination is capable of shutting down the possibilities, especially those 
possibilities that relate to race. It is as if, when we use the imagination, we 
consume it; we obstruct its functioning and corrupt or contaminate its intentions. 
Thus, although the imagination is a potent capacity, we do not always allow it to 
realize its potential because of a racially charged society.
Why examine Morrison's work on the literary imagination's use of the 
Africanist presence in the context of this dissertation? It is necessary to our 
understanding of the way that the imagination operates in critical thinking to ferret 
out those uses of this capacity that can potentially sabotage imagination's more 
potent qualities. Morrison eloquently uncovers a use of the imagination to 
fabricate a negative image of one race in order to silhouette and highlight 
positively the fabricated image of another race. Morrison suggests without 
showing any signs of antipathy that critics must face this aspect of our literary
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works directly and without restraint in order "to render the nation's literature a 
much more complex and rewarding body of knowledge" (p. 53). We need to face 
without flinching the ways we use the imagination in the employ of language 
biases and prejudices - the way we fabricate stereotypes - while we are engaged in 
a critical dialogue during the thinking process. The imagination needs to be at 
play when we think critically (a process which may engage young people as they 
uncover possibilities), but the critical thinker needs to be ever conscious of the 
negative images that may overtake the critical thinking process, mainly because 
they are so enticing. The imagination may play with ideas, but the critical and 
evaluative process enables the thinker to discern which ideas may not contribute to 
resolving a problem or making a decision.
Summary
Both Toni Morrison and Samuel Johnson are not only highlighting the 
epistemological and moral problems of the imagination and their consequences in 
the human psyche and society, but recommending solutions or counterproblems to 
reduce or eliminate the negatives as well. Johnson contends that the imagination 
needs to be suppressed by ensuring the dominance of reason - a somewhat 
detached and unemotional process nurtured through social interactions. In a way 
Johnson is calling for the education of reason to curb the powerfully dangerous 
tendencies of the imagination.
Morrison is not critical of the imagination per se. but underscores a 
devastating use of it by American authors. She believes that we must address such 
deleterious uses of the imagination by acknowledging them and facing them. We 
contribute to and support the envisioned negative stereotypes and prejudices when 
we ignore them because of our own discomfort or fragile sensibilities. Morrison
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also seems to be calling for education - in this case, for education of the 
imagination in order to recognize its negative uses and their consequences. 
Deanne Bogdan, whose work extends Northrop Frye's study of the imagination, 
focuses on the notion of educating the imagination more overtly and directly than 
Morrison.
Bogdan and the Educated Imagination
In the post-structuralist era, the imagination has assumed a somewhat 
different character. Whereas some writers in the past have regarded the 
imagination as part of the human consciousness that taps into the reservoir of 
divine consciousness, many contemporary theorists and literary critics envision it 
as an emancipatory capacity. Helene Cixous (1985) and Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari (1977), for example, adopt Jacques Lacan's notion of the imaginary (a 
visual consciousness which precedes language) to suggest a way out of 
oppression. For the post-structuralist, imagination has distinctive political and 
social overtones because of its associations with writers and theorists who focus 
on the voices of the oppressed and repressed. Bogdan (1992) admits to the 
influence of the post-structuralist and post-modernist perspective in her 
exploration of the imagination, although she draws from eclectic sources. She 
accepts a feminist perspective in critiquing the liberal humanism of Northrop 
Frye's educated imagination and develops her own literary theory and poetics. In 
her study she underscores the role of women, who find themselves as outsiders 
looking into masculine structures and entitlements. This outsider status 
necessarily affects the way that women view imagination and the imaginative 
work.
Although Bogdan (1992) focuses on the remedies for people's perceptions
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about the dangers of the imagination, I will focus on the dangers themselves that 
prompt Bogdan (and her mentor, Northrop Frye) to seek to educate the 
imagination. When we examine the underlying issues of the claims of Bogdan and 
Frye, we find that they echo some of the moral and epistemological concerns, even 
if remedies for these concerns differ. Some regard the imagination and its product 
as morally objectionable. Like Johnson (1971), they believe the imagination is 
especially problematic for young people, who may become more easily swayed by 
the enticements of the imagination than adults and be seduced into a negative 
lifestyle. We have especially seen such objections to imaginative works in this 
country from individuals and groups that believe some of the literature taught in 
schools is morally indefensible or anti-Christian, that object to the violent content 
of dramas on television, that see rock lyrics as having dangerous effects on the 
minds of young people, and that seek to eliminate funding for the National 
Endowment for the Humanities and public broadcasting on the grounds that it 
promotes immoral artistic projects and programs. The response to this perceived 
danger is to censor or ban the imaginative product and, in some instances, to 
attempt to prevent the imaginative process by removing funding for programs.
This is done in order to prevent people from being exposed to the imagination and 
succumbing to its lure.
Others may find the imagination less morally than epistemologically 
objectionable. Of what use, they ask, is the imagination if it is not real? Can we 
truly justify our investing any time and energy in imaginative activities at the 
expense of more reasonable and productive endeavors like the study of science? 
After all, isn't the imagination simply an interesting and unenlightening diversion 
from more significant activities? Although those who have epistemological 
problems occasionally wish to ban the imaginative product (especially if they 
believe it interferes with more serious activities), more often than not the response
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to this perceived danger tends to be to limit its use. For these people the 
imagination cannot be justified as an area of study or as an activity worthy of our 
time and energy.
Bogdan (1992) affirms Frye's contention (Frye, 1964) that the key to 
overcoming these dangers is the response to them. The kind of response one 
makes to an imaginative work is central to the educating of the imagination - a 
process which both Frye and Bogdan believe important in order to overcome the 
perceived dangers of the imagination to our thinking and our lives. For Frye this 
is a truly Romantic process because he believes in the enduring salutary effects of 
the imagination properly understood. Frye suggests that the imagination will be 
understood and even have a positive effect on people's lives once we educate 
people to approach the imaginative work in a detached and critical way. Thus, 
when we remove ourselves from a personal response to the imaginative work, we 
are less likely to want to censor it or dismiss it because it is not real. If we are able 
to get to the point of critical detachment, Frye believes, we will be able to see and 
use the imagination to expand our views of the world and our belief systems. In 
other words, if we educate the imagination, we will be able to use the imagination 
for morally positive purposes and enhance our epistemological understanding of 
what is real.
The Educated Imagination and Critical Thinking
Frye's and Bogdan's responses to addressing the perceived dangers of the 
imagination certainly resonate with critical thinking infused with the imagination 
already discussed in this dissertation. I have argued for the introduction, use, and 
nurturing of the imagination as a dynamic in critical thinking. Certainly there 
might be those who object to the introduction of the imagination in critical
134
thinking on both moral and epistemological grounds and wish to deny its 
involvement with critical thinking. I would argue that the imagination can be 
educated in the way that Frye seeks simply by its being used in the context of 
critical thinking. The critical elements of critical thinking (namely, the analytical 
and evaluative elements) tend to disengage us from the more personal and 
emotional elements sparked by the imagination. What the critical elements enable 
us to do is to "analyze, delay gratification, accept bewilderment, defer moral 
judgment, engage aesthetic complexity, embrace a broad perspective, or negotiate 
points of view" (Bogdan, 1992, p. 140) - all necessary characteristics of Frye's 
critical detachment and the educated imagination.
If I am thinking critically about the appropriate response to my boss, who 
has overlooked my contributions to a major project, I might imagine different 
responses, which may be as sensible as rational discourse with my boss or as 
irrational as a confrontation resulting in my quitting or being fired. When I truly 
engage in critical thinking, however, I weigh and analyze the evidence (including 
my imaginings), exploring various issues and concerns along with the ramification 
of my decisions. This process may not necessarily yield a simple or single 
solution (or even a solution that I might have been anticipating), but it may lead to 
an ill advised decision - one detrimental to me or my boss. I then may return to 
the imagining process to envision how I might handle the encounter with my boss 
and the reactions she might have. The critical and imaginative elements, therefore, 
operate in a dialectical fashion in critical thinking to move us to another level of 
understanding of the problem.
Re-educating the Imagination
In spite of imagination's education by virtue of its presence and use in
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critical thinking, we would be naive to assume that everyone could or would 
engage in such critical thinking any more than they would engage in the detached 
approach of the educated imagination. I believe it important, however, that we 
acknowledge the barriers to the type of critical thinking I am proposing in this 
dissertation if we hope to make it a real experience in the lives of young people.
Bogdan suggests a whole segment of our population - those who have been 
disenfranchised in some way - are unable to accept the basic tenets of the educated 
imagination. For them responding to the imagination in a critical detached way 
only reinforces their disenfranchised status. For women, for example, reading a 
work of literature featuring characters who are sexist and attempting to maintain 
critical detachment during the reading may be regarded as tacit acceptance of such 
an attitude.
Thus, Bogdan addresses these dangers by introducing the notion of a 
reeducated imagination. If we succumb to these problems, we tend to feel self­
alienated by the imaginative work - literature - we read, cannot identify with the 
imaginative work because we are outside of the power structure which dictates the 
milieu of the literature, and are unable to engage in a response to literature because 
of the context or location in which the literature is read. Bogdan calls these 
problems feeling, power, and location.
Bogdan (1992) suggests that, for certain readers, it is necessary to deal with 
the needs of the disenfranchised before responding to a work of literature. 
Addressing the feeling problem requires responding to a work of literature because 
of some objectionable aspect of it. Responding negatively or objecting to such a 
work of literature (to acknowledging the feelings toward it) liberates and enables 
the reader to construct her own literature, her own story, and her own responses 
(rather than the stock responses, which she may initially use). The power 
differential comes because of the awkward, bewildered, outsider status of various
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groups (people who must come to terms with their outsider status by reading the 
literature of those who are members of the mainstream culture and context). The 
disenfranchised must search for their own authors and authorship both in the past 
and present; reinterpret existing imaginative works, as Toni Morrison (1992) does 
in Playing in the Dark: and play with the language to enable it to fit the reality of 
their lives. Sometimes, they must reject the work of literature because it 
perpetuates their psychic oppression. For the imagination to emancipate a person, 
then, for it to be transformative, we must initially be aware of the political context 
and "acknowledge patterns of dominance and control of the culture" (Bogdan, 
1992, p. 153).
We need literary engagement of the sort that Frye (1964) theorizes, but we 
must not forget the power differential and the lived experience of the reader. 
Imagination can shape "the real lives of real readers" (p. 161). We can educate the 
imagination but not exclusively through critical response since it leads to 
detachment and a separation of thought and feeling.
Critical Thinking and Re-educating the Imagination
The imagination as a dynamic in critical thinking may not be nurtured if an 
individual feels he or she is powerless in the context in which the thinking occurs. 
If I have been sexually harassed by my boss, I am going to find it self-alienating to 
detach myself from the situation in order to engage in critical thinking. A 
detached response may come later, but the appropriate response for me at the time 
may very well be personal and political. I may use my imagination to envision 
alternate ways of dealing with the issue, but I will probably find it difficult to step 
back from the context and view it dispassionately.
Although disenfranchised individuals may find it self-alienating to adopt a
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detached stance toward an imaginative work, this does not mean that these 
individuals will be unable to participate in the educated imagination. However, we 
must recognize "the developmental value education places on building individual, 
social, and political identity through identification" (Bogdan, 1992, p. 150) with an 
imaginative work for disenfranchised readers. Thus, we must forego a detached 
response to an imaginative work, but Bogdan emphasizes that this is not a 
permanent status, since she believes in the transformative qualities of literature. In 
a similar way I believe that we may need to forego the critical in critical thinking 
for a period of time in order to enable a person to gain her self-identity, but we 
may anticipate that the purpose behind such a move is only temporary and 
intended to lead her toward an educated imagination at some point.
When disenfranchised thinkers discover that a critical response places them 
in an "alien" world, which does not accept their own world, their feelings prevent 
them from engaging in critical thinking. Our feelings may inhibit our critical 
thinking when we explore issues as personal (yet as universal) as race, abortion, or 
sexual preferences. We must acknowledge individuals' feelings, then, as an 
important part of their thought processes. They need to be able to acknowledge 
their feelings about the topic and to focus on their own stories and responses in 
order to engage others and themselves in a conversation about the topic. 
Fortunately critical thinking, as developed by contemporary critical thinking 
theorists like Prawat (1991, 1993), Paul (1984, 1988, 1991), and Perkins (1986a, 
1986b, 1987, 1991), and as redesigned in this dissertation, honors both thought 
and feeling, the latter of which we may see emerging because of the imagination.
Individuals outside the power structure must think critically, as Ira Shor and 
Paulo Freire (1987) underscore in their book focusing on the transformation of 
education, but this thinking may also alienate them from their own identity. To 
have critical thinking infused with the imagination work, disenfranchised people
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must be able to focus on their disenfranchisement. They must be encouraged and 
given the freedom to acknowledge their identity as they participate in a process of 
engagement and detachment. This process may require them to be free to be more 
involved initially in order to understand themselves and the world before they try 
to envision another world and begin to immerse themselves in a dialectic between 
thought and feeling, detachment and engagement.
The location problem really focuses on the context of critical thinking. 
Thus, the context may accentuate the power differential and make individuals feel 
self-alienated or alienated from society; if they feel this way, they will not reach 
the dialectic between engagement and detachment, between feeling and thought, a 
state so important for emancipatory critical thinking. We need to create an 
environment where we respect both the intuitive and the rational, where we allow 
both to flourish without one being elevated above the other.
I add two additional (but related) problems for critical thinking infused with 
the imagination. The first is a moral problem, identified by Johnson (1971) as 
well as Frye (1964), both of whom observe a moral dimension to the imagination, 
which carries over to critical thinking. An awakened critical thinking, which 
allows us to act on a newly envisioned world and newly imagined ideas, has a 
normative feature. Not only can we educate critical thinking infused by the 
imagination, but we should educate it in order to empower our thinking.
Otherwise, critical thinking will tend to be narrow and limited, able to deal with 
analysis but less able to deal with synthesis. We should view our goal as enabling 
individuals to use critical thinking in their everyday lives (a process which 
requires us to draw together thought and emotion). We should regard this goal as a 
moral obligation, since it will enable all individuals to make better choices and to 
live cooperatively in our society for the good of all.
We may also highlight a connection problem as an important issue for
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critical thinking. We have two particular problems with connections. The first - 
one we have been exploring throughout this dissertation - we may identify as the 
connection between the imagination and critical thinking (and by implication 
connections among other mental capacities). We must allow this connection to 
emerge, if we wish to see critical thinking flourish. The second connection 
problem is social in nature. In order to realize the potential or real scope and 
power of critical thinking, we must encourage a social atmosphere, in which 
young people can interact during the thinking process. Akin to the development of 
a community of thinkers or inquirers so prominently identified by researchers and 
philosophers like Rexford Brown (1991), Lauren Resnick (1987), and John Dewey 
(1933), this second connection allows critical thinking to be a thinking process 
that incorporates reason, memory, perception, and emotions.
Enhancing Critical Thinking & Overcoming the Negative Imagination
In the Shakespearean play, Othello, we observe the intertwining of three 
central characters - Othello, Iago, and Desdemona. Othello wins the hand of 
Desdemona, but alienates Iago by promoting a young man instead of him. In 
Iago's attempts to dole out vengeance, he instills jealousy and suspicion in Othello 
about Desdemona. In his jealousy, Othello smothers Desdemona. When he 
discovers how wrong he has been about her, he commits suicide. What is so 
striking about Shakespeare's tale is the extent to which the imagination can have a 
negative impact on a person's life and mind. Iago plants the seeds of suspicion and 
doubt about Desdemona, but it is Othello's imagination that leads him to destroy 
his wife's life and eventually his own.
This story illustrates only one of many negative uses of the imagination. In 
this chapter we have considered three examples. Samuel Johnson (1971) relates
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the tale of a young man named Rasselas, who is journeying toward adulthood and 
discovering how dangerous the imagination can be for the psyche and the 
development of a young person to adulthood. Toni Morrison (1992) shows us how 
the imagination can be used to construct an Africanist presence in literature that 
shapes our understanding of whiteness and relegates the black image to 
stereotypes. Finally, Deanne Bogdan (1992) highlights the problems of the 
imagination in efforts to educate and reeducate the imagination for those who, like 
women, are disenfranchised.
Each of the above authors seeks remedies for the ill effects and injurious 
uses of the imagination. Johnson (1971) advocates fostering reason to suppress 
the imagination. Morrison (1992) encourages readers to acknowledge the 
fabrication of African American and white characters in order to appreciate the 
richness of our literature - by implication, to face the demons of our society 
created by the imagination. Bogdan (1992) suggests that we deal with the 
negative impact of the imagination, especially on those who are disenfranchised, 
by addressing the needs of the individuals involved. Those who have such needs 
refuse to "analyze, delay gratification, accept bewilderment, defer moral judgment, 
engage aesthetic complexity, embrace a broad perspective, or negotiate multiple 
points of view" (p. 140) - all aspects of Frye's notion of the educated imagination. 
If we are aware of the feeling, power, and location problems, all of which can 
contribute to a needful situation, we acknowledge that "problematizing the 
problem is better than thinking it a simple matter" (p. 152). The complexity can 
be transformative if we "acknowledge patterns of dominance and control of the 
culture and provide for recognition of those patterns as part of its educational 
mandate" (p. 153). We do this by involving "the critical reading of existing texts" 
(p. 153) or possibly "calling a text out of existence for a while to make way for 
new growth" (p. 153).
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What links all of these remedies is education. Johnson (1971) is more 
likely to focus on the educating of reason, as we have seen in our discussion of 
Rasselas - encouraging young people to separate thoughts from feelings and to 
focus on the mind's awareness of reality rather than fantasies which move us from 
reality. Both Morrison (1992) and Bogdan (1992), as well as Frye (1964), explore 
the educating of the imagination. In each case the author believes that the 
imagination has negative tendencies that debilitate rather than elevate the human 
spirit. The trick for both of them is to turn the imagination around so that it will be 
more elevating. They enable this reversal by facing the problems that shape a 
negative imagination and revealing an imagination that constructs a more complex 
process and product. The educating comes when we acknowledge the complexity 
of the imaginative process and product - a complexity which incorporates the 
needs of both the dominant and disenfranchised individuals in our society, is 
allowed to exist rather than be reduced to simple images, and guides the 
imagination's operation in our daily lives.
As the imagination operates in critical thinking, we use the imagination's 
sense of becoming to influence critical thinking, if the imagination is given the 
opportunity. When we imagine, this sense of becoming provides the imagination 
with energy and deters static thinking; we envision something different. When a 
person decides on what job to apply for, he or she goes through a process of 
engagement and detachment, reflecting on the types of jobs he or she is interested 
in, envisioning himself or herself doing certain jobs, generating a number of 
possible job options, analyzing the pros and cons of one job over another, and 
selecting the job to apply for. Each image of the job can be more illuminating than 
the previous one and contributes to the sense of becoming that will result in a job 
choice based on the envisaging of multiple possibilities. That sense of becoming 
which the imagination enables us to engage in during the critical thinking process
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keeps the process going and continues even after the process has ceased.
The critical thinking I have been portraying in this dissertation can benefit 
from the kind of educating I have been examining in this chapter, especially since 
the negative as well as the positive elements of the imagination can affect critical 
thinking. The negative impact of the imagination is somewhat minimized, 
however, when we allow this capacity to operate with other mental capacities.
The interaction of various capacities more closely resembles the kind of operations 
that take place when we think critically in everyday situations. Thus, Johnson 
(1971) may offer insights into the relationship between the imagination and 
reason, although his attempt to use reason to suppress the imagination tends to be 
unnatural. Nevertheless, if we accept the validity of efforts to obtain some kind of 
balance (perhaps more evident in Wordsworth's views about the relationship 
between the imagination and reason than Johnson's), we will want to seek ways to 
foster that balance and even integration. Johnson offers valuable clues when he 
focuses on the role of socializing. For Johnson the social context enhances the 
capacity to reason and controls the imaginative tendencies of young people. If we 
allow our mental capacities to develop in a social context, we will likely reconcile 
dualities. All of this is consistent with the implications of the theories about the 
development of thinking by fostering a community of thinkers like the one 
described by Brown (1991) and Resnick (1987). The affective qualities of 
dispositions are often developed in the context of a community. We see in the 
imagination the encouragement of certain dispositions that parallel some found in 
Paul's views of critical thinking.
Focusing on the problems inherent in Frye's conception of the educated 
imagination, Bogdan (1992) also identifies certain dispositions or habits of mind 
especially important in the development of thinking individuals. When we 
encourage individuals to respond in a detached and critical way to a product of the
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imagination, we foster an analytical disposition. We also develop a disposition of 
openmindedness when we encourage an individual to imagine another person's 
perspective - to empathize with that person, including his or her "danger zones" 
(Morrison, 1992, p. 4) - in order to see alternatives and possibilities in situations. 
The development of dispositions like openmindedness and empathy is one of the 
by-products of educating the imagination.
The purpose of educating the imagination at the very least is to enable the 
thinker to acknowledge and deal with complexity rather than reduce ideas to 
simple solutions. The multiple possibilities Casey (1976) associates with the 
imagination and I have attempted to link with critical thinking encourage us to 
hold complexities in order to avoid simplistic solutions and inadequate critical 
thinking products. When we "familiarize the strange and mystify the familiar" 
(Morrison, 1992, p. 15), we are revealing diverse possibilities that contribute to the 
complexity of our thinking. Allowing for such complexity ultimately leads to a 
more satisfactory conclusion to the critical thinking process because we can 
construct richer, more meaningful contexts for the problems or issues we are 
trying to resolve.
Conclusion
We come closer to recognizing the true nature of the imagination when we 
acknowledge its potential for negative as well as positive effects on our minds and 
lives. In this chapter I have focused on the negative aspects of the imagination. In 
each case we can see how these problems affect critical thinking. As we finally 
draw together the various observations made during the last three chapters, we 
must recognize and address those forces that undermine the thinking process in
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order to nurture a critical thinking process that fosters a constructive, possibilizing, 
sensuous and nonsensuous, creative imagination. The imagination has much 
potential as a capacity if it remains unfettered and responsive to our needs, 
especially while we are engaged in thinking critically. Ultimately what we hope 
will become of the imagination as it operates in critical thinking will be the 
imagination's being "transposed from the order of words to the dailiness of life" 
(Bogdan, 1992, p. 299), so that we are continually disposed to think and imagine 




Ms. Alsop thought Katrina an extraordinary thinker. In her English class 
Katrina was able to analyze a problem, issue, or belief and offer a solution. What 
struck Ms. Alsop was how Katrina drew from her inner self to discover 
alternatives. She accepted a challenge, analyzed it, reflected on it, explored it with 
her friends, and offered alternative proposals fo r  meeting the challenge. This was 
not a dispassionate process, since she was passionate about the thinking process 
and believed in critical thinking to solve problems and address issues in every 
aspect o f her life. She was seldom reticent to react emotionally to an issue, but 
Ms. Alsop always knew that this was part o f her thinking process. Occasionally 
Katrina and one o f her friends would enact scenarios in which they would look at 
different situations in which a problem might exist. Katrina continually amazed 
Ms. Alsop, because she was able to visualize a myriad o f alternate solutions to a 
single problem.
Not only did Katrina have the ability to think critically, but she also had the 
inclination. Ms. Alsop saw her use similar techniques at student senate meetings. 
She had a habit o f recognizing a problem or issue, reflecting on it, and posing 
alternate solutions that often made sense to everyone. Once, when the principal 
asked members o f the student senate to make a recommendation on the issue o f 
chronic tardiness, Katrina encouraged her peers to imagine themselves in the 
mind o f a student who had a serious problem with tardiness. She led the student 
senate members on a journey through this student's mind to discover the reasons
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fo r  his actions and the consequences o f those actions. This process o f empathizing 
sparked various responses from students, who eventually developed a 
recommendation that the faculty and administration adopted as a policy.
Another o f Ms. Alsop's students, Brian, did not have the same facility.
When presented with a problem, issue, or situation, he struggled to find  a solution 
because he lacked the tools to solve it. Ms. Alsop was also at a loss about how to 
instill critical thinking abilities in him. She tried to create a classroom 
environment in which students could explore, discover, analyze, and imagine. In 
this environment Katrina flourished, but Brian did not. She suggested strategies 
fo r  Brian to try and even asked Katrina to help, but he continued to struggle. 
Brian's inability to grasp critical thinking strategies frustrated Ms. Alsop.
A talented artist, Brian could capture the feeling o f a subject or object he 
was painting. He particularly liked to work in the medium o f pen and ink, 
sketching fanciful scenes o f a futuristic world, drawing caricatures o f teachers and 
friends, and creating realistic portraits o f individuals. Ms. Alsop wondered if  
Brian's creative and imaginative abilities might help him to develop his critical 
thinking abilities. She encouraged him to sketch his vision o f problems she 
presented and then to share the renderings with a group o f classmates. In one 
instance in particular she asked students to complete a critical analysis o f the gun 
control issue fo r  a panel discussion the following week. Brian was asked to 
develop a case both fo r  and against gun control in his drawings. Ms. Alsop did 
not know how this exercise would work; however, she hoped fo r  success, since 
Brian seemed to accept the task with enthusiasm. The next day Brian brought in a 
series o f sketched images on the uses and abuses o f guns. Some were humorous 
and others were realistic. All focused on this difficult topic and demonstrated 
Brian's ability to think through a medium other than speech and writing. He 
explained sketches to the group, a process which ignited many questions which
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Brian attempted to answer. Through interactions with his classmates, who 
referred to the sketches and then offered their reflections, he and the other students 
began to develop alternative visions to address the situation and solve the 
problem. Although Brian never became an adept thinker and problem solver 
during his high school years, he began to use his painting and interacted with 
friends to address issues as he had to face them.
Admittedly most o f Ms. Alsop's students had the ability to think critically, if  
the conditions and the context allowed. Generally, however, their capabilities to 
engage in critical thinking varied. She discovered from each o f them differing 
ways to think critically and to approach a problem. Katrina thought more 
holistically than Brian. She drew from the analytical characteristics o f reason, but 
she was also able to evoke the imagination to conjure emotions and consider 
possible solutions or conclusions to the critical thinking process. Katrina realized 
that our minds want to settle fo r  dualistic thinking because such thinking is simple 
and less challenging and encourages stability and comfort. Consciously she 
strove to suspend the either/or tendencies and to hold contradictory views and 
ideas fo r  as long as possible during the critical thinking process. An 
extraordinary individual Katrina had the potential to solve some o f the more 
challenging problems she faced in both academic and non-academic settings - 
challenges that her peers and her teachers expected her to face and attempt to 
solve.
Brian was more typical o f the students Ms. Alsop taught. His critical 
thinking abilities were limited, but he had artistic ability which proved 
advantageous in encouraging critical thinking. Many o f his friends did not have 
this background, so Ms. Alsop constantly tried to discover avenues to improve the 
students' thinking through acting or reading or writing. Eventually she began to 
realize that she needed to cultivate the imagination in the context o f critical
148
thinking i f  she hoped to free students' minds so that they would use them more 
effectively and critically. She sought ways o f engaging students' imaginations to 
encourage them to use their critical thinking abilities. She was able to make some 
gains with Brian by sanctioning his use o f the imagination as an entry way to 
encourage him to think critically.
Although we frequently assume that critical thinking means using our 
reasoning powers, some people exercise their imagination regularly during the 
critical thinking process. Katrina tended to reason initially (that is to say, to 
analyze and construct an argument), even though she was such a well rounded 
thinker that she used capacities like the imagination, memory, and perception as 
well as reason throughout the critical thinking process to successfully meet the 
goals she set fo r  herself, while remaining open to possibilities that might take her 
in alternate directions. Brian needed to use the imagination to spark his creative 
thinking, although he needed the social support and prodding o f a community o f 
learners to enable the imagination to lead to critical thought. Both Katrina and 
Brian integrated various mental processes to varying degrees, often by allowing 
the imagination to play a more prominent role in our thinking.
The dialectic of freedom Greene (1988) proposes may inform our 
understanding of the role of imagination in critical thinking that Katrina uses so 
effectively, since imagination needs freedom in order to operate fully as a dynamic 
in critical thinking. Freeing the imagination demands acknowledging the 
obstacles, in this case the long history of relegating the imagination to a role 
subservient to reason and regarding imagination as dangerous. The imagination 
has tended to suffer from the either/or syndrome that Greene wants to "break 
through" in order to allow freedom to emerge. Since critical thinking is often 
equated with reason, the operation of the mind that is generally set in opposition to 
it is the imagination. Like so many either/or tensions, the general solution to
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resolving it in Western thought has been to assert one aspect dominant and the 
other subordinate. In this dissertation we have acknowledged obstacles to the free 
operation of the imagination and have tried to envision an imagination not set in 
opposition to critical thinking but in fact an integral part of it.
In this chapter I offer my own conception of critical thinking, which I call 
integrative critical thinking, that employs the imagination to affect and, at times, to 
transform our thinking. As I construct my conception, I will also explore the 
power of the imagination to liberate the vision and hence the minds of oppressed 
people - a freeing capacity which, I believe, transfers to critical thinking. In order 
to utilize this capacity in critical thinking, however, theorists and practitioners 
must avoid fragmenting the various approaches to critical thinking - knowledge, 
skills, and dispositions, merging the three into an organic whole. Freed by the 
imagination, critical thinking in actuality may be better equipped than imagination 
by itself to effect social and individual change and transformation. This re­
formed critical thinking will not only free the mind, but enable individuals to act 
on their vision.
The Focus of this Dissertation
I have contended in this dissertation that the imagination is a dynamic in 
current conceptions of critical thinking. I have supported this contention by 
highlighting the features of some of the powerful contemporary conceptions of 
critical thinking and then linking the features of the imagination as conceived by 
philosophers and revealed by literary writers to some of the characteristics of 
critical thinking conceptions. Although these conceptions may be undermined by 
the negative elements of the imagination, the imagination can have a powerful 
influence on critical thinking if we are willing to focus on the education of
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imagination as explored in the last chapter.
I build the case for the imagination as a dynamic in critical thinking 
because I believe that critical thinking theorists, despite their efforts to expand 
conceptions of critical thinking to include much more than logic and 
argumentation, have been remiss in ignoring the latent power of the imagination to 
ignite the passion of critical thinking. I would suggest that it is this passion that 
will entice young people like Katrina and Brian to engage in critical thinking not 
only in an academic setting but also in their daily lives. In this dissertation the 
imagination has been variously described as: initiating creativity; providing a 
catalyst for ideas; creating the capacity for constructing multiple possibilities; 
aiding in the apprehension of the perspectives of others and the imagining of 
conversations among perspectives (including one's own); evoking emotions; 
promoting self-reflection; allowing for one to envision the ends and the means to 
reach those ends; and, finally, constructing a new whole from parts. The 
imagination is often viewed as sensuous; we imagine seeing a farm scene, hearing 
the ducks quacking on the pond, smelling the grain in a bin in the barn. When we 
talk about seeing in the mind's eye, we imagine using the sense of sight. 
Nonsensuous imagination is not traditional and therefore is regarded with 
skepticism by some, because it accepts the possibility of an imagination not 
defined and confined by our senses. I believe that, when I am envisaging the 
language to describe the operation of the imagination in critical thinking, I am 
appealing to nonsensuous imagining. This conception of the imagination is 
important to this dissertation because it allows us to see how ideas can be 




I have adopted the phrase "integrative critical thinking" to describe the kind 
of thinking I am proposing in this dissertation. I particularly emphasize critical 
thinking's integrative nature to contrast it with traditional critical thinking 
conceptions which, for better or worse, are associated more with separating and 
analyzing parts without necessarily emphasizing the shaping of those parts into a 
whole. By admitting a role for the imagination, I am implicitly accepting critical 
thinking as an integrative process. It is enabled by an imagination that generates a 
variety of possible avenues for our thinking and our conclusions, evokes emotions 
held in creative tension with reason, projects a conclusion (or conclusions) to one's 
thought process and the means to reach conclusions, and allows for creativity.
Integrative critical thinking is still characterized by criticism, judgment, and 
the evaluation of evidence and claims. The goal of this critical thinking is 
integrative in the sense that the critical component is intended to lead to a solution 
or belief or conclusion greater than the sum of its parts. Critical thinking 
integrates the traditional approaches of logic and argumentation with the newer 
approaches which acknowledge that critical thinking occurs in a social context and 
is influenced by and is an integral part of the dynamics that constitute that context. 
In its most powerful role critical thinking is an integral part of the complete person 
and the society in which he or she lives.
Non-integrative critical thinking tends to focus on the criticism and 
evaluation of the parts of an argument. Such thinking does not take into account 
the context of thinking nor does it encourage critical thinkers to be themselves 
integrative - to see the parts of the argument as leading to a greater contextual 
whole. This contextual whole includes the criticism and evaluation of the parts 
but also incorporates the emotional impact of the argument on the individual, the
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willingness to draw from other capacities such as the perception and memory to 
bolster the argument, and the integration of imagination into the critical thinking 
process in order to envisage possible solutions to the argument and various means 
to reach the solutions. Students trained to be non-integrative equate critical 
thinking with one conception of thinking (for example, the evaluation of 
statements and arguments) and draw sharp distinctions between this function and 
others, thus encouraging in them a tendency to eschew the use of the imagination 
and other capacities when they address a critical thinking issue.
Moving Toward the Integration of the Three Approaches to Critical Thinking
Integrative critical thinking does not tolerate the separation of critical 
thinking approaches - mainly because the separations are artificial. When we 
teach critical thinking, we should not say that teaching the subject matter 
effectively is adequate for instilling critical thinking in students any more than 
extracting skills for instruction or creating a climate that fosters critical thinking 
dispositions is satisfactory. In reality, these three distinct approaches are actually 
parts of a single approach in an integrative conception of critical thinking.
The imagination operating among the approaches activates the mind to 
envision, synthesize, and integrate. We may begin our critical thinking with 
reason assessment using logical or subject-specific principles which "warrant 
beliefs, claims and actions properly" (Siegel, 1988, p. 34), but, if we wish to open 
ourselves to allow the mind to operate fully, if we hope to free the mind to 
imagine, then our reasons for beliefs, claims, and actions will often take our 
critical thinking journey far afield from simply observing the fallacies of certain 
types of thinking to interconnect knowledge, skills, and dispositions (a process 
which we observed in Katrina's critical thinking).
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In looking at an example of critical thinking, we will notice the role of the 
imagination as it operates in an example of critical thinking. Let us say that we 
have a general belief, which prompts a claim, that we can eliminate the problem of 
students dropping out of our schools. We accumulate information on the drop-out 
rate from various sources (including speaking to authorities on the subject, school 
officials, and young people who have left school). Through the process we 
develop a powerful knowledge base, which evolves while critically assessing the 
information and the logic of our reasoning. If we try to suppress the imagination 
in this process, then we do not move beyond the accumulation of knowledge and 
the implementation of a plan that does not get at the root causes of the problem. If 
we allow the imagination the freedom to operate in critical thinking, then in the 
process of accumulating knowledge and assessing the reasons for our claims we 
open ourselves to and often consciously engage in envisioning how this 
information fits into the puzzle of the drop-out problem. This imaginative process 
prompts us to use our knowledge differently, to synthesize information in a way 
not envisioned when the problem was first constructed, and to return to assessing 
our reasons for new contentions or claims evolving from this process. During the 
process we envision the reality of other individuals affected by the drop-out 
problem - the school officials, our politicians, parents of dropouts, and especially 
students themselves. This form of empathy is similar to Paul's focus on exploring 
other individual's perspectives as part of the dialectic and dialogic approach he 
advocates for critical thinking (Paul, 1984, 1990). In fact, it is this process which 
Paul most specifically connects with the imagination. Ultimately this process 
leads to the emergence of the emotional, which may need to become a temporary 
focus because of its importance in getting the whole picture before making a 
decision or solving a problem. This process may result in our imagining an 
alternate solution (or alternate solutions) very different from the present methods
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of solving the problem. We may then analyze and visualize the steps needed to 
move from the present situation to an envisioned ideal solution.
Maxine Greene's Dialectic
Maxine Greene (1988) also recognizes the inadequacies of our traditional 
ways of thinking that separate. Although she specifically theorizes about a 
dialectic of freedom, she provides a model that is useful in talking about the 
integration of various critical thinking approaches. She uses the words "opening" 
and "spaces" metaphorically to suggest a process of discovery and a place in the 
mind where the dualities exist simultaneously and operate together to transform 
the world. She acknowledges dualistic or separated thinking in our thought 
processes and interweaves the notion of dialectic to address the tension she 
perceives as inherent in our thought process - to "break through, whenever 
possible, the persisting either/ors" (p. 8). We cannot ignore the tension that exists 
between the two aspects of a duality (or the multiple aspects of approaches), 
because they will exist even when we find the space to hold them together. To 
Greene the either/or contrasts, which our society tends to regard as opposites, 
actually have a "dialectic relation," which result in spaces created through a 
mediation - "something that occurs between nature and culture, work and action, 
technologies and human minds" (p. 8) - or dialogue, which creates conditions 
where students "can take initiatives and uncover humanizing possibilities" (p. 13). 
To overcome obstacles we must recognize and name them, to perceive the 
resistances, thus bringing them into our consciousness to discover alternatives. If 
we are unable to perceive the obstacles, "imagine a better state of things, share 
with others a project of change" (Greene, 1988, p. 9), we are doomed to "remain 
anchored and submerged" (p. 9) rather than free despite claims to the contrary.
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What emerges in Greene's thinking is a dialectic of freedom. Separations 
(like the ones among the three approaches to critical thinking instruction) create 
obstacles to our thinking and the accomplishments that accompany thinking. She 
underscores in the context of her discussion on freedom a relationship between 
freedom and the imagination. These two concepts operating interactively establish 
"the ability to make present what is absent, to summon up a condition that is not 
yet" (p. 16). In integrative critical thinking we have a sense of anticipation and the 
capacity to act on it. If the culmination of critical thinking comes from 
knowledge, it requires skills to reach it and dispositions to motivate it to go on.
The standard critical thinking approaches suffer from either/or thinking.
For example, we select either a knowledge approach or a skills approach, but one 
approach is often minimized when the other is elevated. If we follow Greene's 
contentions, we need to consider the knowledge of a subject and the skills to 
decode that knowledge in a dialectical relationship where knowledge and skills 
interact for the common purpose of solving a problem - one emerging at certain 
times and the other at other times, but neither being dismissed. Thus, i f  Alison in 
Ms. Alsop's class was thinking critically in an integrative way about the meaning 
o f the white whale in Mobv Dick, she would need to have the knowledge that 
comes from reading the novel and an understanding o f the context in which the 
whale appears. She would also need to become knowledgeable about the symbolic 
use o f whiteness and the numerous allusions (many o f them Biblical) that Melville 
uses to enrich our understanding o f the whale. To get the necessary information 
required Alison to use the skills o f analysis and evaluation as well as retrieval and 
research. Alison then had to apply the information she had retrieved through these 
skills to enlarge her knowledge base. Throughout the process, Alison used her 
imagination to envision how the information retrieved by the skills fits  into her 
knowledge about the white whale and began to imagine the pieces in a new,
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perhaps more expansive, understanding. The interaction between the knowledge 
we gain and the skills we have to use that knowledge is continual.
The Critical Thinking Context
The integrative critical thinker engages in an interactive process. The skills 
(both subject-neutral and subject-specific) involved with reason assessment are 
generally developed because of a critical spirit or attitude or disposition we have 
to engage in such assessment. And all of this reason assessment occurs in a 
context. Dewey (1916) suggests that this context should not be viewed in a 
disconnected way but should be informed by an enriched knowledge, which 
responds to connections in the world, approaching events and issues in the world 
from various angles. He believes that we "get at a new event indirectly instead of 
immediately - by invention, ingenuity, resourcefulness [all closely linked to the 
imagination]. An ideally perfect knowledge would represent such a network of 
interconnections that any past experience would offer a point of advantage from 
which to get at the problem presented in a new experience" (p. 396). The aspect of 
Dewey's theory of knowledge, which seems akin to and a part of expanded 
conceptions of critical thinking, seems to draw its energy from imagination.
In raising the level of consciousness in the mind, revitalizing the rational, 
and synthesizing apparently separate qualities, the imagination draws knowledge, 
skills, and dispositions approaches together in an interconnected way characteristic 
of integrative critical thinking. The organic whole that forms one meta-approach 
combining the three no longer sees a single approach dominating the others, but 
rather this approach encourages a dynamic in which becoming immersed in the 
context sparks the imagination to draw on certain skills and dispositions, both of 




Even if our mindset rejects the imagination in favor of reason or the 
rational, it is often difficult to escape imagination's transformative and liberatory 
role in critical thinking or philosophical thinking . Plato, for example, believes the 
ability to think in images is a lower form of thinking, the higher form a more 
abstract process of the manipulation of "pure ideas" free of the senses. 
Nevertheless, he does not dismiss a certain power inherent in the operation of the 
imagination. In Philebus Plato (1952) posits the imagination as akin to a "painter 
who draws images in the soul" (p. 624) portraying our thoughts. Plato's own 
philosophical writings belie his negative feelings about the imagination and 
demonstrate how powerful that "painter" truly is in our thought process. The 
Republic is a wonderful example of the power of the imagination, a power which 
seems to transform Plato's thought and clarify his philosophy. The image of the 
myth of the cave is one of the more famous in philosophy. By having Socrates 
envision a prisoner in a cave moving from darkness and shadows to the light of 
day, Plato depicts an allegory for education and the discovery of knowledge. It is 
a story of liberation, the vehicle of which is the creation of images. Through the 
painting of an image, Plato gives us access to his abstract ideas. In a sense it 
brings philosophical ideas into the lives of the readers. Even though Plato is 
apprehensive about the power of the imagination, its use in his works implicitly 
testifies to its transformative role.
Although few other philosophers in Western culture have created images as 
memorable and vital as Plato, they have often drawn on the imagination to 
illuminate their writing. Aristotle (1958), for example, uses the image of the
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master and slave to illustrate the relationship between reason and imagination, 
which needs to be controlled the way that a slave needs to be controlled. Hume 
(1969) draws on the image of the theater in the mind to gain insight into the way 
the mind operates. Sartre's works are suffused with images. One of the more 
famous examples in The Psychology of the Imagination (Sartre, 1966) is his 
depiction of Franconay, a female impersonator of Maurice Chevalier, whose 
impersonation can only be accepted through the imagination. This example is 
used to demonstrate that, when we imagine, we do more than simply create a 
visual image. We also capture subtle nuances that emerge from all of our other 
senses and our emotions.
Imagination even emerges in the writings of critical thinking theorists. 
Harvey Siegel (1988), for example, uses images as techniques to make his theory 
clearer and more understandable. In the chapter on "The Indoctrination 
Objection," for example, he focuses on the relationship between critical thinking 
and indoctrination. He finds this issue a particularly troublesome one to address, 
since those who wish to indoctrinate reject a role for critical thinking in one's 
thinking and certainly reject critical thinking as an educational ideal in society. To 
clarify his contention that critical thinking is not indoctrination, Siegel offers 
examples of two fictional characters - Johnny and Janie. He uses the image of 
Johnny to discuss the nature of an individual indoctrinated in such a way that he 
permanently refrains from giving justifying reasons. Janie, on the other hand, 
receives beliefs without reasons, but this state is temporary and Janie will 
eventually be open to being educated into justifying beliefs and reasons. Thus, 
Siegel is able to make a subtle, but important, distinction between indoctrination 
and "non-indoctrinative belief-inculcation" (p. 83). Once again, the imagination 
clarifies abstract thinking and underscores its value at one level as an aspect of 
critical thinking, even if we are not inclined to acknowledge a role for the
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imagination in our thinking.
The Natural Emergence of the Imagination
If imagination tends to emerge naturally during the critical thinking 
process, then we face a troublesome issue. Why do we need to argue for the 
infusion of imagination in critical thinking under these circumstances? Admittedly 
the imagination, a constant presence in our minds, is a mental operation that is 
accessible at will, as I have suggested at various points in the dissertation. It 
might be compared to the presence of a talent for playing basketball. A person 
with such a talent might be able to shoot and dribble a basketball well and inspire 
awe among his or her peers. However, the talent remains unrealized if we leave it 
at this level of development. We must be trained in the techniques of basketball 
playing and couple it with the natural talent if we hope to see the talent grow and 
reach its potential.
The imagination operates in critical thinking in a similar way. It also 
naturally emerges during the critical thinking process and enriches that process 
occasionally in spite of the thinker. It enhances our thinking and engages our 
reasoning power. For the imagination not to be impeded and unable to reach its 
full positive potential in the critical thinking process, however, it must be educated 
and nurtured. This educational process requires our recognizing the imagination's 
qualities so that we can consciously use them. We focus on the active imagination 
in this case. It includes the enmeshing of opposites and the willingness and 
openness to envision a transformed individual and society. We need to cultivate 
the imagination, not to lift it above reason or other operations of the mind but to 
make it a respected aspect of integrative critical thinking. Under these 
circumstances the imagination becomes a catalyst for our thinking and the
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synthesizing power interconnecting the various approaches to critical thinking.
The imagination in critical thinking provides the connective tissue for critical 
thinking.
What does this imagination look like when it is in operation? As we have 
seen in our discussion of the three approaches to critical thinking, knowledge, 
skills, and dispositions will interact and form a whole in a context that will allow 
the imagination to emerge and to draw them together. Our consciousness is 
heightened and continually evolves as we deal with the complexity and 
multiplicity of critical thinking problems and situations. We discover a problem or 
situation and examine it, evaluating the situation and context, imagining various 
possibilities and uncovering alternate ideas, testing the ideas and analyzing the 
results. The process constantly emphasizes interrelationships and interaction and 
always moves toward reintegration with the whole.
The Contemporary Embrace of the Liberatory Imagination
In order to fully appreciate the role of the imagination as a dynamic in 
critical thinking, it is helpful to consider its capacity to free the perspectives of 
those who believe themselves oppressed or subservient. Contemporary 
philosophers and theorists have not only recognized the power of the imagination, 
but embraced it in order potentially to transform lives as well. The wish is to 
create images that can liberate us from oppression and encourage autonomy and 
opportunity. Some philosophers and theorists believe the imagination to be a 
mental capacity paramount in their theories and the lives of the individuals they 
seek to transform and not simply a mental capacity that mediates other capacities. 
Because the imagination, although universally regarded as a powerful (if not 
dangerous) concept, has traditionally been associated with subservience and
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suppression, it has been embraced by groups traditionally oppressed in our society 
to communicate a liberating way of thinking in order to shatter the dominant white 
male culture that extols the virtues of reasoning and the rational (often associated 
with the masculine) over the imaginative and the emotional (often associated with 
the feminine).
Freire's "dissident" imagination. Few educational theorists have explored 
more extensively the effects of oppression and liberation on individuals and 
society than Paulo Freire (1969, 1973). He is particularly cognizant of the 
contradictory role of education to promote and support the dominant culture and 
yet also to enable the voices of the oppressed, of those who are often silent or 
silenced, to emerge. Through imagination, coupled with a heightened critical 
consciousness, Freire envisions this contradiction resolved in such a way that not 
only education but society may be liberated and transformed. This process begins 
through language, where students name aspects of their lives and then rename 
them in order to change them, a process which Maxine Greene (1988) echoes in 
The Dialectic of Freedom. In Freire's work with Ira Shor (1985), he and Shor 
suggest that the imagination of the dominant culture, an imagination which is 
commonly fostered in the schools, provides "many tools to shape the way people 
think about the past, present, and future" (p. 185). What is missing is a "dissident" 
imagination, one that can "anticipate a history different from the one we live in 
now" (p. 185). A liberating pedagogy demands such an imagination.
Feminist imagination. Examining the need for liberation from a different 
perspective, Karen Hansen and Ilene Philipson (1990) have edited a collection of 
essays devoted entirely to the feminist imagination, a reader that underscores 
throughout its pages the importance of images in liberating women from the 
oppression they have faced. Writing from a socialist-feminist perspective, the 
authors in this book examine the past, the present, and the future images
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developed by socialist feminists. The section on the future is particularly 
interesting, here we have explained new images for women that are designed not 
only to free them from the "totalizing visions of male power and female 
victimization" (Elayne Rapping, 1990, p. 540), but also images that capture the 
visions of feminists, who are "actively rewriting the texts of their bodies and 
societies" (Donna Haraway, 1990, p. 607). Haraway uses the myth of the cyborg 
to construct a new image for women; it is a myth about "transgressed boundaries, 
potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities that progressive people might explore 
as one part of needed political work" (p. 585). The cyborg uses writing - the 
telling and retelling of stories - to subvert the hierarchies and dualities of Western 
culture and to reinvent a world for women.
A latina imagination. Haraway's use of myth - the use of figurative 
language to envision an alternate, more liberating world - is also characteristic of 
many theorists focusing on the liberating power of imagination. Maria Lugones 
(1994) also uses imaginative analogies to define a hybrid, Latina imagination with 
liberating possibilities. She focuses on two egg analogies to explore separation - 
the separation of splitting as exemplified in the separation of the white from the 
yolk (an exercise in purity) and separation as exemplified in the making of 
mayonnaise (an exercise in impurity that results in differing degrees of 
coalescence). Both are appropriate to explain what Lugones calls mestizaje, "a 
metaphor for both impurity and resistance" (p. 459). Mestizaje is defined as 
consciousness that is ambiguous, resisting dichotomies, and residing "in the 
middle of either/or" (p. 459). Fragmentation is associated with purity (as 
exemplified in the separation of the white from the yolk), while multiplicity is 
associated with impurity (as exemplified in the constitution of mayonnaise). 
Lugones carefully examines the logic of purity, in which the individual is "a 
fiction of his [sic] own imagination" (p. 467), a fiction that others (namely, those
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who are impure and multiple) help to create in their subservient, "other" roles. 
Because the "others" don't fit into the logic of purity, because they are viewed as 
outside the unity of purity, they are subject to control. On the other hand, curdle 
separation, which is a phrase to describe the logic of impurity, resists the logic of 
control, remaining "a haphazard technique of survival as an active subject, o r .. .an 
art of resistance, metamorphosis, transformation" (p. 4). Lugones recommends 
that the Latina imagination focus on the art of resistance, which leads to 
transformation and liberation.
The Liberating Imagination and Critical Thinking
It is important to consider just how it is that the imagination can free the 
human mind to envision new ways of living. By itself it does not necessarily 
prompt us to act, but it gives us the tools to begin the process of changing and 
transforming our lives. It is the imagination acting within integrative critical 
thinking that enables us to envision a new life and to execute that vision.
The liberating and transforming power of the imagination also provides a 
means for transforming our thought processes so that we can envision ourselves 
from someone else's perspective, much in the way as Paul (1990) suggests in his 
study of critical thinking. This can help us to develop alternate habits of mind or 
ways of living, if we open our minds to multiple perspectives and possibilities and 
engage in self-reflection as we examine other perspectives. We should note, 
however, that seeing ourselves from the perspective of others is not necessarily 
liberating, if the other is the dominant culture. So, for women, seeing themselves 
from the perspective of the dominant white male culture can be oppressive; 
African Americans and Latino/as experience similar displacement when they see 
themselves from the perspective of the dominant culture. Thus, we need to take
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account of the context in which critical thinking occurs in order for individuals in 
different cultures to engage in critical thinking.
We have seen in our discussion of narrow conceptions of critical thinking 
that the primary focus in critical thinking so conceived is the analysis and 
assessment of arguments through a formal or informal logical process. That 
approach requires the recognition of fallacies and the development of logical 
counterarguments. This process tends to separate various approaches to critical 
thinking by especially focusing on certain skills of analysis. The role of emotion 
and feelings are almost totally excluded in the process.
When we allow the imagination to emerge, argument analysis and the 
assessment of reasons become less prominent (although they do not necessarily 
disappear if they are needed during the critical thinking process). The integrative 
critical thinker begins to envision alternative solutions, sometimes before and 
sometimes after the analysis of arguments. The imaginative process encourages 
him or her to draw from various parts of the mind (including the emotions). Thus, 
analysis may be necessary but it may be eclipsed by feelings and emotions or our 
memories and perceptions of the context. The more creative we allow ourselves to 
be, the more likely we will stretch critical thinking to assist us in many areas of 
our lives. If we engage in analysis, that process may stimulate images that enable 
us to make connections designed to discover alternate arguments and solutions.
Our dispositions to reflect and be openminded come to bear as we examine a 
problem or argument, as we explore the context and use our skills to address the 
issue or solve the problem.
Dissident, latina, or feminist imaginations show us the power of the 
imagination to envision alternate realities to serve as the basis of liberation. This 
process is enhanced, I believe, by entering into interactive conversation in a 
community of integrative critical thinkers. In doing so we are less likely to focus
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on only limited evaluation of arguments and more likely to attend to the larger 
context. In doing so we may revise the initial problem and generate alternative 
"solutions" for evaluation. If we assume that the imagination of the 
disenfranchised individual emphasizes multiplicity, a "both/and" rather than 
"either/or" mentality, possibilities, holism, complexity, pluralism, and connection, 
then the critical thinking developed in this study fits well with that conception. All 
of this can heighten our critical consciousness, which can construct a new vision, 
one we not only imagine but act on to make a reality.
In sum, then, we began this study by focusing on the contemporary 
conceptions of critical thinking that appear to be far more expansive than 
traditional conceptions which underscore only logic, argumentation, and 
assessment of reasons. The expanded conceptions are meant to be generative, 
creative, and constructive. Theorists who have expanded their views about critical 
thinking tend to be uncomfortable with dualities, want to draw from all approaches 
to critical thinking, are open to accepting creativity in the process, and attend to 
the social context. I concluded with an exploration of how expanded conceptions 
of critical thinking, once they acknowledge the place of the imagination in this 
form of thinking, can be liberating for the individual and potentially for society as 
well. We have reached this point through an exploration of the nature of the 
philosophical and literary imagination and by a consideration of how the 
imagination can assist in the transcending of dualities and hierarchies, which tend 
to negate a holistic perspective of our world. In the culminating chapter I will 
focus on the implications of the argument in this dissertation for curriculum 
development, teacher education, and future research.
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CHAPTER TEN 
REWARDS OF THE CRITICAL THINKING JOURNEY
If thinking is the method of intelligent learning, of "learning that employs 
and rewards mind" (Dewey, 1916, p. 180), then the journey in this dissertation has 
been one of discovering the nature of this method. The purpose of this dissertation 
has been not only to uncover a profound and vibrant conception of critical 
thinking, but also to model the "intelligent learning" that emerges from the 
thinking process. The mind is rewarded, I believe, when it is used to make 
connections which enable us to reconceive the ordinary as well as the 
extraordinary.
Toni Morrison (1992) in her monograph, Playing in the Dark, writes of her 
desire to "draw a m ap .. .of a critical geography and use that map to open as much 
space for discovery, intellectual adventure, and close exploration as did the 
original charting of the New World - without the mandate for conquest" (p. 3). 
Although the purpose of this dissertation differs from Morrison's purpose, the 
analogy is apt for this study. I have tried to draw a map for growth and discovery. 
The landscape the map depicts begins with critical thinking, which is often 
equated with reason. In contending that conceptions of critical thinking are being 
expanded and emancipated from the limitations of more traditional conceptions of 
critical thinking that emphasize logic and argumentation, I have tried to answer 
several crucial questions. Why is it necessary to expand our conceptions of 
critical thinking beyond logic and argumentation? What is the nature of those 
expanded conceptions? Can we find a motivating factor or quality of mind that
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connects these expanded conceptions?
In this dissertation I particularly focus on the imagination as a factor that 
enriches and provides vitality to expanded conceptions of critical thinking. We 
find imagination in many territories, but I concentrate on the imagination 
conceptualized by philosophers and writers. They point out qualities of the 
imagination similar to the qualities of thinking that characterize expanded 
conceptions of critical thinking and aim for a capacity that might enable critical 
thinking to be a more powerful and useful way of thinking in everyday life 
situations. The map converges on a redesigned conception of critical thinking that 
draws together the three major approaches to critical thinking instruction (the 
knowledge, skills, and dispositions approaches) and has the potential to liberate 
our thinking and ourselves.
The intellectual adventure in search of an understanding of critical thinking, 
if pursued to its conclusion, has multiple implications. If we accept, first, that 
critical thinking truly must be expanded to make it more creative, dynamic, and 
useful for everyday thinking and, second, that imagination is an essential element 
of critical thinking enabling such expansion, then we must reexamine: 1) the 
curriculum providing the framework for introducing and fostering expanded 
conceptions of critical thinking; 2) teacher education programs designed to ensure 
that students receive practice in and an understanding of critical thinking and its 
role in various subject areas; and, finally, 3) research studies which focus on the 
nature of critical thinking infused with the imagination.
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Implications
Forming a Community of Thinkers
I have argued that the imagination tends to be fostered and educated in a 
social context. Although he focuses on methods of controlling the imagination, 
Samuel Johnson demonstrates the importance of a social context in developing the 
mind's capacities in order to create a balanced thought process. Many of the 
writers who view the imagination as a liberating consciousness suggest that the 
imagination is generated in a social context. The development of the imagination 
as a part of critical thinking, therefore, may best be fostered within a community 
of thinkers (which the teacher must establish and nourish). This is not new to the 
literature on critical thinking (see Brown, 1991), but the development of such a 
community of inquirers to cultivate the imagination during inquiry is novel.
Because of its novelty and its importance, we need to establish teacher 
preparation programs that model such communities and that train young teachers 
to introduce and foster them in classrooms. It means emphasizing yet again with 
interns as well as veteran teachers the significance of having the teacher's role not 
be only a deliverer of information but a facilitator of the thought process. The 
teacher needs to learn to become sensitive to the dialectic inherent in critical 
thinking and to recognize when to focus on the imagination and when to downplay 
it, when to highlight skills and when to keep them submerged, when to focus on 
the acquisition of content and when to enable the process to overshadow specific 
content.
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The Effects of Curriculum Orientations on Critical Thinking Instruction
At the teacher preparation level this will require the prospective teacher to 
critically appraise various curriculum approaches or choices that propose 
expanded conceptions of critical thinking. What we must do is refocus the 
curriculum to encourage a critical thinking that is infused with imagination - to 
acknowledge the importance of academic content not for the purpose of 
disseminating knowledge but rather for engaging students in an interactive 
dialogue to construct meaning. The curriculum will need to be more fluid than 
controlled in order to allow the imagination to operate actively and dynamically 
for individual growth and for the development of social consciousness.
This refocused curriculum encouraging critical thinking infused with the 
imagination assumes the educability of the imagination as part of the process of 
educating in critical thinking. That educating process is not static or linear, but 
evolves as the needs of the young person learning to think critically become 
evident. Although the curriculum should continually emphasize the dynamic 
interaction (or dialectic, if you will) between the imagination and reason, there 
may be times when the teacher will focus on encouraging the imagination to 
emerge and even to dominate in order to cultivate that side of critical thinking, 
while at other times he or she may emphasize logic and argumentation.
Ms. Alsop's perspective on curriculum development changed during her 
years as a teacher. Early in her career she would probably have been described 
as an academic rationalist, who believed in cultural transmission through the 
study o f literature. At this period o f her career she regarded an emphasis on 
cognitive development as weak and unchallenging fo r  students. Her critical 
thinking instruction tended not to be overt, because she thought students learned 
to think critically by studying challenging literature. Although she never entirely
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abandoned aspects o f that belief during her career, she did move more toward a 
cognitive development perspective, especially as she expanded her conception o f  
critical thinking to incorporate more o f the affective and imaginative. As she 
uncovered a role fo r  the imagination in critical thinking, she also began to observe 
a social reform function fo r  the curriculum and tried to foster it among her 
students in a community conducive to thinking. Ms. Alsop, then, began to view the 
curriculum development process with critical thinking at its core as a multifaceted 
process that enabled students to interact with each other and with texts to discover 
themselves as individuals and social beings.
Within an inquiring community, we must attend to some of the curriculum 
issues mentioned above. If we are emphasizing a changing role for the teacher 
from a transmitter of knowledge to a facilitator enabling the students to uncover 
and/or construct knowledge, then the emphasis of our engagement in the 
curriculum will shift from coverage of material to an in-depth examination and 
exploration of it. Again, this is not new to the critical thinking arena, but it 
becomes even more imperative as we uncover the imagination in critical thinking. 
It will take time for the imagination to emerge and interact with critical thinking 
processes. It will require providing opportunities for students to imaginatively 
explore topics and problems through the reading of literature, an investigation of 
art, the writing of creative explorations designed to address a particular situation, 
and the engagement in dialogue and conversation, in which conjecturing and 
envisioning are encouraged. Although "covering the material does not necessarily 
preclude students becoming actively engaged in the learning process, if we spend 
time "covering the material," we have fewer opportunities to think critically and 
certainly no chance for the imagination to be fostered in such a way that our 
consciousness may grow and blossom. A coverage approach tends to encourage a 
teacher delivery method in order to ensure that the class covers a set amount of
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material. If we want to foster critical thinking (with the powerful imaginative 
quality in it) and to build a community to allow for the fostering, then we need to 
sacrifice coverage; we need to delve deeply into material and view it from various 
rational and imaginative perspectives.
Preservice Critical Thinking Instruction
In order for these shifts to be implemented in the classroom, it is necessary 
to change the mindset of the teacher. Although some of this may be effected 
through an ongoing inservice program in the schools, the greater impact will be 
made by changing the mindsets of prospective teachers. To do this we need to 
educate preservice teachers about the nature of critical thinking, the various 
approaches to this activity, and the role of the imagination in it. Most students 
have not been exposed to the critical thinking landscape and have little 
background knowledge to understand the rationale behind different critical 
thinking approaches.
Once the students have been introduced to critical thinking theories, it is 
then necessary to consider how the imagination operates in critical thinking, what 
it does to generate ideas and ignite leaps of judgment. In integrative critical 
thinking students observe not only how the imagination is used during the critical 
thinking process but also how it enables the critical thinker to integrate various 
ideas and utilize other mental capacities (like perception, memory, and intellect). 
Students consider problems and issues, which critical thinking enables us to 
resolve. They focus on aspects of the problem and related issues in order to intuit 
the entire terrain in which the problem may be found. They spend some time as 
individuals and as a group envisioning alternative solutions and outlining them 
without assuming that any of them are too trivial or ridiculous. At some point they
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engage in a more active reasoning process, where they develop arguments to 
support certain alternatives. The imagination comes into play as the students try to 
envision individuals living out the solutions and dealing with the consequences of 
a decision. Through this enterprise it is imperative to recognize the emotions and 
feelings, which Wamock suggests the imagination plays a role in eliciting. The 
imagination may be framed by a more rational thought process, but the emotions 
should be an acknowledged part of critical thinking and the curriculum, even when 
the rational seems to dominate.
The problems of the imagination. At some point critical thinking 
curriculum and instruction must address the problems Bogdan identifies in her 
examination of the imagination. While Bogdan (1992) argues that these problems 
need to be attended to in the context of the imaginative products of literature, I 
contend that they appropriately can be regarded as problems in critical thinking as 
well, because of the role that I envision the imagination playing in critical 
thinking. The implications for curriculum and instruction and teacher preparation 
programs may be identified as a process of sensitizing present and prospective 
teachers to the metaproblem and incorporating it into their curriculum plans. For 
young people this means exploring the metaproblem in the community of thinkers 
- to work with students to justify the dialectic of critical thinking and to recognize 
the value of the imaginative element to the overall critical thinking process. This 
should be an ongoing process, since justification will constantly be an issue for 
those who are skeptical or unknowledgeable about a critical thinking infused with 
the imagination.
During the process the way we encourage students to respond may draw 
students into the critical thinking process or discourage them from engaging in it. 
Frye (1964) believes that a reader must respond to a work of the imagination in a 
detached and critical way in order to transcend stock reponses and begin to make
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connections. The ideal response for critical thinking, as I have suggested, would 
be of a dialectical nature, in which a thinker alternates between actively, 
imaginatively, and personally engaging in the critical thinking topic and detaching 
himself or herself in a more critical response. For preservice and inservice 
programs this dialectic needs to be modeled for students and teachers must 
understand it from the inside by operating in an environment in which adults 
engage in the dialectic to solve problems. Consequently the entire school needs to 
be structured in such a way that individuals are interacting cooperatively in order 
to address issues and solve problems. The community of thinkers, then, is more 
than individual classrooms; it includes all people in the school and, if possible, the 
wider community.
The issue of how we respond during the critical thinking process demands 
that we address other issues which Bogdan describes as problems characterized 
under the poetics of need. Preservice and inservice teachers will continually be 
teaching students who may be regarded as disenfranchised or outside the 
traditional frame of reference in society. A student's place in society should not 
preclude him or her from engaging in the critical thinking process, but such 
thinking may highlight his or her status in society. It becomes crucial for the 
prospective teacher to be aware of the problems students face as they begin to 
explore critical thinking. We might ask how a teacher handles an issue where a 
student feels he or she cannot enter a detached, critical stage of critical thinking 
because the issue being investigated affects her personally. Bogdan describes this 
problem as the feeling problem. In reality the individual may deal with the more 
emotional and personal issues before entering a dialectic in which needed critical 
reponses may be possible. This response may be complicated by a power 
differential. A student may feel threatened by an engagement in critical thinking 
because she or he perceives critical thinking as an activity of those in a more
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powerful position in society. The teacher will need to assist the student to discover 
and strengthen her own identity and source of power before she can feel fully 
comfortable in participating in a community of thinkers.
We develop and reinforce the capacity to use the imagination to free our 
minds, to envision alternatives in the world, and to act on them by fostering social 
interaction and encouraging young people to imagine alternatives to the present 
circumstances and problems they face. Once again, the process is a dialectical 
one, in which students uncover the barriers to change and discover the novel 
possibilities during the process. Occasionally the imagination will be the only part 
of our consciousness we will be able to draw from. At other times we may 
gravitate toward a more rational process of breaking down the component parts of 
the problem and analyzing them. Most times the thinker's mind will move 
seamlessly from the imagination to rationality and back again. This movement, 
however, occurs through practice, modeling, and conversing among a group of 
people who are also groping for solutions and freeing their minds to discover how 
we might live better or differently.
During this process we cannot rule out the possibility that students will 
refuse to engage in the critical thinking process, at least as we describe it here. We 
need to discover, as Ms. Alsop tried to learn, the activities that will enable these 
students to enter the conversation and think critically.
Questions to Promote Research on Integrative Critical Thinking
Many of these implications mentioned in this chapter may also suggest 
some directions for research. I offer the following focus questions for research in 
the area of integrative critical thinking:
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1) What are the best ways to accurately assess the occurrence of integrative 
critical thinking?
2) What teaching strategies best foster integrative critical thinking?
3) What barriers emerge when we ask students to do integrative critical 
thinking?
4) How can we determine whether or not students are using integrative 
critical thinking in a variety of contexts (for example, to solve their everyday 
problems)?
5) Do "good" teachers already model integrative critical thinking?
6) How do different cultural backgrounds influence the teaching and 
learning of integrative critical thinking?
Conclusion
The implications explored in this chapter evolve from the 
acknowledgement that expanded conceptions of critical thinking are not presently 
introduced in the classroom. In order to establish a critical thinking program in a 
school or a teacher education program, it is necessary to make changes in the 
school or teacher preparation program itself. The curriculum and instruction needs 
to focus more on depth than coverage and must acknowledge that the imagination 
helps to activate and energize critical thinking. In some curriculum areas such 
acknowledgement may be difficult, since the imagination is now seen as belonging 
to the domain of the arts. The science and mathematics curricula may be the most 
notable, since so much of the math and science taught in schools relies on 
processes involving logic and analytical reasoning. In these areas, as in others 
where educators are more willing to acknowledge the imagination, present and 
prospective teachers must come to understand the role that the imagination plays
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in critical thinking and how it can be fostered and developed in order to be used 
effectively. In addition, curriculum and instruction must be designed to face the 
issues that can potentially sidetrack critical thinking and the imaginative role in 
critical thinking. As we focus on a type of thinking that challenges our basic 
assumptions about ourselves and the society we live in, we make critical thinking 
a risky process, open to attack and constantly in need of an advocate. The teacher 
and other officials in the school must be the advocates for integrative critical 
thinking, and they must model it in the school and the community.
Critical thinking is necessarily a complex concept primarily because the 
mind is a complex and interactive organism. While scientists are better 
understanding how the mind works, philosophers and writers are also seeking to 
uncover the mysteries of the mind that enable us to analyze and synthesize, to 
make the leaps necessary to discover new possibilities. Although imaginative 
visions can be used to seek and find better, more imaginative ways to be 
oppressive and to exploit others, these visions have also allowed us to solve 
problems, create new inventions, discover cures for once fatal diseases, make 
improvements in the quality of life for disenfranchised individuals, and liberate a 
segment of a country's population to make them equal partners in a new 
government. Integrative critical thinking can be an empowering process. If we 
hope to see them grow and discover new possibilities for themselves, it is one we 
must foster in our young people.
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